| Internet-Draft | json-proof-algorithms | June 2025 |
| Jones, et al. | Expires 27 December 2025 | [Page] |
The JSON Proof Algorithms (JPA) specification registers cryptographic algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Proof, JSON Web Key (JWK), and COSE specifications. It defines IANA registries for these identifiers.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."¶
This Internet-Draft will expire on 27 December 2025.¶
Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
The JSON Web Proof (JWP) [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-proof] draft establishes a new secure container format that supports selective disclosure and unlinkability using Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) or other cryptographic algorithms.¶
Editor's Note: This draft is still early and incomplete. There will be significant changes to the algorithms as currently defined here. Please do not use any of these definitions or examples for anything except personal experimentation and learning. Contributions and feedback are welcomed at https://github.com/ietf-wg-jose/json-web-proof.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
The roles of "issuer", "holder", and "verifier" are used as defined by the VC Data Model [VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]. The term "presentation" is also used as defined by this source, but the term "credential" is avoided in this specification to minimize confusion with other definitions.¶
The terms "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", "Base64url Encoding", "Header Parameter", "JOSE Header", "JWS Payload", "JWS Signature", and "JWS Protected Header" are defined by [RFC7515].¶
The terms "JSON Web Proof (JWP)", "JWP Payload", "JWP Proof", and "JWP Protected Header" are defined by [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-proof].¶
These terms are defined by this specification:¶
JWP defines a container binding together a protected header, one or more payloads, and a cryptographic proof. It does not define any details about the interactions between an application and the cryptographic libraries that implement proof-supporting algorithms.¶
Due to the nature of ZKPs, this specification also documents the subtle but important differences in proof algorithms versus those defined by the JSON Web Algorithms [RFC7518]. These differences help support more advanced capabilities such as blinded signatures and predicate proofs.¶
The four principal interactions that every proof algorithm MUST support are [issue](#issue), [confirm](#confirm), [present](#present), and [verify](#verify).¶
The JWP is first created as the output of a JPA's issue operation.¶
Every algorithm MUST support a JSON issuer protected header along with one or more octet string payloads. The algorithm MAY support using additional items provided by the holder for issuance such as blinded payloads, keys for replay prevention, etc.¶
All algorithms MUST provide integrity protection for the issuer header and all payloads and MUST specify all digest and/or hash2curve methods used.¶
Performed by the holder to validate that the issued JWP is correctly formed and protected.¶
Each algorithm MAY support using additional input items options, such as those sent to the issuer for issuance. After confirmation, an algorithm MAY return a modified JWP for serialized storage without the local state (such as with blinded payloads now unblinded).¶
The algorithm MUST fully verify the issued proof value against the issuer protected header and all payloads. If given a presented JWP instead of an issued one, the confirm process MUST return an error.¶
Used to apply any selective disclosure choices and perform any unlinkability transformations, as well as to show binding.¶
An algorithm MAY support additional input options from the requesting party, such as for predicate proofs and verifiable computation requests.¶
Every algorithm MUST support the ability to hide any or all payloads. It MUST always include the issuer protected header unmodified in the presentation.¶
The algorithm MUST replace the issued proof value and generate a new presented proof value. It also MUST include a new presentation protected header that provides replay protection.¶
Performed by the verifier to verify the protected headers along with any disclosed payloads and/or assertions about them from the proving party, while also verifying they are the same payloads and ordering as witnessed by the issuer.¶
The algorithm MUST verify the integrity of all disclosed payloads and MUST also verify the integrity of both the issuer and presentation protected headers.¶
If the presented proof contains any assertions about the hidden payloads, the algorithm MUST also verify all of those assertions. It MAY support additional options, such as those sent to the holder to generate the presentation.¶
If given an issued JWP for verification, the algorithm MUST return an error.¶
This section defines how to use specific algorithms for JWPs.¶
The Single Use (SU) algorithm is based on composing multiple traditional asymmetric signatures into a single JWP proof. It enables a very simple form of selective disclosure without requiring any advanced cryptographic techniques.¶
It does not support unlinkability if the same JWP is presented multiple times, therefore when privacy is required the holder will need to interact with the issuer again to receive new single-use JWPs (dynamically or in batches).¶
The Single Use algorithm is based on using multiple signatures to cover the individual payloads, all of which are generated with the same Asymmetric JSON Web Algorithm (JWA). The internal signing algorithm to use is part of the registration for a new Single Use algorithm identifier.¶
The chosen JWA MUST be an asymmetric signing algorithm so that each signature can be verified without sharing any private values between the parties. This ensures that the verifier cannot brute force any non-disclosed payloads based only on their disclosed individual signatures.¶
In order to support the protection of a presentation by a holder to a verifier, the holder MUST use a Presentation Key during the issuance and the presentation of every Single Use JWP. This Presentation Key MUST be generated and used for only one JWP.¶
The issuer MUST verify that the holder has possession of this key. The holder-issuer communication to exchange this information is out of scope of this specification, but can be accomplished by the holder using this key to generate a JWS that signs a value the issuer can verify as unique.¶
To create a Single Use JWP, the issuer first generates a unique Ephemeral Key using the selected internal algorithm. This key-pair will be used to sign each of the payloads of a single JWP and then discarded.¶
Each individual payload is signed using the selected internal algorithm using the Ephemeral Key.¶
The issuer's Ephemeral Key MUST be included in the issuer protected header via the Proof Key header parameter.¶
The holder's Presentation Key MUST be included in issuer protected header via the Presentation Key header parameter.¶
The issuer protected header is signed using the given JWA and the issuer's Stable Key.¶
Each JWP payload is processed in order and signed using the given JWA using the issuer's Ephemeral Key.¶
The proof value is an octet string array. The first entry is the octet string of the issuer protected header signature, with an additional entry for each payload signature.¶
To generate a new presentation, the holder first creates a presentation protected header that is specific to the verifier being presented to. This header MUST contain a parameter that both the holder and verifier trust as being unique and non-replayable.
