| Internet-Draft | json-proof-algorithms | October 2025 |
| Jones, et al. | Expires 23 April 2026 | [Page] |
The JSON Proof Algorithms (JPA) specification registers cryptographic algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Proof, JSON Web Key (JWK), and COSE specifications. It defines IANA registries for these identifiers.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 April 2026.¶
Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
The JSON Web Proof (JWP) [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-proof] draft establishes a new secure container format that supports selective disclosure and unlinkability using Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) or other cryptographic algorithms.¶
Editor's Note: This draft is still early and incomplete. There will be significant changes to the algorithms as currently defined here. Please do not use any of these definitions or examples for anything except personal experimentation and learning. Contributions and feedback are welcomed at https://github.com/ietf-wg-jose/json-web-proof.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
The roles of "issuer", "holder", and "verifier" are used as defined by the VC Data Model [VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]. The term "presentation" is also used as defined by this source, but the term "credential" is avoided in this specification to minimize confusion with other definitions.¶
The terms "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", "Base64url Encoding", "Header Parameter", "JOSE Header", "JWS Payload", "JWS Signature", and "JWS Protected Header" are defined by [RFC7515].¶
The terms "JSON Web Proof (JWP)", "JWP Payload", "JWP Proof", and "JWP Header" are defined by [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-proof].¶
These terms are defined by this specification:¶
JWP defines a container binding together a Header, one or more payloads, and a cryptographic proof. It does not define any details about the interactions between an application and the cryptographic libraries that implement proof-supporting algorithms.¶
Due to the nature of ZKPs, this specification also documents the subtle but important differences in proof algorithms versus those defined by the JSON Web Algorithms [RFC7518]. These differences help support more advanced capabilities such as blinded signatures and predicate proofs.¶
The four principal interactions that every proof algorithm MUST support are issue, confirm, present, and verify.¶
The JWP is first created as the output of a JPA's issue operation.¶
Every algorithm MUST support a JSON issuer Header along with one or more octet string payloads. The algorithm MAY support using additional items provided by the holder for issuance such as blinded payloads, keys for replay prevention, etc.¶
All algorithms MUST provide integrity protection for the Issuer Header and all payloads and MUST specify all digest and/or hash2curve methods used.¶
Performed by the holder to validate that the issued JWP is correctly formed and protected.¶
Each algorithm MAY support using additional input items options, such as those sent to the issuer for issuance. After confirmation, an algorithm MAY return a modified JWP for serialized storage without the local state (such as with blinded payloads now unblinded).¶
The algorithm MUST fully verify the issued proof value against the Issuer Header and all payloads. If given a presented JWP instead of an issued one, the confirm process MUST return an error.¶
Used to apply any selective disclosure choices and perform any unlinkability transformations, as well as to show binding.¶
An algorithm MAY support additional input options from the requesting party, such as for predicate proofs and verifiable computation requests.¶
Every algorithm MUST support the ability to hide any or all payloads. It MUST always include the Issuer Header unmodified in the presentation.¶
The algorithm MUST replace the issued proof value and generate a new presented proof value. It also MUST include a new Presentation Header that provides replay protection.¶
Performed by the verifier to verify the Headers along with any disclosed payloads and/or assertions about them from the proving party, while also verifying they are the same payloads and ordering as witnessed by the issuer.¶
The algorithm MUST verify the integrity of all disclosed payloads and MUST also verify the integrity of both the Issuer and Presentation Headers.¶
If the presented proof contains any assertions about the hidden payloads, the algorithm MUST also verify all of those assertions. It MAY support additional options, such as those sent to the holder to generate the presentation.¶
If given an issued JWP for verification, the algorithm MUST return an error.¶
This section defines how to use specific algorithms for JWPs.¶
The Single Use (SU) algorithm is based on composing multiple traditional asymmetric signatures into a single JWP proof. It enables a very simple form of selective disclosure without requiring any advanced cryptographic techniques.¶
It does not support unlinkability if the same JWP is presented multiple times, therefore when privacy is required the holder will need to interact with the issuer again to receive new single-use JWPs (dynamically or in batches).¶
The Single Use algorithm uses multiple signing keys to protect the Header as well as individual payloads of an Issued JWP. The issuer uses a stable public key to sign each Header, and a per-JWP ephemeral key (conveyed within the Header) to protect the individual payloads. These signatures are all created using the same Asymmetric Algorithm, with the JOSE and COSE name/label of this algorithm being part of registration for a fully-specified Single Use algorithm identifier.¶
The Issuer Header also conveys a holder presentation key, an ephemeral asymmetric key meant to only be used for presenting a single JWP. The fully-specified algorithm the holder must use for presentations is also included. This algorithm MAY be different from the algorithm used by the issuer.¶
The chosen algorithms MUST be asymmetric signing algorithms, so that each signature can be verified without sharing any private values between the parties.¶
In order to support the protection of a presentation by a holder to a verifier, the holder MUST use a Holder Presentation Key during the issuance and the presentation of every Single Use JWP. This Holder Presentation Key MUST be generated and used for only one JWP if unlinkability is desired.¶
The issuer MUST verify that the holder has possession of this key. The holder-issuer communication to exchange this information is out of scope of this specification, but can be accomplished by the holder using this key to generate a JWS that signs a value the issuer can verify as unique.¶
The issuer MUST determine an appropriate holder presentation algorithm
corresponding to the holder presentation key. If the holder and
verifier cannot be assumed to know this algorithm is the appropriate
choice for a given holder presentation key, this value MUST be conveyed
in the hpa Issuer Header.¶
To create a Single Use JWP, the issuer first generates a unique Ephemeral Key using the selected internal algorithm. This key-pair will be used to sign each of the payloads of a single JWP and then discarded.¶
Each individual payload is signed using the selected internal algorithm using the Ephemeral Key.¶
The Issuer's Ephemeral Key MUST be included via the Issuer Ephemeral Key Header Parameter.¶
The Holder's Presentation Key MUST be included via the Holder Presentation Key Header Parameter.¶
The Holder's Presentation Algorithm MUST be included via the Holder Presentation Algorithm Header Parameter unless there is another way for the holder and verifier to unambiguously determine the appropriate algorithm to use.¶
The Issuer Header is signed using the appropriate internal signing algorithm for the given fully-specified single use algorithm, using the issuer's Stable Key.¶
Each JWP payload is processed in order and signed using the given JWA using the issuer's Ephemeral Key.¶
The proof value is an octet string array. The first entry is the octet string of the Issuer Header signature, with an additional entry for each payload signature.¶
To generate a new presentation, the holder first creates a Presentation
Header that is specific to the verifier being presented to.
