| Internet-Draft | json-proof-algorithms | November 2025 |
| Jones, et al. | Expires 8 May 2026 | [Page] |
The JSON Proof Algorithms (JPA) specification registers cryptographic algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Proof, JSON Web Key (JWK), and COSE specifications. It defines IANA registries for these identifiers.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 May 2026.¶
Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
The JSON Web Proof (JWP) [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-proof] draft establishes a new secure container format that supports selective disclosure and unlinkability using Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) or other cryptographic algorithms.¶
Editor's Note: This draft is still early and incomplete. There will be significant changes to the algorithms as currently defined here. Please do not use any of these definitions or examples for anything except personal experimentation and learning. Contributions and feedback are welcomed at https://github.com/ietf-wg-jose/json-web-proof.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
The roles of "issuer", "holder", and "verifier" are used as defined by the VC Data Model [VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]. The term "presentation" is also used as defined by this source, but the term "credential" is avoided in this specification to minimize confusion with other definitions.¶
The terms "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", "Base64url Encoding", "Header Parameter", "JOSE Header", "JWS Payload", "JWS Signature", and "JWS Protected Header" are defined by [RFC7515].¶
The terms "JSON Web Proof (JWP)", "JWP Payload", "JWP Proof", and "JWP Header" are defined by [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-proof].¶
These terms are defined by this specification:¶
JWP defines a container binding together a Header, one or more payloads, and a cryptographic proof. It does not define any details about the interactions between an application and the cryptographic libraries that implement proof-supporting algorithms.¶
Due to the nature of ZKPs, this specification also documents the subtle but important differences in proof algorithms versus those defined by the JSON Web Algorithms [RFC7518]. These differences help support more advanced capabilities such as blinded signatures and predicate proofs.¶
The four principal interactions that every proof algorithm MUST support are issue, confirm, present, and verify.¶
The JWP is first created as the output of a JPA's issue operation.¶
Every algorithm MUST support a JSON issuer Header along with one or more octet string payloads. The algorithm MAY support using additional items provided by the holder for issuance such as blinded payloads, keys for replay prevention, etc.¶
All algorithms MUST provide integrity protection for the Issuer Header and all payloads and MUST specify all digest and/or hash2curve methods used.¶
Performed by the holder to validate that the issued JWP is correctly formed and protected.¶
Each algorithm MAY support using additional input items options, such as those sent to the issuer for issuance. After confirmation, an algorithm MAY return a modified JWP for serialized storage without the local state (such as with blinded payloads now unblinded).¶
The algorithm MUST fully verify the issued proof value against the Issuer Header and all payloads. If given a presented JWP instead of an issued one, the confirm process MUST return an error.¶
Used to apply any selective disclosure choices and perform any unlinkability transformations, as well as to show binding.¶
An algorithm MAY support additional input options from the requesting party, such as for predicate proofs and verifiable computation requests.¶
Every algorithm MUST support the ability to hide any or all payloads. It MUST always include the Issuer Header unmodified in the presentation.¶
The algorithm MUST replace the issued proof value and generate a new presented proof value. It also MUST include a new Presentation Header that provides replay protection.¶
Performed by the verifier to verify the Headers along with any disclosed payloads and/or assertions about them from the proving party, while also verifying they are the same payloads and ordering as witnessed by the issuer.¶
The algorithm MUST verify the integrity of all disclosed payloads and MUST also verify the integrity of both the Issuer and Presentation Headers.¶
If the presented proof contains any assertions about the hidden payloads, the algorithm MUST also verify all of those assertions. It MAY support additional options, such as those sent to the holder to generate the presentation.¶
If given an issued JWP for verification, the algorithm MUST return an error.¶
This section defines how to use specific algorithms for JWPs.¶
The Single Use (SU) algorithm is based on composing multiple traditional asymmetric signatures into a single JWP proof. It enables a very simple form of selective disclosure without requiring any advanced cryptographic techniques.¶
It does not support unlinkability if the same JWP is presented multiple times, therefore when privacy is required the holder will need to interact with the issuer again to receive new single-use JWPs (dynamically or in batches).¶