Use of the nonce header parameter is RECOMMENDED for this purpose.¶
This specification registers the nonce header parameter for the presentation protected header that contains a string value either generated by the verifier or derived from values provided by the verifier. When present, the verifier MUST ensure the nonce value matches during verification.¶
The presentation protected header MAY contain other header parameters that are either provided by the verifier or by the holder. These presentation header parameters SHOULD NOT contain values that are common across multiple presentations and SHOULD be unique to a single presentation and verifier.¶
Editor's Note: The current definition here is incomplete, the holder's signature needs to also incorporate the presented proof.¶
The holder derives a new proof as part of presentation. The presented proof value will always contain the issuer's Stable Key signature for the issuer protected header as the first element.¶
The second element of the presented proof is the holder's signature of the presentation protected header using the holder's presentation key. This signature is constructed using the same algorithm described in generating the issuer's signature over the issuer protected header. Signing only the presentation header with the Presentation Key is sufficient to protect the entire presentation since that key is private to the holder and only the contents of the presentation header are used for replay prevention.¶
For each payload which is to be disclosed, the corresponding payload signature (from the issued JWP) is included in the proof. If a payload is omitted from the presented JWP, the signature value will NOT be includeed, and the presentation proof will have one less part.¶
For example, if the second and fifth of five payloads are not disclosed, then the holder's derived proof would consist of the issuer's signature over the issuer protected header, the holder's signature over the holder's protected header, the ephemeral key signature over the first, third and fourth payloads.¶
Since the individual signatures in the proof value are unique and remain unchanged across multiple presentations, a Single Use JWP SHOULD only be presented a single time to each verifier in order for the holder to remain unlinkable across multiple presentations.¶
The verifier MUST verify the issuer protected header octets against the first part in the proof using the issuer's Stable Key. It MUST also verify the presentation protected header octets against the second part in the proof value using the holder's Presentation Key, as provided in the Presentation Key header parameter.¶
With the headers verified, the Proof Key header parameter can then be used to verify each of the disclosed payload signatures.¶
The proposed JWP alg value is of the format "SU-" appended with the relevant JWS alg value for the chosen public and ephemeral key-pair algorithm, for example "SU-ES256".¶
The BBS Signature Scheme [I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures] is under active development within the CRFG.¶
This algorithm supports both selective disclosure and unlinkability, enabling the holder to generate multiple presentations from one issued JWP without a verifier being able to correlate those presentations together based on the proof.¶
The BBS algorithm corresponds to a ciphersuite identifier of BBS_BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_.¶
The key used for the BBS algorithm is an elliptic curve-based key pair, specifically against the G_2 subgroup of a pairing friendly curve. Additional details on key generation can be found in Section 3.4. The JWK and Cose Key Object representations of the key are detailed in [I-D.ietf-cose-bls-key-representations].¶
There is no additional holder presentation key necessary for presentation proofs.¶
Issuance is performed using the Sign operation from Section 3.5.1 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures]. This operation utilizes the issuer's BLS12-381 G2 key pair as SK and PK, along with desired protected header and payloads as the octets header and the octets array messages.¶
The octets resulting from this operation form a single octet string in the issuance proof array, to be used along with the protected header and payloads to serialize the JWP.¶
Holder verification of the signature on issuance form is performed using the Verify operation from Section 3.5.2 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures].¶
This operation utilizes the issuer's public key as PK, the proof as signature, the protected header octets as header and the array of payload octets as messages.¶
Derivation of a presentation is done by the holder using the ProofGen operation from Section 3.5.3 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures].¶
This operation utilizes the issuer's public key as PK, the issuer protected header as header, the issuance proof as signature, the issuance payloads as messages, and the holder's presentation protected header as ph.¶
The operation also takes a vector of indexes into messages, describing which payloads the holder wishes to disclose. All payloads are required for proof generation, but only these indicated payloads will be required to be disclosed for later proof verification.¶
The output of this operation is the presentation proof, as a single octet string.¶
Presentation serialization leverages the two protected headers and presentation proof, along with the disclosed payloads. Non-disclosed payloads are represented with the absent value of null in CBOR serialization and a zero-length string in compact serialization.¶
Verification of a presentation is done by the verifier using the ProofVerify operation from Section 3.5.4.¶
This operation utilizes the issuer's public key as PK, the issuer protected header as header, the issuance proof as signature, the holder's presentation protected header as ph, and the payloads as disclosed_messages.¶