This Header MUST contain a parameter that both the holder and verifier
trust as being unique and non-replayable. Use of the nonce Header
Parameter is RECOMMENDED for this purpose.¶
This specification registers the nonce Header Parameter for the
Presentation Header that contains a string value either
generated by the verifier or derived from values provided by the
verifier. When present, the verifier MUST ensure the nonce value
matches during verification.¶
The Presentation Header MAY contain other Header Parameters that are either provided by the verifier or by the holder. These Presentation Header Parameters SHOULD NOT contain values that are common across multiple presentations and SHOULD be unique to a single presentation and verifier.¶
The Presentation Header MUST contain the same Algorithm protected header as the Issuer Header. The Holder Presentation Algorithm Header Parameter MUST NOT be included.¶
The holder derives a new proof as part of presentation. The holder will also use these components to generate a presentation internal representation. The number of components depends on the number of payloads which are being disclosed in the presented JWP.¶
The first proof component will be the signature over the Issuer Header made by the issuer's Stable Key.¶
For each payload which is to be disclosed, the corresponding payload signature (from the issued JWP) is included as a subsequent proof component. If the payload is being omitted, the corresponding payload signature is omitted from the proof components.¶
The Presentation Header, Issuer Header, payload slots (distinguishing which are being disclosed) and these proof components are inputs to determine the presentation internal representation.¶
The holder's signature over the presentation internal representation (using the holder's private key and the holder presentation algorithm) is then included as one additional proof component in the final presentation.¶
For example, if only the second and fifth of five payloads are being disclosed, then the proof at this stage will consist of three values:¶
The presentation internal representation would be calculated with these three proof components, while the final presentation would have an additional fourth component containing the signature using the holder's private key.¶
Since the individual signatures in the proof value are unique and remain unchanged across multiple presentations, a Single Use JWP SHOULD only be presented a single time to each verifier in order for the holder to remain unlinkable across multiple presentations.¶
Verification is performed using the following steps.¶
The proposed JWP alg value is of the format "SU-" appended with the
relevant JWS alg value for the chosen public and ephemeral key-pair
algorithm, for example "SU-ES256".¶
Some algorithms (such as Single use and MAC) use a holder key to provide integrity over the presentation. For these algorithms, an internal binary form of the presentation must be generated both for signing by the holder, and for verification by the verifier. Other algorithms MAY use this same form for consistency.¶
The instructions for creating this binary representation will also create well-formed CBOR, although this data is not meant to be shared outside the implementing algorithm. Instead, it focuses on simplicity of generation by the holder and verifier implementations. Although CBOR has multiple representations of the same underlying information, this same octet string MUST be generated by an implementation.¶
When a length or count is added by the steps below, it is added as its
8-byte, network-ordered representation. For example, the length of a
1,234 byte payload would have a length representation of
0x00 00 00 00 00 00 04 D2.¶
The binary representation is created by appending data into a single octet string in the following order:¶
0x84 5B¶
0x5B¶
0x9B¶
For each payload representation:¶
0x9B¶
The number of proof components as specified by the algorithm¶
For each proof component, append:¶
The BBS Signature Scheme [I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures] is under active development within the CRFG.¶
This algorithm supports both selective disclosure and unlinkability, enabling the holder to generate multiple presentations from one issued JWP without a verifier being able to correlate those presentations together based on the proof.¶
The BBS algorithm corresponds to a cipher suite identifier of
BBS_BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_.¶
The key used for the BBS algorithm is an elliptic curve-based key
pair, specifically against the G_2 subgroup of a pairing friendly curve.
Additional details on key generation can be found in
Section 3.4. The JWK and Cose Key
Object representations of the key are detailed in
[I-D.ietf-cose-bls-key-representations].¶
There is no additional holder presentation key necessary for presentation proofs.¶
Issuance is performed using the Sign operation from
Section 3.5.1 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures]. This operation
utilizes the issuer's BLS12-381 G2 key pair as SK and PK, along with
desired Header octets as header, and the array of payload
octet string as messages.¶
The octets resulting from this operation form a single octet string in the issuance proof array, to be used along with the Header and payloads to serialize the JWP.¶
Holder verification of the signature on issuance form is performed using
the Verify operation from [@!I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures, section
3.5.2].¶
This operation utilizes the issuer's public key as PK, the proof as
signature, the Header octets as header and the array of
payload octets as messages.¶
Derivation of a presentation is done by the holder using the ProofGen
operation from Section 3.5.3 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures].¶
This operation utilizes the issuer's public key as PK, the Issuer
Header as header, the issuance proof as signature, the
issuance payloads as messages, and the holder's Presentation Header
as ph.¶
The operation also takes a vector of indexes into messages, describing
which payloads the holder wishes to disclose. All payloads are required
for proof generation, but only these indicated payloads will be required
to be disclosed for later proof verification.¶
The output of this operation is the presentation proof, as a single octet string.¶
Presentation serialization leverages the two Headers and
presentation proof, along with the disclosed payloads. Non-disclosed
payloads are represented with the absent value of null in CBOR
serialization and a zero-length string in compact serialization.¶
Verification of a presentation is done by the verifier using the
ProofVerify operation from [@!I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures, Section
3.5.4].¶
This operation utilizes the issuer's public key as PK, the Issuer
Header as header, the issuance proof as signature, the
holder's Presentation Header as ph, and the payloads as
disclosed_messages.¶
In addition, the disclosed_indexes scalar array is calculated from the
payloads provided. Values disclosed in the presented payloads have a
zero-based index in this array, while the indices of absent payloads are
omitted.¶
The Message Authentication Code (MAC) JPA uses a MAC to both generate ephemeral secrets and to authenticate payloads, along with an asymmetric signature to provide integrity to the issued JWP.¶
The holder can manipulate which payloads are disclosed from the issued JWP, and uses the Holder Presentation Key to create a presentation. The signature created from the Holder Presentation Key MAY use a different algorithm than the Issuer used to sign the issued form.¶
Like the Single Use algorithm family, it also does not support unlinkability if the same JWP is presented multiple times and requires an individually issued JWP for each presentation in order to fully protect privacy. When compared to the JWS approach, using a MAC requires less computation but can result in potentially larger presentation proof values.¶
The design is intentionally minimal and only involves using a single standardized MAC method instead of a mix of MAC/hash methods or a custom hash-based construct. It is able to use any published cryptographic MAC method such as HMAC [RFC2104] or KMAC. It uses traditional public key-based signatures to verify the authenticity of the issuer and holder.¶
In order to support the protection of a presentation by a holder to a verifier, the holder MUST use a Holder Presentation Key during the issuance and the presentation of every MAC JWP. This Holder Presentation Key MUST be generated and used for only one JWP if unlinkability is desired.¶
The issuer MUST verify that the holder has possession of this key. The holder-issuer communication to exchange this information is out of scope of this specification, but can be accomplished by the holder using this key to generate a JWS that signs a value the issuer can verify as unique.¶
The holder's presentation key MUST be included in the Issuer Header using the Holder Presentation Key Header Parameter.¶