The Single Use algorithm uses multiple signing keys to protect the Header as well as individual payloads of an Issued JWP. The issuer uses a stable public key to sign each Header, and a per-JWP ephemeral key (conveyed within the Header) to protect the individual payloads. These signatures are all created using the same Asymmetric Algorithm, with the JOSE and COSE name/label of this algorithm being part of registration for a fully-specified Single Use algorithm identifier.¶
The Issuer Header also conveys a holder presentation key, an ephemeral asymmetric key meant to only be used for presenting a single JWP. The fully-specified algorithm the holder must use for presentations is also included. This algorithm MAY be different from the algorithm used by the issuer.¶
The chosen algorithms MUST be asymmetric signing algorithms, so that each signature can be verified without sharing any private values between the parties.¶
In order to support the protection of a presentation by a holder to a verifier, the holder MUST use a Holder Presentation Key during the issuance and the presentation of every Single Use JWP. This Holder Presentation Key MUST be generated and used for only one JWP if unlinkability is desired.¶
The issuer MUST verify that the holder has possession of this key. The holder-issuer communication to exchange this information is out of scope of this specification, but can be accomplished by the holder using this key to generate a JWS that signs a value the issuer can verify as unique.¶
The issuer MUST determine an appropriate holder presentation algorithm
corresponding to the holder presentation key. If the holder and
verifier cannot be assumed to know this algorithm is the appropriate
choice for a given holder presentation key, this value MUST be conveyed
in the hpa Issuer Header.¶
To create a Single Use JWP, the issuer first generates a unique Ephemeral Key using the selected internal algorithm. This key-pair will be used to sign each of the payloads of a single JWP and then discarded.¶
Each individual payload is signed using the selected internal algorithm using the Ephemeral Key.¶
The Issuer's Ephemeral Key MUST be included via the Issuer Ephemeral Key Header Parameter.¶
The Holder's Presentation Key MUST be included via the Holder Presentation Key Header Parameter.¶
The Holder's Presentation Algorithm MUST be included via the Holder Presentation Algorithm Header Parameter unless there is another way for the holder and verifier to unambiguously determine the appropriate algorithm to use.¶
The Issuer Header is signed using the appropriate internal signing algorithm for the given fully-specified single use algorithm, using the issuer's Stable Key.¶
Each JWP payload is processed in order and signed using the given JWA using the issuer's Ephemeral Key.¶
The proof value is an octet string array. The first entry is the octet string of the Issuer Header signature, with an additional entry for each payload signature.¶
To generate a new presentation, the holder first creates a Presentation
Header that is specific to the verifier being presented to.
This Header MUST contain a parameter that both the holder and verifier
trust as being unique and non-replayable. Use of the nonce Header
Parameter is RECOMMENDED for this purpose.¶
This specification registers the nonce Header Parameter for the
Presentation Header that contains a string value either
generated by the verifier or derived from values provided by the
verifier. When present, the verifier MUST ensure the nonce value
matches during verification.¶
The Presentation Header MAY contain other Header Parameters that are either provided by the verifier or by the holder. These Presentation Header Parameters SHOULD NOT contain values that are common across multiple presentations and SHOULD be unique to a single presentation and verifier.¶
The Presentation Header MUST contain the same Algorithm protected header as the Issuer Header. The Holder Presentation Algorithm Header Parameter MUST NOT be included.¶
The holder derives a new proof as part of presentation. The holder will also use these components to generate a presentation internal representation. The number of components depends on the number of payloads which are being disclosed in the presented JWP.¶
The first proof component will be the signature over the Issuer Header made by the issuer's Stable Key.¶
For each payload which is to be disclosed, the corresponding payload signature (from the issued JWP) is included as a subsequent proof component. If the payload is being omitted, the corresponding payload signature is omitted from the proof components.¶
The Presentation Header, Issuer Header, payload slots (distinguishing which are being disclosed) and these proof components are inputs to determine the presentation internal representation.¶
The holder's signature over the presentation internal representation (using the holder's private key and the holder presentation algorithm) is then included as one additional proof component in the final presentation.¶
For example, if only the second and fifth of five payloads are being disclosed, then the proof at this stage will consist of three values:¶
The presentation internal representation would be calculated with these three proof components, while the final presentation would have an additional fourth component containing the signature using the holder's private key.¶