In addition, the disclosed_indexes scalar array is calculated from the payloads provided. Values disclosed in the presented payloads have a zero-based index in this array, while the indices of absent payloads are omitted.¶
The Message Authentication Code (MAC) JPA uses a MAC to both generate ephemeral keys and compute authentication codes to protect the issuer header and each payload individually.¶
Like the the Single Use algorithm family, it also does not support unlinkability if the same JWP is presented multiple times. and requires an individually issued JWP for each presentation in order to fully protect privacy. When compared to the JWS approach, using a MAC requires less computation but can result in potentially larger presentation proof values.¶
The design is intentionally minimal and only involves using a single standardized MAC method instead of a mix of MAC/hash methods or a custom hash-based construct. It is able to use any published cryptographic MAC method such as HMAC [RFC2104] or KMAC. It uses traditional public-key based signatures to verify the authenticity of the issuer and holder.¶
Prior to the issuer creating a new JWP, the issuer MUST have a presentation public key provided by the holder.¶
The holder's presentation key MUST be included in the issuer's protected header using the Presentation Key header parameter.¶
To use the MAC algorithm, the issuer must have a stable public key pair to perform signing. To start the issuance process, a single 32-byte random Shared Secret must first be generated. This value will be shared privately to the holder as part of the issuer's JWP proof value.¶
The Shared Secret is used by both the issuer and holder as the MAC method's key to generate a new set of unique ephemeral keys. These keys are then used as the input to generate a MAC that protects each payload.¶
The combined MAC representation is a single octet string representing the MAC values of the issuer protected header, along with each payload provided by the issuer. This representation is signed by the issuer, but not shared - parties will recreate this octet string and verify the signature to verify the integrity of supplied issuer protected header and the integrity of any disclosed payloads.¶
The issuer protected header is included in this value as a MAC created using the fixed key "issuer_header" in UTF-8 encoded octets. The value is the issuer header JSON as a UTF-8 encoded octet string.¶
A unique key is generated for each payload using a MAC, with the Shared Secret as the key and a value of "payload_X" as UTF-8 encoded octets, where "X" is replaced by the zero-based array index of the payload, for example "payload_0", "payload_1", etc.¶
Each payload then itself has a corresponding MAC, using the above per-payload key and the payload octet string.¶
The combined MAC representation is the octet string formed by the the concatentation of the issuer protected header MAC output, along with each payload MAC output.¶
The issuer proof consists of two octet strings.¶
The first octet string is the issuer signature over the combined MAC representation. The issuer signs the JWS using its stable public key, and a fixed header containing the alg associated with signing algorithm in use.¶
jws_header = '{"alg":"ES256"}'¶
The signature value of the JWS is extracted and base64url-decoded into an octet string.¶
The second octet string is the Shared Secret used to generate the per-payload keys for the combined representation.¶
See the JWS Presentation Protected Header section.¶
Editor's Note: The current definition here is incomplete, the holder's signature needs to also incorporate the presented proof.¶
The first value in the presentation proof is the presentation signature. This is a signature over the presentation protected header, using the key specified by the Presentation Key header parameter in the issuer protected header.¶
The second value is the issuer signature over the Combined MAC Representation provided with the issued form.¶
The remaining values are used by the verifier to reconstruct the combined MAC representation without access to the Shared Secret. There is one value corresponding to each payload, whether it has been disclosed or not.¶
If a payload is disclosed, the unique per-payload key derived from the shared secret is used as the payload's entry in the proof array.¶
If a payload is not disclosed, the payload's MAC in the combined MAC representation is used as the payload's entry in the proof array.¶
The verifier must recreate the Combined MAC Representation from the presentation proof to verify integrity over the disclosed information.¶
The issuer protected header MAC is recreated using the same mechanism described above.¶
For each payload in the presentation:¶
If the payload is disclosed, then the presentation proof contains the unique per-payload key. The corresponding payload MAC can be computed by performing the MAC operation with this key and the corresponding payload.¶
If the payload is not disclosed, then the presentation proof contains the payload MAC, which can be used directly¶
The concatenation of the octets of the issuer protected header MAC and each payload MAC forms the Combined MAC Representation. The issuer signature in the proof is then verified by converting these values to a JWS as described above, and verifying that JWS.¶
Proposed JWP alg value is of the format "MAC-" appended with a unique identifier for the set of MAC and signing algorithms used. Below are the initial registrations:¶
MAC-H256 uses HMAC SHA-256 as the MAC and ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256 for the signatures¶
MAC-H384 uses HMAC SHA-384 as the MAC and ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384 for the signatures¶
MAC-H512 uses HMAC SHA-512 as the MAC and ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512 for the signatures¶
MAC-K25519 uses KMAC SHAKE128 as the MAC and EdDSA using Curve25519 for the signatures¶