The issuer MUST determine an appropriate holder presentation algorithm corresponding to the holder presentation key. If the holder and verifier cannot be assumed to know this algorithm is the appropriate choice for a given holder presentation key, this value MUST be conveyed in the Holder Protected Algorithm Header Parameter.¶
To use the MAC algorithm, the issuer must have a stable public key pair to perform signing. To start the issuance process, a single 32-byte random Shared Secret must first be generated. This value will be shared privately with the holder as part of the issuer's JWP proof value.¶
The Shared Secret is used by both the issuer and holder as the MAC method's key to generate a new set of unique ephemeral keys. These keys are then used as the input to generate a MAC that protects each payload.¶
The combined MAC representation is a single octet string representing the MAC values of the Issuer Header, along with each payload provided by the issuer. This representation is signed by the issuer, but not shared - parties will recreate this octet string and verify the signature to verify the integrity of supplied Issuer Header and the integrity of any disclosed payloads.¶
The steps below describe a sequential concatenation of binary values to generate the Combined MAC Representation. The instructions for generating this octet string will also generate well-formed CBOR, although this data is not meant to be shared outside the implementing algorithm. Instead, it focuses on simplicity of generation by the issuer, holder, and verifier implementations. Although CBOR has multiple representations of the same underlying information, this same octet string MUST be generated by an implementation.¶
When a length or count is added by steps in this section, it is added as
its 8-byte, network-ordered representation. For example, the length of
a 1,234-byte payload would have a length representation of
0x00 00 00 00 00 00 04 D2.¶
The holder will a unique key per payload value using a MAC, with the Shared Secret as the key and a generated binary value. This binary value is constructed by appending data into a single octet string:¶
The holder will also compute a corresponding MAC of each payload. This MAC uses the unique key above and the payload octet string as the value.¶
When verifying a presentation, the shared secret will be unavailable so the unique key cannot be calculated. The payload octet string may also be omitted in the presentation. The following instructions describe how to get the corresponding MAC of each payload:¶
The binary representation is created by appending data into a single octet string in the following order:¶
The Holder's Presentation Key MUST be included via the Holder Presentation Key Header Parameter.¶
The Holder's Presentation Algorithm MUST be included via the Holder Presentation Algorithm Header Parameter unless there is another way for the holder and verifier to unambiguously determine the appropriate algorithm to use.¶
The issuer proof consists of two octet strings.¶
The first octet string is the issuer signature over the combined MAC representation. The issuer signs the combined MAC representation using its stable public key, and the internal signing algorithm for the given fully-specified MAC algorithm variant.¶
The second octet string is the Shared Secret used to generate the per-payload keys for the combined representation.¶
See the Presentation Header section given for Single Use algorithms.¶
The presentation proof is made of multiple components.¶
The first proof component is the issuer signature over the Combined MAC Representation, which is provided as the first proof component from the issued form.¶
There will now be one proof component per payload slot in the issued JWP. These are used by the verifier to reconstruct the combined MAC representation without access to the Shared Secret. The proof components are calculated per the instructions used to generate the Combined MAC Representation¶
If a payload is disclosed, the corresponding proof component will be the unique key.¶
If a payload is not disclosed, the corresponding proof component will be the payload's MAC (using the unique key.)¶
The Presentation Header, Issuer Header, payload slots (distinguishing which are being disclosed) and above proof components are inputs to determine the presentation internal representation.¶
The holder's signature over the presentation internal representation (using the holder's private key and the holder presentation algorithm) is then included as one additional proof component in the final presentation.¶
The presented form should have two more proof components than payload slots in the issued JWP.¶
Note that the second component of the issued JWP is a shared secret for use by the holder to generate the unique keys used in the Combined MAC Representation. This MUST NOT be included in the presentation.¶
Verification is performed using the following steps.¶
Proposed JWP alg value is of the format "MAC-" appended with a unique
identifier for the set of MAC and signing algorithms used. Below are
the initial registrations:¶
MAC-H256 uses HMAC SHA-256 as the MAC and
ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256 for the signatures¶
MAC-H384 uses HMAC SHA-384 as the MAC and
ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384 for the signatures¶
MAC-H512 uses HMAC SHA-512 as the MAC and
ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512 for the signatures¶
MAC-K25519 uses KMAC SHAKE128 as the MAC and
EdDSA using Curve25519 for the signatures¶
MAC-K448 uses KMAC SHAKE256 as the MAC and EdDSA using Curve448
for the signatures¶
MAC-H256K uses HMAC SHA-256 as the MAC and
ECDSA using secp256k1 and SHA-256 for the signatures¶
Editor's Note: This will follow once the algorithms defined here have become more stable.¶
The following registration procedure is used for all the registries established by this specification.¶
Values are registered on a Specification Required [RFC5226] basis after a three-week review period on the jose-reg-review@ietf.org mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published.¶
Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register JWP algorithm: example").¶
Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful. Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution.¶
Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts include determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing functionality, whether it is likely to be of general applicability or useful only for a single application, and whether the registration description is clear.¶
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing list.¶
It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are able to represent the perspectives of different applications using this specification, in order to enable broadly informed review of registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other Experts.¶
This specification establishes the IANA "JSON Web Proof Algorithms"
registry for values of the JWP alg (algorithm) parameter in Header
Parameters. The registry records the algorithm name, the algorithm
description, the algorithm usage locations, the implementation
requirements, the change controller, and a reference to the
specification that defines it. The same algorithm name can be
registered multiple times, provided that the sets of usage locations are
disjoint.¶
It is suggested that the length of the key be included in the algorithm name when multiple variations of algorithms are being registered that use keys of different lengths and the key lengths for each need to be fixed (for instance, because they will be created by key derivation functions). This allows readers of the JSON text to more easily make security decisions.¶
The Designated Experts should perform reasonable due diligence that algorithms being registered either are currently considered cryptographically credible or are being registered as Deprecated or Prohibited.¶
The implementation requirements of an algorithm may be changed over time as the cryptographic landscape evolves, for instance, to change the status of an algorithm to Deprecated or to change the status of an algorithm from Optional to Recommended+ or Required. Changes of implementation requirements are only permitted on a Specification Required basis after review by the Designated Experts, with the new specification defining the revised implementation requirements level.¶
Single-Use JWP using ES256.)
Descriptive names may not match other registered names unless the
Designated Experts state that there is a compelling reason to
allow an exception.¶
SU-ES256). This label is a
case-sensitive ASCII string. JSON Labels may not match other
registered labels in a case-insensitive manner unless the
Designated Experts state that there is a compelling reason to allow
an exception.¶
1). CBOR Labels may not match
other registered labels unless the Designated Experts state that there
is a compelling reason to allow an exception.¶
Issued or Presented. Other values may be used with the
approval of a Designated Expert.¶
Required, Recommended, Optional, Deprecated, or
Prohibited. Optionally, the word can be followed by a + or -.