Since the individual signatures in the proof value are unique and remain unchanged across multiple presentations, a Single Use JWP SHOULD only be presented a single time to each verifier in order for the holder to remain unlinkable across multiple presentations.¶
Verification is performed using the following steps.¶
The proposed JWP alg value is of the format "SU-" appended with the
relevant JWS alg value for the chosen public and ephemeral key-pair
algorithm, for example "SU-ES256".¶
Some algorithms (such as Single use and MAC) use a holder key to provide integrity over the presentation. For these algorithms, an internal binary form of the presentation must be generated both for signing by the holder, and for verification by the verifier. Other algorithms MAY use this same form for consistency.¶
The instructions for creating this binary representation will also create well-formed CBOR, although this data is not meant to be shared outside the implementing algorithm. Instead, it focuses on simplicity of generation by the holder and verifier implementations. Although CBOR has multiple representations of the same underlying information, this same octet string MUST be generated by an implementation.¶
When a length or count is added by the steps below, it is added as its
8-byte, network-ordered representation. For example, the length of a
1,234 byte payload would have a length representation of
0x00 00 00 00 00 00 04 D2.¶
The binary representation is created by appending data into a single octet string in the following order:¶
0x84 5B¶
0x5B¶
0x9B¶
For each payload representation:¶
0x9B¶
The number of proof components as specified by the algorithm¶
For each proof component, append:¶
The BBS Signature Scheme [I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures] is under active development within the CRFG.¶
This algorithm supports both selective disclosure and unlinkability, enabling the holder to generate multiple presentations from one issued JWP without a verifier being able to correlate those presentations together based on the proof.¶
The BBS algorithm corresponds to a cipher suite identifier of
BBS_BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_.¶
The key used for the BBS algorithm is an elliptic curve-based key
pair, specifically against the G_2 subgroup of a pairing friendly curve.
Additional details on key generation can be found in
Section 3.4. The JWK and Cose Key
Object representations of the key are detailed in
[I-D.ietf-cose-bls-key-representations].¶
There is no additional holder presentation key necessary for presentation proofs.¶
Issuance is performed using the Sign operation from
Section 3.5.1 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures]. This operation
utilizes the issuer's BLS12-381 G2 key pair as SK and PK, along with
desired Header octets as header, and the array of payload
octet string as messages.¶
The octets resulting from this operation form a single octet string in the issuance proof array, to be used along with the Header and payloads to serialize the JWP.¶
Holder verification of the signature on issuance form is performed using
the Verify operation from [@!I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures, section
3.5.2].¶
This operation utilizes the issuer's public key as PK, the proof as
signature, the Header octets as header and the array of
payload octets as messages.¶
Derivation of a presentation is done by the holder using the ProofGen
operation from Section 3.5.3 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures].¶
This operation utilizes the issuer's public key as PK, the Issuer
Header as header, the issuance proof as signature, the
issuance payloads as messages, and the holder's Presentation Header
as ph.¶
The operation also takes a vector of indexes into messages, describing
which payloads the holder wishes to disclose. All payloads are required
for proof generation, but only these indicated payloads will be required
to be disclosed for later proof verification.¶
The output of this operation is the presentation proof, as a single octet string.¶
Presentation serialization leverages the two Headers and
presentation proof, along with the disclosed payloads. Non-disclosed
payloads are represented with the absent value of null in CBOR
serialization and a zero-length string in compact serialization.¶
Verification of a presentation is done by the verifier using the
ProofVerify operation from [@!I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures, Section
3.5.4].¶
This operation utilizes the issuer's public key as PK, the Issuer
Header as header, the issuance proof as signature, the
holder's Presentation Header as ph, and the payloads as
disclosed_messages.¶
In addition, the disclosed_indexes scalar array is calculated from the
payloads provided. Values disclosed in the presented payloads have a
zero-based index in this array, while the indices of absent payloads are
omitted.¶
The Message Authentication Code (MAC) JPA uses a MAC to both generate ephemeral secrets and to authenticate payloads, along with an asymmetric signature to provide integrity to the issued JWP.¶
The holder can manipulate which payloads are disclosed from the issued JWP, and uses the Holder Presentation Key to create a presentation. The signature created from the Holder Presentation Key MAY use a different algorithm than the Issuer used to sign the issued form.¶