MAC-K448 uses KMAC SHAKE256 as the MAC and EdDSA using Curve448 for the signatures¶
MAC-H256K uses HMAC SHA-256 as the MAC and ECDSA using secp256k1 and SHA-256 for the signatures¶
Editor's Note: This will follow once the algorithms defined here have become more stable.¶
The following registration procedure is used for all the registries established by this specification.¶
Values are registered on a Specification Required [RFC5226] basis after a three-week review period on the jose-reg-review@ietf.org mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published.¶
Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register JWP algorithm: example").¶
Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful. Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution.¶
Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts include determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing functionality, whether it is likely to be of general applicability or useful only for a single application, and whether the registration description is clear.¶
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing list.¶
It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are able to represent the perspectives of different applications using this specification, in order to enable broadly informed review of registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other Experts.¶
This specification establishes the
IANA "JSON Web Proof Algorithms" registry
for values of the JWP alg (algorithm) parameter in JWP Header Parameters.
The registry records the algorithm name, the algorithm description,
the algorithm usage locations,
the implementation requirements, the change controller,
and a reference to the specification that defines it.
The same algorithm name can be registered multiple times,
provided that the sets of usage locations are disjoint.¶
It is suggested that the length of the key be included in the algorithm name when multiple variations of algorithms are being registered that use keys of different lengths and the key lengths for each need to be fixed (for instance, because they will be created by key derivation functions). This allows readers of the JSON text to more easily make security decisions.¶
The Designated Experts should perform reasonable due diligence that algorithms being registered either are currently considered cryptographically credible or are being registered as Deprecated or Prohibited.¶
The implementation requirements of an algorithm may be changed over time as the cryptographic landscape evolves, for instance, to change the status of an algorithm to Deprecated or to change the status of an algorithm from Optional to Recommended+ or Required. Changes of implementation requirements are only permitted on a Specification Required basis after review by the Designated Experts, with the new specification defining the revised implementation requirements level.¶
Single-Use JWP using ES256.)
Descriptive names may not match other registered names unless the
Designated Experts state that there is a compelling reason to
allow an exception.¶
SU-ES256). This label is a
case-sensitive ASCII string. JSON Labels may not match other
registered labels in a case-insensitive manner unless the
Designated Experts state that there is a compelling reason to
allow an exception.¶
1). CBOR Labels may not match
other registered labels unless the Designated Experts state that
there is a compelling reason to allow an exception.¶
Issued or Presented. Other values may be used with the
approval of a Designated Expert.¶
Required, Recommended, Optional, Deprecated,
or Prohibited.
Optionally, the word can be followed by a + or -. The use of
+ indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be
increased in a future version of the specification. The use of
- indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be
decreased in a future version of the specification.
Any identifiers registered for algorithms that are otherwise
unsuitable for direct use as JWP algorithms must be registered as
Prohibited.¶
SU-ES256¶
SU-ES384¶
SU-ES512¶
BBS¶
BBS_BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_H2G_HM2S_¶
MAC-H256¶
MAC-H256 uses HMAC SHA-256 as the MAC,
and ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256 for the signatures¶
MAC-H384¶
MAC-H384 uses HMAC SHA-384 as the MAC,
and ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384 for the signatures¶
MAC-H512¶
MAC-H512 uses HMAC SHA-512 as the MAC,
and ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512 for the signatures¶
MAC-K25519¶
MAC-K25519 uses KMAC SHAKE128 as the
MAC, and EdDSA using Curve25519 for the signatures¶
MAC-K448¶
MAC-K448 uses KMAC SHAKE256 as the MAC,
and EdDSA using Curve448 for the signatures¶
MAC-H256K¶
MAC-H256K uses HMAC SHA-256 as the MAC,
and ECDSA using secp256k1 and SHA-256 for the signatures¶
The following examples use algorithms defined in JSON Proof Algorithms and also contain the keys used, so that implementations can validate these samples.¶
This example uses the Single-Use Algorithm as defined in JSON Proof Algorithms to create a JSON Proof Token. It demonstrates how to apply selective disclosure using an array of traditional JWS-based signatures. Unlinkability is only achieved by using each JWP one time, as multiple uses are inherently linkable via the traditional ECDSA signature embedded in the proof.¶
To begin, we need two asymmetric keys for Single Use: one that represents the JPT Issuer's stable key and the other is an ephemeral key generated by the Issuer just for this JWP.¶
This is the Issuer's stable private key used in this example in the JWK format:¶
{
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "EkOAuG3KJWED8eEbzaPPfbnqQiJm8ma7OJzI4teTN4w",
"y": "JKLFzK8PNYDB72OMDAsY4Ah7h-ywwEMsQgwZye5TaXY",
"d": "fe491S5aNFqr1DQEtTegz9vbYo0ssZXYxsQTN8UYg_g"
}
This is the ephemeral private key used in this example in the JWK format:¶
{