The use of + indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be
increased in a future version of the specification. The use of -
indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be decreased in a
future version of the specification. Any identifiers registered for
algorithms that are otherwise unsuitable for direct use as JWP
algorithms must be registered as Prohibited.¶
SU-ES256¶
SU-ES384¶
SU-ES512¶
BBS¶
BBS_BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_H2G_HM2S_¶
MAC-H256¶
MAC-H256 uses HMAC SHA-256 as the MAC, and
ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256 for the signatures¶
MAC-H384¶
MAC-H384 uses HMAC SHA-384 as the MAC, and
ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384 for the signatures¶
MAC-H512¶
MAC-H512 uses HMAC SHA-512 as the MAC, and
ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512 for the signatures¶
MAC-K25519¶
MAC-K25519 uses KMAC SHAKE128 as the MAC,
and EdDSA using Curve25519 for the signatures¶
MAC-K448¶
MAC-K448 uses KMAC SHAKE256 as the MAC, and
EdDSA using Curve448 for the signatures¶
MAC-H256K¶
MAC-H256K uses HMAC SHA-256 as the MAC, and
ECDSA using secp256k1 and SHA-256 for the signatures¶
The following examples use algorithms defined in JSON Proof Algorithms and also contain the keys used, so that implementations can validate these samples.¶
This example uses the Single-Use Algorithm as defined in JSON Proof Algorithms to create a JSON Proof Token. It demonstrates how to apply selective disclosure using an array of traditional JWS-based signatures. Unlinkability is only achieved by using each JWP one time, as multiple uses are inherently linkable via the traditional ECDSA signature embedded in the proof.¶
To begin, we need two asymmetric keys for Single Use: one that represents the JPT Issuer's stable key and the other is an ephemeral key generated by the Issuer just for this JWP.¶
This is the Issuer's stable private key used in this example in the JWK format:¶
{
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "11pcfV3eXZJvz75QoQqKcL4YsSWsas5uEkDGJ8_PIWc",
"y": "t5fONv-sMbqGNMdl1cctAMHLq5jh82S8aNaOr5cCFag",
"d": "1Rl6mjEvhRZsPlZQTa6F0nfMeClfl11vRIaDFLbNdbM"
}
This is the ephemeral private key used in this example in the JWK format:¶
{
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "DDvbfra3Pd0Yt1H0JXAA-olwSN0bmbThRAVo2YvdbV8",
"y": "TBXcK6KypTxSE9KTx27i7vsKO7uoTjQoSHY8Zufc3WY",
"d": "SM5TTEcUTXd2BAtwNDkNbiE3PCSfRvSeqwcNhjdpDkY"
}
This is the Holder's presentation private key used in this example in the JWK format:¶
{
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "HLhJ3REyN_D3QbqoSCvEr0GsmdIVapXcfLyuTbN3iO0",
"y": "zTL4FVLsrL5UJkwtcJfikX98trcvDeyvSMY5bnGDHF4",
"d": "PkePsZw2g17xI5Vtc43rC8sMcteo1AYK2Pgkw3s_DWA"
}
The Header declares that the data structure is a JPT and the JWP Proof Input is secured using the Single-Use ECDSA algorithm with the P-256 curve and SHA-256 digest. It also includes the ephemeral public key, the Holder's presentation public key and list of claims used for this JPT.¶
{
"alg": "SU-ES256",
"typ": "JPT",
"iss": "https://issuer.example",
"hpa": "ES256",
"claims": [
"iat",
"exp",
"family_name",
"given_name",
"email",
"address",
"age_over_21"
],
"iek": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "DDvbfra3Pd0Yt1H0JXAA-olwSN0bmbThRAVo2YvdbV8",
"y": "TBXcK6KypTxSE9KTx27i7vsKO7uoTjQoSHY8Zufc3WY"
},
"hpk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "HLhJ3REyN_D3QbqoSCvEr0GsmdIVapXcfLyuTbN3iO0",
"y": "zTL4FVLsrL5UJkwtcJfikX98trcvDeyvSMY5bnGDHF4"
}
}
eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpQVCIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaXNzdWVyL mV4YW1wbGUiLCJocGEiOiJFUzI1NiIsImNsYWltcyI6WyJpYXQiLCJleHAiLCJmYW1pbH lfbmFtZSIsImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCJlbWFpbCIsImFkZHJlc3MiLCJhZ2Vfb3Zlcl8yMSJ dLCJpZWsiOnsia3R5IjoiRUMiLCJjcnYiOiJQLTI1NiIsIngiOiJERHZiZnJhM1BkMFl0 MUgwSlhBQS1vbHdTTjBibWJUaFJBVm8yWXZkYlY4IiwieSI6IlRCWGNLNkt5cFR4U0U5S 1R4MjdpN3ZzS083dW9UalFvU0hZOFp1ZmMzV1kifSwiaHBrIjp7Imt0eSI6IkVDIiwiY3 J2IjoiUC0yNTYiLCJ4IjoiSExoSjNSRXlOX0QzUWJxb1NDdkVyMEdzbWRJVmFwWGNmTHl 1VGJOM2lPMCIsInkiOiJ6VEw0RlZMc3JMNVVKa3d0Y0pmaWtYOTh0cmN2RGV5dlNNWTVi bkdESEY0In19
The Single Use algorithm utilizes multiple individual JWS Signatures.
Each signature value is generated by creating a JWS with a single
Header with the associated alg value. In this example, the
fixed Header used for each JWS is the serialized JSON Object
{"alg":"ES256"}. This Header will be used to generate a
signature over each corresponding payload in the JWP. The corresponding
octet value in the proof is the octet string (base64url-decoded) value
of the signature.¶
The final proof value from the Issuer is an array with the octets of the Header signature, followed by entries for each payload signature.¶
[
1714521600,
1717199999,
"Doe",
"Jay",
"jaydoe@example.org",
{
"formatted": "1234 Main St.\nAnytown, CA 12345\nUSA",
"street_address": "1234 Main St.",
"locality": "Anytown",
"region": "CA",
"postal_code": 12345,
"country": "USA"
},
true
]
The compact serialization of the same JPT is:¶
eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpQVCIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaXNzdWVyL mV4YW1wbGUiLCJocGEiOiJFUzI1NiIsImNsYWltcyI6WyJpYXQiLCJleHAiLCJmYW1pbH lfbmFtZSIsImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCJlbWFpbCIsImFkZHJlc3MiLCJhZ2Vfb3Zlcl8yMSJ dLCJpZWsiOnsia3R5IjoiRUMiLCJjcnYiOiJQLTI1NiIsIngiOiJERHZiZnJhM1BkMFl0 MUgwSlhBQS1vbHdTTjBibWJUaFJBVm8yWXZkYlY4IiwieSI6IlRCWGNLNkt5cFR4U0U5S 1R4MjdpN3ZzS083dW9UalFvU0hZOFp1ZmMzV1kifSwiaHBrIjp7Imt0eSI6IkVDIiwiY3 J2IjoiUC0yNTYiLCJ4IjoiSExoSjNSRXlOX0QzUWJxb1NDdkVyMEdzbWRJVmFwWGNmTHl 1VGJOM2lPMCIsInkiOiJ6VEw0RlZMc3JMNVVKa3d0Y0pmaWtYOTh0cmN2RGV5dlNNWTVi bkdESEY0In19.MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~ImpheWRvZU BleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI~eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuXG5Bbnl0b3duLCB DQSAxMjM0NVxuVVNBIiwic3RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuIiwibG9j YWxpdHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI6MTIzNDUsI mNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~dHJ1ZQ.pLeTlzV1oAZItqSDnAbB8qodkTXf0CabGwrnEFgK Q0nwnzCdytWmD3wbswexnqJKyj3dGhFMxO5dTlpJzqu4uA~to1GW-gojqrA4Kp1VG6J5u UQdmgNEWYTs0JBjHiUc2z18wAqz0k-faiR-Y1huX3X9eN84WnUOO0WF8QfgKRkng~ad28 SqXiPdM9u-ce2B6w94U1FzGqARzHK9PzaVeisSGeLCwrj_mJztAofHeN9AlBlt-Ggqlcz fccUgmr9oanjg~KsS1ESq9SkheyQo9sllDvzp3IC1YeaGTpEgMCuTiXl1w4V-T4vgjWFX yn8Rpu9nJYmOZFs5YdT6uyCrP2gnXmw~JgSiUOaYTYu1Gqzc0ooSFhUBM9T_odaMoDKyl ZLf7PaCpZpIJZZXTrkMuRh5w_sowQW7AUB1isP-GEYBmoi2Lw~XUBX9_T1x2tp5t7SPz- _iYY3zxEWiupCery-hkGMwvQ4RV8xg-sQ3D4msWrE1Ge3TX0PR9Q18JMJV3FekP_toQ~q j3NYhtAhlBj3h3WuxyYhom7KmFxPIzCEJQdPlm0Tv40rd73Hs8c4VpT7_dsvC9Y5JKfJ_ ZYoYItBkZrTNbCjQ~wMrNs-7EiRfS_CwXE6R5UANdYy1OCTuvC5hai-rzCZadK3xRs1st GuyCgoVMdmyGmOYUYB2diZQN_K5PKYkkhg
To present this JPT, we first use the following Presentation Header with a nonce (provided by the Verifier):¶
{
"alg": "SU-ES256",
"aud": "https://recipient.example.com",
"nonce": "Ngramhi2zz8wt3Q0qdQkGTbY5V_ssK1c5w_fWeIBr-E"
}
eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vcmVjaXBpZW50LmV4YW1wbGUuY 29tIiwibm9uY2UiOiJOZ3JhbWhpMnp6OHd0M1EwcWRRa0dUYlk1Vl9zc0sxYzV3X2ZXZU lCci1FIn0
We apply selective disclosure of only the given name and age claims (family name and email hidden), and remove the proof components corresponding to these entries.¶
Using the selectively disclosed information, we generate the presentation internal representation. Using that and the selectively disclosed payloads, we get the following presented JPT in compact serialization:¶
eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vcmVjaXBpZW50LmV4YW1wbGUuY 29tIiwibm9uY2UiOiJOZ3JhbWhpMnp6OHd0M1EwcWRRa0dUYlk1Vl9zc0sxYzV3X2ZXZU lCci1FIn0.eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpQVCIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8 vaXNzdWVyLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJocGEiOiJFUzI1NiIsImNsYWltcyI6WyJpYXQiLCJleHAi LCJmYW1pbHlfbmFtZSIsImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCJlbWFpbCIsImFkZHJlc3MiLCJhZ2Vfb 3Zlcl8yMSJdLCJpZWsiOnsia3R5IjoiRUMiLCJjcnYiOiJQLTI1NiIsIngiOiJERHZiZn JhM1BkMFl0MUgwSlhBQS1vbHdTTjBibWJUaFJBVm8yWXZkYlY4IiwieSI6IlRCWGNLNkt 5cFR4U0U5S1R4MjdpN3ZzS083dW9UalFvU0hZOFp1ZmMzV1kifSwiaHBrIjp7Imt0eSI6 IkVDIiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYiLCJ4IjoiSExoSjNSRXlOX0QzUWJxb1NDdkVyMEdzbWRJV mFwWGNmTHl1VGJOM2lPMCIsInkiOiJ6VEw0RlZMc3JMNVVKa3d0Y0pmaWtYOTh0cmN2RG V5dlNNWTVibkdESEY0In19.MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~ ImpheWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI~eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuXG5Bb nl0b3duLCBDQSAxMjM0NVxuVVNBIiwic3RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3 QuIiwibG9jYWxpdHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI 6MTIzNDUsImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~dHJ1ZQ~~.pLeTlzV1oAZItqSDnAbB8qodkTXf 0CabGwrnEFgKQ0nwnzCdytWmD3wbswexnqJKyj3dGhFMxO5dTlpJzqu4uA~to1GW-gojq rA4Kp1VG6J5uUQdmgNEWYTs0JBjHiUc2z18wAqz0k-faiR-Y1huX3X9eN84WnUOO0WF8Q fgKRkng~ad28SqXiPdM9u-ce2B6w94U1FzGqARzHK9PzaVeisSGeLCwrj_mJztAofHeN9 AlBlt-GgqlczfccUgmr9oanjg~KsS1ESq9SkheyQo9sllDvzp3IC1YeaGTpEgMCuTiXl1 w4V-T4vgjWFXyn8Rpu9nJYmOZFs5YdT6uyCrP2gnXmw~JgSiUOaYTYu1Gqzc0ooSFhUBM 9T_odaMoDKylZLf7PaCpZpIJZZXTrkMuRh5w_sowQW7AUB1isP-GEYBmoi2Lw~XUBX9_T 1x2tp5t7SPz-_iYY3zxEWiupCery-hkGMwvQ4RV8xg-sQ3D4msWrE1Ge3TX0PR9Q18JMJ V3FekP_toQ~oAl8V7pj7qaDwxLmB-6L4-53YXMWSxJKvI2d4kjMkw_CTa8REErmFSHH8A uPdEbPy5fFUZrh7TlXF3JmE7njxg¶
Figure: Presentation (SU-ES256, JSON, Compact Serialization)¶
This example is meant to mirror the prior compact serialization, using RFC8392 and claims from [I-D.ietf-spice-oidc-cwt], illustrated using [I-D.ietf-cbor-edn-literals] (EDN).¶
To simplify this example, the same information is represented as the JPT example above, including the same public and private keys.¶
{ / protected header /
1: 1, / alg: "SU-ES256" /
3: 20, / typ: "JPT" (20CPA) /
5: "https://issuer.example", / iss: "https://issuer.example" /
6: [ / claims /
6, / "iat" /
4, / "exp" /
170, / "family_name" (I-D.maldant-spice-oidc-cwt TBD1) /
171, / "given_name" (I-D.maldant-spice-oidc-cwt TBD2) /
179, / "email" (I-D.maldant-spice-oidc-cwt TBD10) /
187, / "address" (I-D.maldant-spice-oidc-cwt TBD18) /
"age_over_21"
],
8: { / iek /