Like the Single Use algorithm family, it also does not support unlinkability if the same JWP is presented multiple times and requires an individually issued JWP for each presentation in order to fully protect privacy. When compared to the JWS approach, using a MAC requires less computation but can result in potentially larger presentation proof values.¶
The design is intentionally minimal and only involves using a single standardized MAC method instead of a mix of MAC/hash methods or a custom hash-based construct. It is able to use any published cryptographic MAC method such as HMAC [RFC2104] or KMAC. It uses traditional public key-based signatures to verify the authenticity of the issuer and holder.¶
In order to support the protection of a presentation by a holder to a verifier, the holder MUST use a Holder Presentation Key during the issuance and the presentation of every MAC JWP. This Holder Presentation Key MUST be generated and used for only one JWP if unlinkability is desired.¶
The issuer MUST verify that the holder has possession of this key. The holder-issuer communication to exchange this information is out of scope of this specification, but can be accomplished by the holder using this key to generate a JWS that signs a value the issuer can verify as unique.¶
The holder's presentation key MUST be included in the Issuer Header using the Holder Presentation Key Header Parameter.¶
The issuer MUST determine an appropriate holder presentation algorithm corresponding to the holder presentation key. If the holder and verifier cannot be assumed to know this algorithm is the appropriate choice for a given holder presentation key, this value MUST be conveyed in the Holder Protected Algorithm Header Parameter.¶
To use the MAC algorithm, the issuer must have a stable public key pair to perform signing. To start the issuance process, a single 32-byte random Shared Secret must first be generated. This value will be shared privately with the holder as part of the issuer's JWP proof value.¶
The Shared Secret is used by both the issuer and holder as the MAC method's key to generate a new set of unique ephemeral keys. These keys are then used as the input to generate a MAC that protects each payload.¶
The combined MAC representation is a single octet string representing the MAC values of the Issuer Header, along with each payload provided by the issuer. This representation is signed by the issuer, but not shared - parties will recreate this octet string and verify the signature to verify the integrity of supplied Issuer Header and the integrity of any disclosed payloads.¶
The steps below describe a sequential concatenation of binary values to generate the Combined MAC Representation. The instructions for generating this octet string will also generate well-formed CBOR, although this data is not meant to be shared outside the implementing algorithm. Instead, it focuses on simplicity of generation by the issuer, holder, and verifier implementations. Although CBOR has multiple representations of the same underlying information, this same octet string MUST be generated by an implementation.¶
When a length or count is added by steps in this section, it is added as
its 8-byte, network-ordered representation. For example, the length of
a 1,234-byte payload would have a length representation of
0x00 00 00 00 00 00 04 D2.¶
The holder will a unique key per payload value using a MAC, with the Shared Secret as the key and a generated binary value. This binary value is constructed by appending data into a single octet string:¶
The holder will also compute a corresponding MAC of each payload. This MAC uses the unique key above and the payload octet string as the value.¶
When verifying a presentation, the shared secret will be unavailable so the unique key cannot be calculated. The payload octet string may also be omitted in the presentation. The following instructions describe how to get the corresponding MAC of each payload:¶
The binary representation is created by appending data into a single octet string in the following order:¶
The Holder's Presentation Key MUST be included via the Holder Presentation Key Header Parameter.¶
The Holder's Presentation Algorithm MUST be included via the Holder Presentation Algorithm Header Parameter unless there is another way for the holder and verifier to unambiguously determine the appropriate algorithm to use.¶
The issuer proof consists of two octet strings.¶
The first octet string is the issuer signature over the combined MAC representation. The issuer signs the combined MAC representation using its stable public key, and the internal signing algorithm for the given fully-specified MAC algorithm variant.¶
The second octet string is the Shared Secret used to generate the per-payload keys for the combined representation.¶
See the Presentation Header section given for Single Use algorithms.¶
The presentation proof is made of multiple components.¶
The first proof component is the issuer signature over the Combined MAC Representation, which is provided as the first proof component from the issued form.¶
There will now be one proof component per payload slot in the issued JWP. These are used by the verifier to reconstruct the combined MAC representation without access to the Shared Secret. The proof components are calculated per the instructions used to generate the Combined MAC Representation¶