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "_gxZoS0Qqy2DJ-4b0SNnhd7ElFYiAJkP7_2X4LnLM84",
"y": "l2vcqoU_oLtZdDEii-5ubHV46uT0VY-Qe0NikMUrk0g",
"d": "brR0W1-fU_XzRTjK3rbYircdymajDc7JZmZdWcTn3WI"
}
This is the Holder's presentation private key used in this example in the JWK format:¶
{
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "adQOxcHoohdgUuZAy9BrxeDnj25krf38dwOu5hblxw4",
"y": "8P6lmfVoYt8-cavO3kOO3NaJw82HHgZx2FzRuC4ix8s",
"d": "WPMC1_kK0W6i4wFLO_bKI26444Ps45lUBeZEgvPThvg"
}
The JWP Protected Header declares that the data structure is a JPT and the JWP Proof Input is secured using the Single-Use ECDSA algorithm with the P-256 curve and SHA-256 digest. It also includes the ephemeral public key, the Holder's presentation public key and list of claims used for this JPT.¶
{
"alg": "SU-ES256",
"typ": "JPT",
"iss": "https://issuer.example",
"claims": [
"iat",
"exp",
"family_name",
"given_name",
"email",
"address",
"age_over_21"
],
"proof_key": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "_gxZoS0Qqy2DJ-4b0SNnhd7ElFYiAJkP7_2X4LnLM84",
"y": "l2vcqoU_oLtZdDEii-5ubHV46uT0VY-Qe0NikMUrk0g"
},
"presentation_key": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "adQOxcHoohdgUuZAy9BrxeDnj25krf38dwOu5hblxw4",
"y": "8P6lmfVoYt8-cavO3kOO3NaJw82HHgZx2FzRuC4ix8s"
}
}
eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpQVCIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaXNzdWVyL mV4YW1wbGUiLCJjbGFpbXMiOlsiaWF0IiwiZXhwIiwiZmFtaWx5X25hbWUiLCJnaXZlbl 9uYW1lIiwiZW1haWwiLCJhZGRyZXNzIiwiYWdlX292ZXJfMjEiXSwicHJvb2Zfa2V5Ijp 7Imt0eSI6IkVDIiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYiLCJ4IjoiX2d4Wm9TMFFxeTJESi00YjBTTm5o ZDdFbEZZaUFKa1A3XzJYNExuTE04NCIsInkiOiJsMnZjcW9VX29MdFpkREVpaS01dWJIV jQ2dVQwVlktUWUwTmlrTVVyazBnIn0sInByZXNlbnRhdGlvbl9rZXkiOnsia3R5IjoiRU MiLCJjcnYiOiJQLTI1NiIsIngiOiJhZFFPeGNIb29oZGdVdVpBeTlCcnhlRG5qMjVrcmY zOGR3T3U1aGJseHc0IiwieSI6IjhQNmxtZlZvWXQ4LWNhdk8za09PM05hSnc4MkhIZ1p4 MkZ6UnVDNGl4OHMifX0
The Single Use algorithm utilizes multiple individual JWS Signatures. Each signature value is generated by creating a JWS with a single Protected Header with the associated alg value. In this example, the fixed header used for each JWS is the serialized JSON Object {"alg":"ES256"}. This protected header will be used to generate a signature over each corresponding payload in the JWP. The corresponding octet value in the proof is the octet string (base64url-decoded) value of the signature.¶
The final proof value from the Issuer is an array with the octets of the header signature, followed by entries for each payload signature.¶
[
1714521600,
1717199999,
"Doe",
"Jay",
"jaydoe@example.org",
{
"formatted": "1234 Main St.\nAnytown, CA 12345\nUSA",
"street_address": "1234 Main St.",
"locality": "Anytown",
"region": "CA",
"postal_code": 12345,
"country": "USA"
},
true
]
The compact serialization of the same JPT is:¶
eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpQVCIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaXNzdWVyL mV4YW1wbGUiLCJjbGFpbXMiOlsiaWF0IiwiZXhwIiwiZmFtaWx5X25hbWUiLCJnaXZlbl 9uYW1lIiwiZW1haWwiLCJhZGRyZXNzIiwiYWdlX292ZXJfMjEiXSwicHJvb2Zfa2V5Ijp 7Imt0eSI6IkVDIiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYiLCJ4IjoiX2d4Wm9TMFFxeTJESi00YjBTTm5o ZDdFbEZZaUFKa1A3XzJYNExuTE04NCIsInkiOiJsMnZjcW9VX29MdFpkREVpaS01dWJIV jQ2dVQwVlktUWUwTmlrTVVyazBnIn0sInByZXNlbnRhdGlvbl9rZXkiOnsia3R5IjoiRU MiLCJjcnYiOiJQLTI1NiIsIngiOiJhZFFPeGNIb29oZGdVdVpBeTlCcnhlRG5qMjVrcmY zOGR3T3U1aGJseHc0IiwieSI6IjhQNmxtZlZvWXQ4LWNhdk8za09PM05hSnc4MkhIZ1p4 MkZ6UnVDNGl4OHMifX0.MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~Imp heWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI~eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuXG5Bbnl0 b3duLCBDQSAxMjM0NVxuVVNBIiwic3RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuI iwibG9jYWxpdHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI6MT IzNDUsImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~dHJ1ZQ._V1hId_gImqEtWDuirG1fkdYrA5M0EptT 1KTCRN-eD5rlKzo_Od81WyrOwsAtW4wmkJ4muhIZjaPV1NsYpGOdQ~THt9xfMstwml7tf NIC1a-A2ss8MvpKxpYpEFHXnUkEELbs_YplVRw66fPQc5RJ3-1qRxUR-GxUhX4oALQoeV rw~IiEFmu8krP6O7VSPmMwrEOlrNsY7LmyyeLMf7alggs9WOX15QovBT15QowozSXQB_O x0dpFYeEy91RDtQuqXdA~vo4LV3IOBFAKKrTA0rzNyeHAlOkrvgHRny73OZdgJnzpYybE 1h1O5-qJd_7Cv_2Z6n2AFzRv9_egsvF4s8legQ~TZ8fWA7YH62_yIa5Osb760p3-i0CTS _f7PmzzaQxDltNC-xQ_655nvxr5Mn9O1DT1BVQ6mLRVjMQS4YfMQmBTw~fwZaOq8UH4Df G9czAVKA4J62CcRyW_lvfafbozvscNI5B0ctJoBAbpIxY481TwdKo8tLvJ0m3csfRAgrH GKK0g~otf4nSEYFxquVhtcWKN7ZKIf7aoYIjv3hZhVFeznlgVtvh0uMHMIUExtdN7kVYt 5heRAFflW2eEvlWk3XBzUFA~eGz0vVIv-JL0vAYDVLzSokiLkxGoUXrv5k1t6hEptEgUu bYCvg3D3-aYyW2woZ2Gt_1JUzP_whojMPmBI-IDpw
To present this JPT, we first use the following presentation header with a nonce (provided by the Verifier):¶
{
"alg": "SU-ES256",
"aud": "https://recipient.example.com",
"nonce": "M-dxX-TqmKh2iewKUrWmL2OcAvY_CWCvTIayLba1mWA"
}
eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vcmVjaXBpZW50LmV4YW1wbGUuY 29tIiwibm9uY2UiOiJNLWR4WC1UcW1LaDJpZXdLVXJXbUwyT2NBdllfQ1dDdlRJYXlMYm ExbVdBIn0
When signed with the holder's presentation key, the resulting signature are:¶
qsMIQ6NbITvoXcDE1ItdGiGNiko1-yn9B5qb-5Br9PURg-9vIJSidzzqDm2n_hBk4e1sq ZCyMfIKoAcbEPzeHQ¶
Figure: Holder Proof-of-Possession (SU-ES256, JSON)¶
Then by applying selective disclosure of only the given name and age claims (family name and email hidden), we get the following presented JPT in compact serialization:¶
eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vcmVjaXBpZW50LmV4YW1wbGUuY 29tIiwibm9uY2UiOiJNLWR4WC1UcW1LaDJpZXdLVXJXbUwyT2NBdllfQ1dDdlRJYXlMYm ExbVdBIn0.eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpQVCIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8 vaXNzdWVyLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJjbGFpbXMiOlsiaWF0IiwiZXhwIiwiZmFtaWx5X25hbWUi LCJnaXZlbl9uYW1lIiwiZW1haWwiLCJhZGRyZXNzIiwiYWdlX292ZXJfMjEiXSwicHJvb 2Zfa2V5Ijp7Imt0eSI6IkVDIiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYiLCJ4IjoiX2d4Wm9TMFFxeTJESi 00YjBTTm5oZDdFbEZZaUFKa1A3XzJYNExuTE04NCIsInkiOiJsMnZjcW9VX29MdFpkREV paS01dWJIVjQ2dVQwVlktUWUwTmlrTVVyazBnIn0sInByZXNlbnRhdGlvbl9rZXkiOnsi a3R5IjoiRUMiLCJjcnYiOiJQLTI1NiIsIngiOiJhZFFPeGNIb29oZGdVdVpBeTlCcnhlR G5qMjVrcmYzOGR3T3U1aGJseHc0IiwieSI6IjhQNmxtZlZvWXQ4LWNhdk8za09PM05hSn c4MkhIZ1p4MkZ6UnVDNGl4OHMifX0.MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~I kpheSI~ImpheWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI~eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3 QuXG5Bbnl0b3duLCBDQSAxMjM0NVxuVVNBIiwic3RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1 haW4gU3QuIiwibG9jYWxpdHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxf Y29kZSI6MTIzNDUsImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~dHJ1ZQ~~._V1hId_gImqEtWDuirG1f kdYrA5M0EptT1KTCRN-eD5rlKzo_Od81WyrOwsAtW4wmkJ4muhIZjaPV1NsYpGOdQ~qsM IQ6NbITvoXcDE1ItdGiGNiko1-yn9B5qb-5Br9PURg-9vIJSidzzqDm2n_hBk4e1sqZCy MfIKoAcbEPzeHQ~THt9xfMstwml7tfNIC1a-A2ss8MvpKxpYpEFHXnUkEELbs_YplVRw6 6fPQc5RJ3-1qRxUR-GxUhX4oALQoeVrw~IiEFmu8krP6O7VSPmMwrEOlrNsY7LmyyeLMf 7alggs9WOX15QovBT15QowozSXQB_Ox0dpFYeEy91RDtQuqXdA~vo4LV3IOBFAKKrTA0r zNyeHAlOkrvgHRny73OZdgJnzpYybE1h1O5-qJd_7Cv_2Z6n2AFzRv9_egsvF4s8legQ~ TZ8fWA7YH62_yIa5Osb760p3-i0CTS_f7PmzzaQxDltNC-xQ_655nvxr5Mn9O1DT1BVQ6 mLRVjMQS4YfMQmBTw~fwZaOq8UH4DfG9czAVKA4J62CcRyW_lvfafbozvscNI5B0ctJoB AbpIxY481TwdKo8tLvJ0m3csfRAgrHGKK0g¶
Figure: Presentation (SU-ES256, JSON, Compact Serialization)¶
This example is meant to mirror the prior compact serialization, using RFC8392 and claims from [I-D.maldant-spice-oidc-cwt], illustrated using [I-D.ietf-cbor-edn-literals] (EDN).¶
To simplify this example, the same information is represented as the JPT example above, including the same public and private keys.¶
{ / protected header /
1: 1, / alg: "SU-ES256" /
3: 20, / typ: "JPT" (20CPA) /
5: "https://issuer.example", / iss: "https://issuer.example" /
6: [ / claims /
6, / "iat" /
4, / "exp" /
170, / "family_name" (I-D.maldant-spice-oidc-cwt TBD1) /
171, / "given_name" (I-D.maldant-spice-oidc-cwt TBD2) /
179, / "email" (I-D.maldant-spice-oidc-cwt TBD10) /
187, / "address" (I-D.maldant-spice-oidc-cwt TBD18) /
"age_over_21"
],
8: { / proof key /
1: 2, / kty : "EC2" /
-1: 1, / crv: "P-256" /
-2: h'69d40ec5c1e8a2176052e640cbd06bc5e0e78f6e64adfdfc7703aee6' +
h'16e5c70e', / x /
-3: h'f0fea599f56862df3e71abcede438edcd689c3cd871e0671d85cd1b8' +
h'2e22c7cb' / y /
},
9: { / presentation key /
1: 2, / kty: "EC2" /
-1: 1, / crv: "P-256" /
-2: h'fe0c59a12d10ab2d8327ee1bd1236785dec494562200990feffd97e0' +
h'b9cb33ce', / x /
-3: h'976bdcaa853fa0bb597431228bee6e6c7578eae4f4558f907b436290' +
h'c52b9348' / y /
}
}
¶
Figure: Issuer Protected Header (SU-ES256, CBOR)¶
[ / payloads /
/ iat / 171452160,
/ exp / 171719999,
/ family_name / "Doe",
/ given_name / "Jay",
/ email / "jaydoe@example.org",
/ address / {
/ formatted / 1: "1234 Main St.\nAnytown, CA 12345\nUSA",
/ street / 2: "1234 Main St.",
/ locality / 3: "Anytown",
/ region / 4: "CA",
/ post code / 5: "90210",
/ country / 6: "USA"
},
/ age_over_21 / true
]
¶
Figure: Issuer Payloads (as CBOR array)¶
When signed and serialized, the CPT is represented by the following CBOR (in hex):¶
8358cda601010314057668747470733a2f2f6973737565722e6578616d706c65 0687060418aa18ab18b318bb6b6167655f6f7665725f323108a4010220012158 2069d40ec5c1e8a2176052e640cbd06bc5e0e78f6e64adfdfc7703aee616e5c7 0e225820f0fea599f56862df3e71abcede438edcd689c3cd871e0671d85cd1b8 2e22c7cb09a401022001215820fe0c59a12d10ab2d8327ee1bd1236785dec494 562200990feffd97e0b9cb33ce225820976bdcaa853fa0bb597431228bee6e6c 7578eae4f4558f907b436290c52b9348871a0a3827001a0a3c3d3f63446f6563 4a6179726a6179646f65406578616d706c652e6f7267a601782331323334204d 61696e2053742e0a416e79746f776e2c2043412031323334350a555341026d31 323334204d61696e2053742e0367416e79746f776e0462434105653930323130 0663555341f5885840b9d82688d261b1d3214d5fa356f12a8c53af16538348be 957e2e4ff1a2a41ed01d9b41b450d5fc75d09a5bd5033e10aff8e4dbf128962b a23ac6d951ae395ee6584063fb57b93fc5edb9a0cd48b7764b9dcc4de7262d68 ab3d044431303920b3493be20c741e0fc320d2c03f2272799e151d8fecbf026c 00d6069fcb26db39743850584032c15b50a684eb85ce882e8e7f74dd4a28a168 26c2741354b4b8cb247fe9ab22a05a0b08ee0910d02998a7d42c92a98765374e e84e033647c1612878bd1774b658406e820845fc2925c5cc1ac525b8a5cea82e eca76acb7b0ab3d350839617bbf3478a1ff9e12dd6100acf824db94c0e811118 3d8f579751ea6740964db96cc949fa584064d8e264906f3a5fe09d64bbf5d1b8 4747aeeaf78c022fb58a557521a22598fb342db5caf6a5667e6c125368cbe04a 1b176b0f4fc30b0a5976ad217f3a6a2a775840f8fdbcaa708040b48ae4c22a85 08fe364733b2bb9516f19a410c8909228457af471630eed80789946fd3de9d7f 1a44a130221f94c50dec36990fa5625f0f39e5584010fc9c5b5245ef2cb74c56 9b623e13ce7aea2c6670720287e157202f6b8c628c80e9f7f77690178ddb889a 281b33a73cb4455a6c1a84a486d5838988f896806d584084bd726bd3f708e500 37ca2475fc9f889684665af9b5720b3b782c339f08f24c9182d255a7f2d4855b 8ddc50f354b5b0caaa6d0527e4e5dc0b97f75249fc2456¶
Fixtures: Issued Form (SU-ES256, CBOR)¶
The presented form, similarly to the issued form above, is made with the holder conveying the same parameters and the same set of selectively disclosed payloads as the JPT above:¶
{ / protected header /
1: 1, / alg: "SU-ES256" /
6: "https://recipient.example.com", / aud /
7: h'33e7715fe4ea98a87689ec0a52b5a62f639c02f63f0960af4c86b22db6b59960', / nonce /
}
¶
Figure: Holder Protected Header (SU-ES256, CBOR)¶
When the appropriate proof is generated, the CPT is serialized into the following CBOR (in hex):¶