1: 2, / kty : "EC2" /
-1: 1, / crv: "P-256" /
-2: h'0c3bdb7eb6b73ddd18b751f4257000fa897048dd1b99b4e1440568d9' +
h'8bdd6d5f', / x /
-3: h'4c15dc2ba2b2a53c5213d293c76ee2eefb0a3bbba84e342848763c66' +
h'e7dcdd66' / y /
},
9: { / hpk /
1: 2, / kty: "EC2" /
-1: 1, / crv: "P-256" /
-2: h'1cb849dd113237f0f741baa8482bc4af41ac99d2156a95dc7cbcae4d' +
h'b37788ed', / x /
-3: h'cd32f81552ecacbe54264c2d7097e2917f7cb6b72f0decaf48c6396e' +
h'71831c5e' / y /
},
10: -9 / hpa: "ESP256" (I-D.ietf-jose-fully-specified-algorithms TBD-9) /
}
¶
Figure: Issuer Header (SU-ES256, CBOR)¶
[ / payloads /
/ iat / 171452160,
/ exp / 171719999,
/ family_name / "Doe",
/ given_name / "Jay",
/ email / "jaydoe@example.org",
/ address / {
/ formatted / 1: "1234 Main St.\nAnytown, CA 12345\nUSA",
/ street / 2: "1234 Main St.",
/ locality / 3: "Anytown",
/ region / 4: "CA",
/ post code / 5: "90210",
/ country / 6: "USA"
},
/ age_over_21 / true
]
¶
Figure: Issuer Payloads (as CBOR array)¶
When signed and serialized, the CPT is represented by the following CBOR (in hex):¶
8358cfa701010314057668747470733a2f2f6973737565722e6578616d706c65 0687060418aa18ab18b318bb6b6167655f6f7665725f323108a4010220012158 200c3bdb7eb6b73ddd18b751f4257000fa897048dd1b99b4e1440568d98bdd6d 5f2258204c15dc2ba2b2a53c5213d293c76ee2eefb0a3bbba84e342848763c66 e7dcdd6609a4010220012158201cb849dd113237f0f741baa8482bc4af41ac99 d2156a95dc7cbcae4db37788ed225820cd32f81552ecacbe54264c2d7097e291 7f7cb6b72f0decaf48c6396e71831c5e0a28871a0a3827001a0a3c3d3f63446f 65634a6179726a6179646f65406578616d706c652e6f7267a601782331323334 204d61696e2053742e0a416e79746f776e2c2043412031323334350a55534102 6d31323334204d61696e2053742e0367416e79746f776e046243410565393032 31300663555341f58858405cb3e953ac81a5aa405529d5076af0f63d0e5abde7 c4027337ecc380789f7c88b5247e1a910240d3452759ffb57e8f4e0343f5153c 9b794bf92d5b18d5a5603a5840b5100f9a10f5390fd9a4ff3bb3c10f4efc8300 c1f181fe5b13ef1ebc63ca17070037498c9851dd6d1552bea6c6c4d8a446b42f 145fb034f7134f5d9b29d5f29e5840ebaab09e65fa37b01d71c6445f3cb376bd a06e77e25de37a2e51bede7e8c95eff1a8b4d4f22b9d80b9867ab4428f711426 3361ae4c91bd6a4fec6e915299787258400b8d728db1b71def0ed7c70391c255 8fb0f3d4cc75698910f9536c692a8404b70db14eea266ed8e491621de0d79439 38f63221483d1147953fbac7f2a48aaae558408eb7bd14b3b065261977e7f2fc 8a0cb36e331d35a5f94b11706634d25eae2cee816544d15a01a0d5e683914b03 9a36ae042d7087c4643b0b9083b13a55f6d1bd58401d521a28408c89e792b4bc 7df767cc423ca2fc84f29c619d4f58872fdabaaf26c20249c8e3c5cfa74687ae cad39cb3c06201373c1b380547852ce57834f8c7e3584001aa7ca10dbb03f9ae 2dd160f0fa22d8f97a70a659f9fa3e6c5c3ad712a96d6fb59993e4ae12bde0a3 e7dc63c85b3f4a28c440455ca37730b474a86a08ef8b815840aff46787e27b51 0d5f2cc00347b35b10bb32ccee5406234f746264514a7d07a3a72b7ce11c13bd 4fb3580d9a9248576a7757deea3b765fb28bcf370d9e8d1af1¶
Fixtures: Issued Form (SU-ES256, CBOR)¶
The presented form, similarly to the issued form above, is made with the holder conveying the same parameters and the same set of selectively disclosed payloads as the JPT above:¶
{ / protected header /
1: 1, / alg: "SU-ES256" /
6: "https://recipient.example.com", / aud /
7: h'360ada9a18b6cf3f30b77434a9d4241936d8e55fecb0ad5ce70fdf59e201afe1', / nonce /
}
¶
Figure: Presentation Header (SU-ES256, CBOR)¶
When the appropriate proof is generated, the CPT is serialized into the following CBOR (in hex):¶
845846a3010106781d68747470733a2f2f726563697069656e742e6578616d70 6c652e636f6d075820360ada9a18b6cf3f30b77434a9d4241936d8e55fecb0ad 5ce70fdf59e201afe158cfa701010314057668747470733a2f2f697373756572 2e6578616d706c650687060418aa18ab18b318bb6b6167655f6f7665725f3231 08a4010220012158200c3bdb7eb6b73ddd18b751f4257000fa897048dd1b99b4 e1440568d98bdd6d5f2258204c15dc2ba2b2a53c5213d293c76ee2eefb0a3bbb a84e342848763c66e7dcdd6609a4010220012158201cb849dd113237f0f741ba a8482bc4af41ac99d2156a95dc7cbcae4db37788ed225820cd32f81552ecacbe 54264c2d7097e2917f7cb6b72f0decaf48c6396e71831c5e0a28891a0a382700 1a0a3c3d3f63446f65634a6179726a6179646f65406578616d706c652e6f7267 a601782331323334204d61696e2053742e0a416e79746f776e2c204341203132 3334350a555341026d31323334204d61696e2053742e0367416e79746f776e04 624341056539303231300663555341f5f6f68758405cb3e953ac81a5aa405529 d5076af0f63d0e5abde7c4027337ecc380789f7c88b5247e1a910240d3452759 ffb57e8f4e0343f5153c9b794bf92d5b18d5a5603a5840b5100f9a10f5390fd9 a4ff3bb3c10f4efc8300c1f181fe5b13ef1ebc63ca17070037498c9851dd6d15 52bea6c6c4d8a446b42f145fb034f7134f5d9b29d5f29e5840ebaab09e65fa37 b01d71c6445f3cb376bda06e77e25de37a2e51bede7e8c95eff1a8b4d4f22b9d 80b9867ab4428f7114263361ae4c91bd6a4fec6e915299787258400b8d728db1 b71def0ed7c70391c2558fb0f3d4cc75698910f9536c692a8404b70db14eea26 6ed8e491621de0d7943938f63221483d1147953fbac7f2a48aaae558408eb7bd 14b3b065261977e7f2fc8a0cb36e331d35a5f94b11706634d25eae2cee816544 d15a01a0d5e683914b039a36ae042d7087c4643b0b9083b13a55f6d1bd58401d 521a28408c89e792b4bc7df767cc423ca2fc84f29c619d4f58872fdabaaf26c2 0249c8e3c5cfa74687aecad39cb3c06201373c1b380547852ce57834f8c7e358 4070a34f928201ce21e99c7de5364204700e351c97742d9a707c23abc4ea930d 3d218ba3c210afb3180818db8bac0aca0b414a0be8bc6f65c01031247d1ec83e 43¶
Figure: Presented Form (SU-ES256, CBOR)¶
The following example uses the BBS algorithm.¶