If a payload is disclosed, the corresponding proof component will be the unique key.¶
If a payload is not disclosed, the corresponding proof component will be the payload's MAC (using the unique key.)¶
The Presentation Header, Issuer Header, payload slots (distinguishing which are being disclosed) and above proof components are inputs to determine the presentation internal representation.¶
The holder's signature over the presentation internal representation (using the holder's private key and the holder presentation algorithm) is then included as one additional proof component in the final presentation.¶
The presented form should have two more proof components than payload slots in the issued JWP.¶
Note that the second component of the issued JWP is a shared secret for use by the holder to generate the unique keys used in the Combined MAC Representation. This MUST NOT be included in the presentation.¶
Verification is performed using the following steps.¶
Proposed JWP alg value is of the format "MAC-" appended with a unique
identifier for the set of MAC and signing algorithms used. Below are
the initial registrations:¶
MAC-H256 uses HMAC SHA-256 as the MAC and
ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256 for the signatures¶
MAC-H384 uses HMAC SHA-384 as the MAC and
ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384 for the signatures¶
MAC-H512 uses HMAC SHA-512 as the MAC and
ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512 for the signatures¶
MAC-K25519 uses KMAC SHAKE128 as the MAC and
EdDSA using Curve25519 for the signatures¶
MAC-K448 uses KMAC SHAKE256 as the MAC and EdDSA using Curve448
for the signatures¶
MAC-H256K uses HMAC SHA-256 as the MAC and
ECDSA using secp256k1 and SHA-256 for the signatures¶
Editor's Note: This will follow once the algorithms defined here have become more stable.¶
The following registration procedure is used for all the registries established by this specification.¶
Values are registered on a Specification Required [RFC5226] basis after a three-week review period on the jose-reg-review@ietf.org mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published.¶
Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register JWP algorithm: example").¶
Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful. Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution.¶
Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts include determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing functionality, whether it is likely to be of general applicability or useful only for a single application, and whether the registration description is clear.¶
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing list.¶
It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are able to represent the perspectives of different applications using this specification, in order to enable broadly informed review of registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other Experts.¶
This specification establishes the IANA "JSON Web Proof Algorithms"
registry for values of the JWP alg (algorithm) parameter in Header
Parameters. The registry records the algorithm name, the algorithm
description, the algorithm usage locations, the implementation
requirements, the change controller, and a reference to the
specification that defines it. The same algorithm name can be
registered multiple times, provided that the sets of usage locations are
disjoint.¶
It is suggested that the length of the key be included in the algorithm name when multiple variations of algorithms are being registered that use keys of different lengths and the key lengths for each need to be fixed (for instance, because they will be created by key derivation functions). This allows readers of the JSON text to more easily make security decisions.¶
The Designated Experts should perform reasonable due diligence that algorithms being registered either are currently considered cryptographically credible or are being registered as Deprecated or Prohibited.¶
The implementation requirements of an algorithm may be changed over time as the cryptographic landscape evolves, for instance, to change the status of an algorithm to Deprecated or to change the status of an algorithm from Optional to Recommended+ or Required. Changes of implementation requirements are only permitted on a Specification Required basis after review by the Designated Experts, with the new specification defining the revised implementation requirements level.¶
Single-Use JWP using ES256.)
Descriptive names may not match other registered names unless the
Designated Experts state that there is a compelling reason to
allow an exception.¶
SU-ES256). This label is a
case-sensitive ASCII string. JSON Labels may not match other
registered labels in a case-insensitive manner unless the
Designated Experts state that there is a compelling reason to allow
an exception.¶
1). CBOR Labels may not match
other registered labels unless the Designated Experts state that there
is a compelling reason to allow an exception.¶
Issued or Presented. Other values may be used with the
approval of a Designated Expert.¶
Required, Recommended, Optional, Deprecated, or
Prohibited. Optionally, the word can be followed by a + or -.