845846a3010106781d68747470733a2f2f726563697069656e742e6578616d70 6c652e636f6d07582033e7715fe4ea98a87689ec0a52b5a62f639c02f63f0960 af4c86b22db6b5996058cda601010314057668747470733a2f2f697373756572 2e6578616d706c650687060418aa18ab18b318bb6b6167655f6f7665725f3231 08a40102200121582069d40ec5c1e8a2176052e640cbd06bc5e0e78f6e64adfd fc7703aee616e5c70e225820f0fea599f56862df3e71abcede438edcd689c3cd 871e0671d85cd1b82e22c7cb09a401022001215820fe0c59a12d10ab2d8327ee 1bd1236785dec494562200990feffd97e0b9cb33ce225820976bdcaa853fa0bb 597431228bee6e6c7578eae4f4558f907b436290c52b9348891a0a3827001a0a 3c3d3f63446f65634a6179726a6179646f65406578616d706c652e6f7267a601 782331323334204d61696e2053742e0a416e79746f776e2c2043412031323334 350a555341026d31323334204d61696e2053742e0367416e79746f776e046243 41056539303231300663555341f5f6f6875840b9d82688d261b1d3214d5fa356 f12a8c53af16538348be957e2e4ff1a2a41ed01d9b41b450d5fc75d09a5bd503 3e10aff8e4dbf128962ba23ac6d951ae395ee658404bf555b94bab9da8ec1b24 12e86e1d5fca23ca3b7cd5fdc666009c8f1fc1ea369e1e216e1d0f3b19099992 82e08c7f6f32c361ba8ecabec9710153f29353b72a584063fb57b93fc5edb9a0 cd48b7764b9dcc4de7262d68ab3d044431303920b3493be20c741e0fc320d2c0 3f2272799e151d8fecbf026c00d6069fcb26db39743850584032c15b50a684eb 85ce882e8e7f74dd4a28a16826c2741354b4b8cb247fe9ab22a05a0b08ee0910 d02998a7d42c92a98765374ee84e033647c1612878bd1774b658406e820845fc 2925c5cc1ac525b8a5cea82eeca76acb7b0ab3d350839617bbf3478a1ff9e12d d6100acf824db94c0e8111183d8f579751ea6740964db96cc949fa584064d8e2 64906f3a5fe09d64bbf5d1b84747aeeaf78c022fb58a557521a22598fb342db5 caf6a5667e6c125368cbe04a1b176b0f4fc30b0a5976ad217f3a6a2a775840f8 fdbcaa708040b48ae4c22a8508fe364733b2bb9516f19a410c8909228457af47 1630eed80789946fd3de9d7f1a44a130221f94c50dec36990fa5625f0f39e5¶
Figure: Presented Form (SU-ES256, CBOR)¶
The following example uses the BBS algorithm.¶
This is the Issuer's stable private key in the JWK format:¶
{
"kty": "EC2",
"alg": "BBS",
"use": "proof",
"crv": "BLS12381G2",
"x": "DrMMfXyz4YnttkVT_UQ4W8V_DDycVWd5tlgd8RiYtAZQspeSQ3F7eG5AG41up
pXLE5z_Ozc3MdMmNAJBZiwCySmWVU7eIkIpvJ1672bU_GGfFsTo2cXQtfEkgcj
GRSTa",
"y": "AslWaPSsQSL7EWrotiNi_Z10VXPRYJXpWpEUnLDTSkn5zATcUIMgqwIDFTsNX
C9eAyftjyYSGMgMPKSpKJb9u9PZrVpxFRMR9AOvftbbW17S-WzHVQw3lKsa2U6
q1rE-",
"d": "TdCNViB9jSxSljUu0Rq8x66CGsxdGthfjK57mSpVjOk"
}
There is no additional holder key necessary for presentation proofs.¶
For the following protected header and array of payloads:¶
{
"kid": "HjfcpyjuZQ-O8Ye2hQnNbT9RbbnrobptdnExR0DUjU8",
"alg": "BBS"
}
These components are signed using the private issuer key previously given, which is then representable in the following serialization:¶
eyJraWQiOiJIamZjcHlqdVpRLU84WWUyaFFuTmJUOVJiYm5yb2JwdGRuRXhSMERValU4I iwiYWxnIjoiQkJTIn0.MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~Imph eWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI~eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuXG5Bbnl0b 3duLCBDQSAxMjM0NVxuVVNBIiwic3RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuIi wibG9jYWxpdHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI6MTI zNDUsImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~dHJ1ZQ.ikXhGLnar3PSw7HAKmToiC8ExTFXFyXR9b FVdLA21lPROFXJ7p9X_uVwCyZ_wsZ3K7OPJDBWrOPs9JaaerDAFED9GdtgcG9Fm9uTtAO BmAI
For a presentation with the following presentation header:¶
{
"alg": "BBS",
"aud": "https://recipient.example.com",
"nonce": "wrmBRkKtXjQ"
}
The holder decides to share all information other than the email address, and generates a proof. That proof is represented in the following serialization:¶
eyJhbGciOiJCQlMiLCJhdWQiOiJodHRwczovL3JlY2lwaWVudC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsI m5vbmNlIjoid3JtQlJrS3RYalEifQ.eyJraWQiOiJIamZjcHlqdVpRLU84WWUyaFFuTmJ UOVJiYm5yb2JwdGRuRXhSMERValU4IiwiYWxnIjoiQkJTIn0.MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxN zE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~~~.gF3FqG6-3kbq0JaUp1E7zn2z1OivJMuoUFUF6QE0 HjX_owZpboqXm5Y8iFIF53yctGzj8W7Au3ciIu8pGDrYk9ebxKgKFddObv56q1wp24lfQ OnmK7tfCl6ZD0XcmFxTogbpvsM_s9cI236IFCwBLtE7g9FN6Ih0WmzInB0e2nxsYlpIsW lgOq9KRWiXjnLpBw0xef9IsCy8DOaD0MPPUeAfBIP_qi4aJ2e4bmMj-dYMBM_cyh-YI3e ASfwqEv9nJ5ntzmmHi3Im8ORqbjYMJgkk6xZLFhtKGpSL-f7zMOF4zxbJpKgxTg6o6fkl lV4_RNGKL75nIHSPB5iuJhs0O52hTkdojkIgxHnsTXtTke9IC_IR5u8eO9QiI5SQxE3y1 3Sl4O3Hrqp65tIM-Kl-kSNVrJ7DbVokn0lB7m69wtVtSzCZGWRZt2oQP4J_NRcycN5p1Q ZDh1InHRLKBu-4PPZDkZ3fh0dot937tZRNFu4
The following example uses the MAC-H256 algorithm.¶
This is the Issuer's stable private key in the JWK format:¶
{
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "EkOAuG3KJWED8eEbzaPPfbnqQiJm8ma7OJzI4teTN4w",
"y": "JKLFzK8PNYDB72OMDAsY4Ah7h-ywwEMsQgwZye5TaXY",
"d": "fe491S5aNFqr1DQEtTegz9vbYo0ssZXYxsQTN8UYg_g"
}
This is the Issuer's ephemerally generated shared secret:¶
"FhJr_57SONbkVn6mKRgkG89-Eb5yFZL2-cd8hMEX-lU"
This is the Holder's presentation private key in the JWK format:¶
{
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "adQOxcHoohdgUuZAy9BrxeDnj25krf38dwOu5hblxw4",
"y": "8P6lmfVoYt8-cavO3kOO3NaJw82HHgZx2FzRuC4ix8s",
"d": "WPMC1_kK0W6i4wFLO_bKI26444Ps45lUBeZEgvPThvg"
}
For the following protected header and array of payloads:¶
{
"alg": "MAC-H256",
"typ": "JPT",
"iss": "https://issuer.example",
"claims": [
"iat",
"exp",
"family_name",
"given_name",
"email",
"address",
"age_over_21"
],
"presentation_key": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"use": "sign",
"x": "adQOxcHoohdgUuZAy9BrxeDnj25krf38dwOu5hblxw4",
"y": "8P6lmfVoYt8-cavO3kOO3NaJw82HHgZx2FzRuC4ix8s"
}
}
[
1714521600,
1717199999,
"Doe",
"Jay",
"jaydoe@example.org",
{
"formatted": "1234 Main St.\nAnytown, CA 12345\nUSA",
"street_address": "1234 Main St.",
"locality": "Anytown",
"region": "CA",
"postal_code": 12345,
"country": "USA"
},
true
]
The first MAC is generated using the key issuer_header and a value of the issuer protected header as a UTF-8 encoded octet string. This results in the following MAC:¶
5vfvU1oprWLQq7TNCnCTLX-cgowTNBei3GxHuGor_vs
The issuer generates an array of derived keys with one for each payload by using the shared secret as the key, and the index of the payload (as payload_{n} in UTF-8 encoded octets) as the input in a HMAC operation. This results in the following set of derived keys:¶
[ "MQ9XK50oHtQyXepRTfaIt4K09a4sYl8k3tSxDhYx_5w", "hOVouuOID1Z1GD1syRTZ_PESz8llFkEhwWiVVeSc3ho", "y2o77owMQvaBF66dJUgQXdKKkXlndSBK2FhpReQEi5A", "PEsgQazhBdg7eHo56O1Bx0Kmti0WXTptqM0hJrFEM4Q", "Q8cIo_9xqOVjsCzpgjsmPG0yDsU4IoncESTZSVG3Yvw", "PZOuG6eJDFhkZGHh2wWQFw7s_Ov_0oddhIY3pIVGNro", "rmoy2l6Yxc25Ved2FnzIDkSxVmUZ0RsvtHG7yinvCHA" ]