This is the Issuer's stable private key in the JWK format:¶
{
"kty": "EC2",
"alg": "BBS",
"use": "proof",
"crv": "BLS12381G2",
"x": "DIuLwlMtL-VadkIwTKkZIKRBHgHiEzxrrgrxiPm3YJhieC6ndW3JQgUuMqqX4
sv_BlJ6BD2E2YIzhNutNlIMYKtyvXY75k4DbPaYTXW2JIlxrKdN5yhPAc9ecWQ
GkLwT",
"y": "D-KWTkMtpJY7fM8x4krIDmlynMjHXXMQLZ_lTotCQLsmRhjYsRRRypAEddNFR
qZ-DRMNQj0-hucvaf60Sd6sW8Sv95MI1uv7L3frQMo1vhLQ4FBhuBSgUHOPFKi
SWvFo",
"d": "AcgEMVnGNWixHWwqcLiLKFxqDNORivxKuq1ynodiEyk"
}
There is no additional holder key necessary for presentation proofs.¶
For the following protected header and array of payloads:¶
{
"kid": "HjfcpyjuZQ-O8Ye2hQnNbT9RbbnrobptdnExR0DUjU8",
"alg": "BBS"
}
These components are signed using the private issuer key previously given, which is then representable in the following serialization:¶
eyJraWQiOiJIamZjcHlqdVpRLU84WWUyaFFuTmJUOVJiYm5yb2JwdGRuRXhSMERValU4I iwiYWxnIjoiQkJTIn0.MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~Imph eWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI~eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuXG5Bbnl0b 3duLCBDQSAxMjM0NVxuVVNBIiwic3RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuIi wibG9jYWxpdHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI6MTI zNDUsImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~dHJ1ZQ.okqIY0ZtzV0eZEt_3avEc-lK8hIClycGXF g_U1qn1_HW5ibYLvSc-fzoLhHOHGPEMBOAzS0hlaEK6ZWiN_symDTgFWSwb9cXxeWB5tG mpb0
For a presentation with the following Presentation Header:¶
{
"alg": "BBS",
"aud": "https://recipient.example.com",
"nonce": "wrmBRkKtXjQ"
}
The holder decides to share all information other than the email address, and generates a proof. That proof is represented in the following serialization:¶
eyJhbGciOiJCQlMiLCJhdWQiOiJodHRwczovL3JlY2lwaWVudC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsI m5vbmNlIjoid3JtQlJrS3RYalEifQ.eyJraWQiOiJIamZjcHlqdVpRLU84WWUyaFFuTmJ UOVJiYm5yb2JwdGRuRXhSMERValU4IiwiYWxnIjoiQkJTIn0.MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxN zE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~~~.mUwxOfDCKKtdPyHwU_9Lcrs4hlxbahAsGl3GELxG jdt1VQ58yq_QcWUVKkny3lmrirzqSNJtmFq6Kx14W0P5PU0LGeWSE6ehC-D1W3qCfltgS p3xY4tAVGQJmGunMWtRlVl5S5NXNWrxlib22qXOKkdMJXt5kSfYnxI9TRzNYuzRNuY_Kj h2K8MUOxPSSo-6TU8KM4ImQUBUtN0khrlmdrpCY8EW63dpeksfD9yqVDs1n4aeeIaY_K- 7p4CxSEpR4T5TkBLiDwuhV15RGk8RAgDcc1qLryvAQvqzi627hsJ51HOPLGmMYozJGwDw GkSlOdwiarpk2KSbulYTYJobYpu5CimVKCfOQulbgCEaafY9VwSdjaNdEdplRfDSDr6k3 ZRg36wPFG54dPOLWEF-FRRcbrFLN3UqbbY8pE6YJS7TXat20bCXmeSEhPwYz8SfEYJKfP 6viiJxmgcFycEeU28UeZQOLjzKNr8b9gwLPe8
The following example uses the MAC-H256 algorithm.¶
This is the Issuer's stable private key in the JWK format:¶
{
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "11pcfV3eXZJvz75QoQqKcL4YsSWsas5uEkDGJ8_PIWc",
"y": "t5fONv-sMbqGNMdl1cctAMHLq5jh82S8aNaOr5cCFag",
"d": "1Rl6mjEvhRZsPlZQTa6F0nfMeClfl11vRIaDFLbNdbM"
}
This is the Issuer's ephemerally generated shared secret:¶
"2LO_GwW3-EccOma2X_7RgwSiVGg5_AHQbmUHlSkobcM"
This is the Holder's presentation private key in the JWK format:¶
{
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "HLhJ3REyN_D3QbqoSCvEr0GsmdIVapXcfLyuTbN3iO0",
"y": "zTL4FVLsrL5UJkwtcJfikX98trcvDeyvSMY5bnGDHF4",
"d": "PkePsZw2g17xI5Vtc43rC8sMcteo1AYK2Pgkw3s_DWA"
}
For the following Header and array of payloads:¶
{
"alg": "MAC-H256",
"hpa": "ES256",
"typ": "JPT",
"iss": "https://issuer.example",
"claims": [
"iat",
"exp",
"family_name",
"given_name",
"email",
"address",
"age_over_21"
],
"hpk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"use": "sign",
"x": "HLhJ3REyN_D3QbqoSCvEr0GsmdIVapXcfLyuTbN3iO0",
"y": "zTL4FVLsrL5UJkwtcJfikX98trcvDeyvSMY5bnGDHF4"
}
}
[
1714521600,
1717199999,
"Doe",
"Jay",
"jaydoe@example.org",
{
"formatted": "1234 Main St.\nAnytown, CA 12345\nUSA",
"street_address": "1234 Main St.",
"locality": "Anytown",
"region": "CA",
"postal_code": 12345,
"country": "USA"
},
true
]
The issuer generates an array of derived keys, one per payload slot. This is done using the shared secret as the key and a binary value based on the payload slot index (from zero) as input to the HMAC operation.¶
This results in the following set of derived keys:¶
[ "_AoDCacxSLDL2xAaVxEgXUKBUd82lrN4nub7JBcx_u0", "bNbebrJ-SXu9-LjmmSpb_Y1FOcsk9dWCCQOdCAha73o", "SDLCU-yuHNoPN-4xV4oBpe4EPIT0RFAqxewG3V0PffY", "l4tVK1Y_mfG6czHFoUrXTiiE3sqX0TBy9VMsMjpBdcY", "uFoqVct1CPMQv-atPP3vCPFKCgT47WHEBqtpyG76mzw", "s9a9H2OA5jU36DySUcYh4voGsUN793ZsXK3OTFGCZ30", "S2F7SE9RqYr3xTv_27uBr2Aytl1UUsMUV_pxgVTqqcw" ]
A MAC is generated for each payload using the corresponding derived payload key. This results in the following set of MAC values:¶
[ "hISQ6oV-Z_nfpZEpF5Z4-hIKIoJbDbEfUSR83thDjbk", "jS_fSpLo60Oe_B4Y4UN4ll0lA5ej41Enil3Ttf_qVFw", "i_d1L16ctaeLI_PbQ3NBA15YgCsaVrfRzBLNQE5cuvs", "N1Y77XW268NmGI9bS9F_JNX_LZ5atq7HvWbDALrGopc", "p8KWzhQja6r4BMlVEkomJr6PXYn9O901UHT7kAwseBE", "hQhwtaaMptGBjtPwb91YIy217xjOhq25Bp8hKknf4as", "XJK2Woy9eyxqKtW5pWUiWICyhRcO1iv_-OKkbPajrq0" ]
The Issuer Header and payload MAC values are combined into a binary representation known as the Compact MAC Representation. This representation is signed with the issuer's private key.¶
The proof consists of two octet string values: the signature over the combined MAC representation, and the shared secret.¶