The use of + indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be
increased in a future version of the specification. The use of -
indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be decreased in a
future version of the specification. Any identifiers registered for
algorithms that are otherwise unsuitable for direct use as JWP
algorithms must be registered as Prohibited.¶
SU-ES256¶
SU-ES384¶
SU-ES512¶
BBS¶
BBS_BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_H2G_HM2S_¶
MAC-H256¶
MAC-H256 uses HMAC SHA-256 as the MAC, and
ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256 for the signatures¶
MAC-H384¶
MAC-H384 uses HMAC SHA-384 as the MAC, and
ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384 for the signatures¶
MAC-H512¶
MAC-H512 uses HMAC SHA-512 as the MAC, and
ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512 for the signatures¶
MAC-K25519¶
MAC-K25519 uses KMAC SHAKE128 as the MAC,
and EdDSA using Curve25519 for the signatures¶
MAC-K448¶
MAC-K448 uses KMAC SHAKE256 as the MAC, and
EdDSA using Curve448 for the signatures¶
MAC-H256K¶
MAC-H256K uses HMAC SHA-256 as the MAC, and
ECDSA using secp256k1 and SHA-256 for the signatures¶
The following examples use algorithms defined in JSON Proof Algorithms and also contain the keys used, so that implementations can validate these samples.¶
This example uses the Single-Use Algorithm as defined in JSON Proof Algorithms to create a JSON Proof Token. It demonstrates how to apply selective disclosure using an array of traditional JWS-based signatures. Unlinkability is only achieved by using each JWP one time, as multiple uses are inherently linkable via the traditional ECDSA signature embedded in the proof.¶
To begin, we need two asymmetric keys for Single Use: one that represents the JPT Issuer's stable key and the other is an ephemeral key generated by the Issuer just for this JWP.¶
This is the Issuer's stable private key used in this example in the JWK format:¶
{
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "dMld3lLFW4U-fNSpJeInaQyft_97v7v6EiTKgN8u8tI",
"y": "4ZqSVUqiVECly07kLPNIWdU5yyUT-ta5e_VeLwTpIaM",
"d": "hMUc5zxtrGQMfw1cBozztotBc--ZpizGxREkrEQn0hQ"
}
This is the ephemeral private key used in this example in the JWK format:¶
{
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "nwbbMjqhqzhgK6UIyXZIvdCoEimbjrebvyRsAyf23d0",
"y": "gJeFmSKP3fdhaXRCHQKzEVgItOaNA_BQIhbpBlc_5zs",
"d": "NK_FTwbL38Eap_6UnS2qToqps4pDq4BJ_TOY4AAH8tQ"
}
This is the Holder's presentation private key used in this example in the JWK format:¶
{
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "ss5HpgG25kGe0Y9jSAkr5yqtAmSkrvYPF84-wYVJ8b0",
"y": "pRmjQPAnYCF4tm20IyWq1BTYlyqCvDBle1KTBTkivNs",
"d": "yQoeB0npiXfPbAUvyq9fYcpapl_N5EQ6qcoxeqH75Pg"
}
The Header declares that the data structure is a JPT and the JWP Proof Input is secured using the Single-Use ECDSA algorithm with the P-256 curve and SHA-256 digest. It also includes the ephemeral public key, the Holder's presentation public key and list of claims used for this JPT.¶
{
"alg": "SU-ES256",
"typ": "JPT",
"iss": "https://issuer.example",
"hpa": "ES256",
"claims": [
"iat",
"exp",
"family_name",
"given_name",
"email",
"address",
"age_over_21"
],
"iek": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "nwbbMjqhqzhgK6UIyXZIvdCoEimbjrebvyRsAyf23d0",
"y": "gJeFmSKP3fdhaXRCHQKzEVgItOaNA_BQIhbpBlc_5zs"
},
"hpk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "ss5HpgG25kGe0Y9jSAkr5yqtAmSkrvYPF84-wYVJ8b0",
"y": "pRmjQPAnYCF4tm20IyWq1BTYlyqCvDBle1KTBTkivNs"
}
}
eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpQVCIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaXNzdWVyL mV4YW1wbGUiLCJocGEiOiJFUzI1NiIsImNsYWltcyI6WyJpYXQiLCJleHAiLCJmYW1pbH lfbmFtZSIsImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCJlbWFpbCIsImFkZHJlc3MiLCJhZ2Vfb3Zlcl8yMSJ dLCJpZWsiOnsia3R5IjoiRUMiLCJjcnYiOiJQLTI1NiIsIngiOiJud2JiTWpxaHF6aGdL NlVJeVhaSXZkQ29FaW1ianJlYnZ5UnNBeWYyM2QwIiwieSI6ImdKZUZtU0tQM2ZkaGFYU kNIUUt6RVZnSXRPYU5BX0JRSWhicEJsY181enMifSwiaHBrIjp7Imt0eSI6IkVDIiwiY3 J2IjoiUC0yNTYiLCJ4Ijoic3M1SHBnRzI1a0dlMFk5alNBa3I1eXF0QW1Ta3J2WVBGODQ td1lWSjhiMCIsInkiOiJwUm1qUVBBbllDRjR0bTIwSXlXcTFCVFlseXFDdkRCbGUxS1RC VGtpdk5zIn19
The Single Use algorithm utilizes multiple individual JWS Signatures.