A MAC is generated for each payload using the corresponding derived payload key. This results in the following set of MAC values:¶
[ "lISR_F-TtW3SeqjI9zwmRE1TKZaFpzX3sm35_dXzVhY", "gHQ_kOu6a1CUgHpPH9A0cXU7DOiUi0R1TTx5dbhS7B4", "xu7H4bqIHifvbKZhLztuVkfMuzr9JzY3shYMLpuoiRU", "7-3jz32eIZp8Cpr_fcXos4VjtICF88Vkilr3hrRCEU8", "zL0xDea1sYbEdx-3A1h4d-DTPEmO0G1tdskT09iqfaM", "hGpXBzuj0gtiBepv-9ciGEkeDZkcD4Jj_vEP2wj9w5s", "m2MaZgovG0qjAasqxLa_bwpdg3njVqvs0hZzHuaknoI" ]
The issuer protected header MAC and the payload MAC octet strings are concatenated into a single value known as the combined MAC representation. This representation is signed with the issuer's private key.¶
The proof consists of two octet string values: the signature over the combined MAC representation, and the shared secret.¶
[ "glh0bmALNHtUMAHDXlgQ1uLe0wRXoBQubKWGhz9NcBwXi6kOip2ENLJU2dRMO4AGCn dHGwJFPtc6Dqetkids_w", "fCQdKenl4vNTluJUfPzHaN0H-iEYH_wOhyzwKIS7jIM" ]
The final issued JWP in compact serialization is:¶
eyJhbGciOiJNQUMtSDI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpQVCIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaXNzdWVyL mV4YW1wbGUiLCJjbGFpbXMiOlsiaWF0IiwiZXhwIiwiZmFtaWx5X25hbWUiLCJnaXZlbl 9uYW1lIiwiZW1haWwiLCJhZGRyZXNzIiwiYWdlX292ZXJfMjEiXSwicHJlc2VudGF0aW9 uX2tleSI6eyJrdHkiOiJFQyIsImNydiI6IlAtMjU2IiwidXNlIjoic2lnbiIsIngiOiJh ZFFPeGNIb29oZGdVdVpBeTlCcnhlRG5qMjVrcmYzOGR3T3U1aGJseHc0IiwieSI6IjhQN mxtZlZvWXQ4LWNhdk8za09PM05hSnc4MkhIZ1p4MkZ6UnVDNGl4OHMifX0.MTcxNDUyMT YwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~ImpheWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI~eyJmb 3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuXG5Bbnl0b3duLCBDQSAxMjM0NVxuVVNBIiwic3 RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuIiwibG9jYWxpdHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIiw icmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI6MTIzNDUsImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~d HJ1ZQ.glh0bmALNHtUMAHDXlgQ1uLe0wRXoBQubKWGhz9NcBwXi6kOip2ENLJU2dRMO4A GCndHGwJFPtc6Dqetkids_w~fCQdKenl4vNTluJUfPzHaN0H-iEYH_wOhyzwKIS7jIM
Next, we show the presentation of the JWP with selective disclosure.¶
For presentation with the following presentation protected header:¶
{
"alg": "MAC-H256",
"aud": "https://recipient.example.com",
"nonce": "M-dxX-TqmKh2iewKUrWmL2OcAvY_CWCvTIayLba1mWA"
}
The holder will take the issuer proof (including shared secret) and derive the same individual payload MAC values (above).¶
In this case, the holder has decided not to disclose the last three claims provided by the issuer (corresponding to email, address, and age_over_21)¶
For the disclosed payloads, the holder will provide the corresponding derived key. For the non-disclosed payloads, the holder will provide the corresponding MAC value.¶
The final presented proof value is an array of octet strings. The contents are presentation header signature, followed by the issuer signature, then the value disclosed by the holder for each payload. This results in the following proof:¶
[ "b1W5R_DDaciSfwwTl2tktK4KkIjPm4hz2k0DDItJsKHG_ZFki8oAVsghpOTjZHLoXt tDZBSmNF_zxT3tL0hd0w", "glh0bmALNHtUMAHDXlgQ1uLe0wRXoBQubKWGhz9NcBwXi6kOip2ENLJU2dRMO4AGCn dHGwJFPtc6Dqetkids_w", "MQ9XK50oHtQyXepRTfaIt4K09a4sYl8k3tSxDhYx_5w", "hOVouuOID1Z1GD1syRTZ_PESz8llFkEhwWiVVeSc3ho", "y2o77owMQvaBF66dJUgQXdKKkXlndSBK2FhpReQEi5A", "PEsgQazhBdg7eHo56O1Bx0Kmti0WXTptqM0hJrFEM4Q", "zL0xDea1sYbEdx-3A1h4d-DTPEmO0G1tdskT09iqfaM", "hGpXBzuj0gtiBepv-9ciGEkeDZkcD4Jj_vEP2wj9w5s", "m2MaZgovG0qjAasqxLa_bwpdg3njVqvs0hZzHuaknoI" ]
The final presented JWP in compact serialization is:¶
eyJhbGciOiJNQUMtSDI1NiIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vcmVjaXBpZW50LmV4YW1wbGUuY 29tIiwibm9uY2UiOiJNLWR4WC1UcW1LaDJpZXdLVXJXbUwyT2NBdllfQ1dDdlRJYXlMYm ExbVdBIn0.eyJhbGciOiJNQUMtSDI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpQVCIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8 vaXNzdWVyLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJjbGFpbXMiOlsiaWF0IiwiZXhwIiwiZmFtaWx5X25hbWUi LCJnaXZlbl9uYW1lIiwiZW1haWwiLCJhZGRyZXNzIiwiYWdlX292ZXJfMjEiXSwicHJlc 2VudGF0aW9uX2tleSI6eyJrdHkiOiJFQyIsImNydiI6IlAtMjU2IiwidXNlIjoic2lnbi IsIngiOiJhZFFPeGNIb29oZGdVdVpBeTlCcnhlRG5qMjVrcmYzOGR3T3U1aGJseHc0Iiw ieSI6IjhQNmxtZlZvWXQ4LWNhdk8za09PM05hSnc4MkhIZ1p4MkZ6UnVDNGl4OHMifX0. MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~~~.b1W5R_DDaciSfwwTl2tk tK4KkIjPm4hz2k0DDItJsKHG_ZFki8oAVsghpOTjZHLoXttDZBSmNF_zxT3tL0hd0w~gl h0bmALNHtUMAHDXlgQ1uLe0wRXoBQubKWGhz9NcBwXi6kOip2ENLJU2dRMO4AGCndHGwJ FPtc6Dqetkids_w~MQ9XK50oHtQyXepRTfaIt4K09a4sYl8k3tSxDhYx_5w~hOVouuOID 1Z1GD1syRTZ_PESz8llFkEhwWiVVeSc3ho~y2o77owMQvaBF66dJUgQXdKKkXlndSBK2F hpReQEi5A~PEsgQazhBdg7eHo56O1Bx0Kmti0WXTptqM0hJrFEM4Q~zL0xDea1sYbEdx- 3A1h4d-DTPEmO0G1tdskT09iqfaM~hGpXBzuj0gtiBepv-9ciGEkeDZkcD4Jj_vEP2wj9 w5s~m2MaZgovG0qjAasqxLa_bwpdg3njVqvs0hZzHuaknoI
This work was incubated in the DIF Applied Cryptography Working Group.¶
We would like to thank Alberto Solavagione for his valuable contributions to this specification.¶
The BBS examples were generated using the library at https://github.com/mattrglobal/pairing_crypto .¶
[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]¶
-09¶
-08¶
-07¶
proof_key and presentation_key names¶
proof_jwk to proof_key and presentation_jwk to
presentation_key to better represent that the key may be JSON
or CBOR-formatted.¶
proof_key and presentation_key to JWP
where they are defined. Consolidated usage, purpose and
requirements from algorith musage under these definitions.¶
BBS-PROOF into BBS¶
-06¶
presentation_header.¶
pjwk to presentation_jwk¶
-05¶
-04¶
BBS-DRAFT-5 to BBS, and from BBS-PROOF-DRAFT-5 to BBS-PROOF¶
BBS_BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_¶
-03¶
-02¶
BBS-DRAFT-3 and BBS-PROOF-DRAFT-3 algorithms based on draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures-03.¶
BBS-X algorithm based on a particular implementation of earlier drafts.¶
-01¶
issuer_header and presentation_header¶
-00¶