[ "urIUhQvIlHt-9IVDuIFoDzUuaB9jUVjJd7yLQ2ecVAhdKmdSsbOtRHM0bjvx6dLpQ- 8sZ7M3T_fOhQOsPHR4Og", "C7Yt2ECsE5ANHjRjIYwAB4pzUEE8f4Y-vwhJ9W6QtjY" ]
The final issued JWP in compact serialization is:¶
eyJhbGciOiJNQUMtSDI1NiIsImhwYSI6IkVTMjU2IiwidHlwIjoiSlBUIiwiaXNzIjoia HR0cHM6Ly9pc3N1ZXIuZXhhbXBsZSIsImNsYWltcyI6WyJpYXQiLCJleHAiLCJmYW1pbH lfbmFtZSIsImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCJlbWFpbCIsImFkZHJlc3MiLCJhZ2Vfb3Zlcl8yMSJ dLCJocGsiOnsia3R5IjoiRUMiLCJjcnYiOiJQLTI1NiIsInVzZSI6InNpZ24iLCJ4Ijoi SExoSjNSRXlOX0QzUWJxb1NDdkVyMEdzbWRJVmFwWGNmTHl1VGJOM2lPMCIsInkiOiJ6V Ew0RlZMc3JMNVVKa3d0Y0pmaWtYOTh0cmN2RGV5dlNNWTVibkdESEY0In19.MTcxNDUyM TYwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~ImpheWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI~eyJm b3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuXG5Bbnl0b3duLCBDQSAxMjM0NVxuVVNBIiwic 3RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuIiwibG9jYWxpdHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIi wicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI6MTIzNDUsImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~ dHJ1ZQ.urIUhQvIlHt-9IVDuIFoDzUuaB9jUVjJd7yLQ2ecVAhdKmdSsbOtRHM0bjvx6d LpQ-8sZ7M3T_fOhQOsPHR4Og~C7Yt2ECsE5ANHjRjIYwAB4pzUEE8f4Y-vwhJ9W6QtjY
Next, we show the presentation of the JWP with selective disclosure.¶
For presentation with the following Presentation Header:¶
{
"alg": "MAC-H256",
"aud": "https://recipient.example.com",
"nonce": "Ngramhi2zz8wt3Q0qdQkGTbY5V_ssK1c5w_fWeIBr-E"
}
The holder will take the issuer proof (including shared secret) and derive the same individual payload MAC values (above).¶
In this case, the holder has decided not to disclose the last three
claims provided by the issuer (corresponding to email, address, and
age_over_21)¶
For each payload slot, the holder will provide one of two values as part of the proof value. For a disclosed payload, the holder will provide the corresponding derived key. For a non-disclosed payload, the holder will provide the corresponding MAC value.¶
The final presented proof value is an array of octet strings. The contents are Presentation Header signature, followed by the issuer signature, then the value disclosed by the holder for each payload. This results in the following proof:¶
[ "urIUhQvIlHt-9IVDuIFoDzUuaB9jUVjJd7yLQ2ecVAhdKmdSsbOtRHM0bjvx6dLpQ- 8sZ7M3T_fOhQOsPHR4Og", "_AoDCacxSLDL2xAaVxEgXUKBUd82lrN4nub7JBcx_u0", "bNbebrJ-SXu9-LjmmSpb_Y1FOcsk9dWCCQOdCAha73o", "SDLCU-yuHNoPN-4xV4oBpe4EPIT0RFAqxewG3V0PffY", "l4tVK1Y_mfG6czHFoUrXTiiE3sqX0TBy9VMsMjpBdcY", "p8KWzhQja6r4BMlVEkomJr6PXYn9O901UHT7kAwseBE", "hQhwtaaMptGBjtPwb91YIy217xjOhq25Bp8hKknf4as", "XJK2Woy9eyxqKtW5pWUiWICyhRcO1iv_-OKkbPajrq0", "2L9PeOEaODlQPsA23QrQCIzaRe0m2ETizzLgPy6hWuBRjXbisd6v7IeEa_xpjPuzys SuAtc1MR7y2f9ylq0VBQ" ]
The final presented JWP in compact serialization is:¶
eyJhbGciOiJNQUMtSDI1NiIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vcmVjaXBpZW50LmV4YW1wbGUuY 29tIiwibm9uY2UiOiJOZ3JhbWhpMnp6OHd0M1EwcWRRa0dUYlk1Vl9zc0sxYzV3X2ZXZU lCci1FIn0.eyJhbGciOiJNQUMtSDI1NiIsImhwYSI6IkVTMjU2IiwidHlwIjoiSlBUIiw iaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9pc3N1ZXIuZXhhbXBsZSIsImNsYWltcyI6WyJpYXQiLCJleHAi LCJmYW1pbHlfbmFtZSIsImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCJlbWFpbCIsImFkZHJlc3MiLCJhZ2Vfb 3Zlcl8yMSJdLCJocGsiOnsia3R5IjoiRUMiLCJjcnYiOiJQLTI1NiIsInVzZSI6InNpZ2 4iLCJ4IjoiSExoSjNSRXlOX0QzUWJxb1NDdkVyMEdzbWRJVmFwWGNmTHl1VGJOM2lPMCI sInkiOiJ6VEw0RlZMc3JMNVVKa3d0Y0pmaWtYOTh0cmN2RGV5dlNNWTVibkdESEY0In19 .MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~~~.urIUhQvIlHt-9IVDuIF oDzUuaB9jUVjJd7yLQ2ecVAhdKmdSsbOtRHM0bjvx6dLpQ-8sZ7M3T_fOhQOsPHR4Og~_ AoDCacxSLDL2xAaVxEgXUKBUd82lrN4nub7JBcx_u0~bNbebrJ-SXu9-LjmmSpb_Y1FOc sk9dWCCQOdCAha73o~SDLCU-yuHNoPN-4xV4oBpe4EPIT0RFAqxewG3V0PffY~l4tVK1Y _mfG6czHFoUrXTiiE3sqX0TBy9VMsMjpBdcY~p8KWzhQja6r4BMlVEkomJr6PXYn9O901 UHT7kAwseBE~hQhwtaaMptGBjtPwb91YIy217xjOhq25Bp8hKknf4as~XJK2Woy9eyxqK tW5pWUiWICyhRcO1iv_-OKkbPajrq0~2L9PeOEaODlQPsA23QrQCIzaRe0m2ETizzLgPy 6hWuBRjXbisd6v7IeEa_xpjPuzysSuAtc1MR7y2f9ylq0VBQ
This work was incubated in the DIF Applied Cryptography Working Group.¶
We would like to thank Alberto Solavagione for his valuable contributions to this specification.¶
The BBS examples were generated using the library at https://github.com/mattrglobal/pairing_crypto .¶
[[ To be removed from the final specification ]] -11¶
-10¶
-09¶
-08¶
-07¶
proof_key and presentation_key
names¶
proof_jwk to proof_key and presentation_jwk to
presentation_key to better represent that the key may be JSON or
CBOR-formatted.¶
proof_key and presentation_key to JWP where
they are defined. Consolidated usage, purpose, and requirements from
algorithm usage under these definitions.¶
BBS-PROOF into BBS¶
-06¶
presentation_header.¶
pjwk to presentation_jwk¶
-05¶
-04¶
BBS-DRAFT-5 to BBS, and from
BBS-PROOF-DRAFT-5 to BBS-PROOF¶
BBS_BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_¶
-03¶
-02¶
BBS-DRAFT-3 and BBS-PROOF-DRAFT-3 algorithms based on
draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures-03.¶
BBS-X algorithm based on a particular implementation of
earlier drafts.¶
-01¶
issuer_header and presentation_header¶
-00¶