Each signature value is generated by creating a JWS with a single
Header with the associated alg value. In this example, the
fixed Header used for each JWS is the serialized JSON Object
{"alg":"ES256"}. This Header will be used to generate a
signature over each corresponding payload in the JWP. The corresponding
octet value in the proof is the octet string (base64url-decoded) value
of the signature.¶
The final proof value from the Issuer is an array with the octets of the Header signature, followed by entries for each payload signature.¶
[
"e7d5785d-1fa0-42bf-aadb-7a7d9880aa2a",
1714521600,
1717199999,
"1000723",
"Doe",
"Jay",
"jaydoe@example.org",
{
"formatted": "1234 Main St.\nAnytown, CA 12345\nUSA",
"street_address": "1234 Main St.",
"locality": "Anytown",
"region": "CA",
"postal_code": 12345,
"country": "USA"
},
{
"formatted": "18995 Sycamore Dr.\nAnytown, CA 12346\nUSA",
"street_address": "18995 Sycamore Dr",
"locality": "Anytown",
"region": "CA",
"postal_code": 12346,
"country": "USA"
},
"USA",
"USA",
true
]
The compact serialization of the same JPT is:¶
eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpQVCIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaXNzdWVyL mV4YW1wbGUiLCJocGEiOiJFUzI1NiIsImNsYWltcyI6WyJpYXQiLCJleHAiLCJmYW1pbH lfbmFtZSIsImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCJlbWFpbCIsImFkZHJlc3MiLCJhZ2Vfb3Zlcl8yMSJ dLCJpZWsiOnsia3R5IjoiRUMiLCJjcnYiOiJQLTI1NiIsIngiOiJud2JiTWpxaHF6aGdL NlVJeVhaSXZkQ29FaW1ianJlYnZ5UnNBeWYyM2QwIiwieSI6ImdKZUZtU0tQM2ZkaGFYU kNIUUt6RVZnSXRPYU5BX0JRSWhicEJsY181enMifSwiaHBrIjp7Imt0eSI6IkVDIiwiY3 J2IjoiUC0yNTYiLCJ4Ijoic3M1SHBnRzI1a0dlMFk5alNBa3I1eXF0QW1Ta3J2WVBGODQ td1lWSjhiMCIsInkiOiJwUm1qUVBBbllDRjR0bTIwSXlXcTFCVFlseXFDdkRCbGUxS1RC VGtpdk5zIn19.ImU3ZDU3ODVkLTFmYTAtNDJiZi1hYWRiLTdhN2Q5ODgwYWEyYSI~MTcx NDUyMTYwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IjEwMDA3MjMi~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~ImpheWRvZUBleG FtcGxlLm9yZyI~eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuXG5Bbnl0b3duLCBDQSA xMjM0NVxuVVNBIiwic3RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuIiwibG9jYWxp dHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI6MTIzNDUsImNvd W50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxODk5NSBTeWNhbW9yZSBEci5cbkFueXR vd24sIENBIDEyMzQ2XG5VU0EiLCJzdHJlZXRfYWRkcmVzcyI6IjE4OTk1IFN5Y2Ftb3Jl IERyIiwibG9jYWxpdHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZ SI6MTIzNDYsImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~IlVTQSI~IlVTQSI~dHJ1ZQ.219oKWj5m18K ayEgXC0agGpB4f8NLv3Jb8HLHYDTJjK-PLyTonRbQ3DGS7XR-kuCC8VUkeMMyO9CN8XE6 pubeg~xymJjOnC2xroJT1sszTE2vka5BH_R9hWIGfxFM_KpDgqyh08c6yIBWUFJsrfkLp vGqne_4hnb0-3F2smuPBubQ~hJQou7F25LJBKkBdDSVQysgqtOG1qtSLr6MxMnChDS8Ko 4FrCpJ1qFPLaqjCB_SLAyJjoOfYwFjfw48t1n5O7A~2pSQ352s85JxRxBc9kT9sYh8VMe QDWOn8hxCQpAsS5VowhofO_yGKPkY0DyqXNOetzHkOn0TpvHUKqKHkffs_Q~xE2rjdGsx 3D0GS5p0jt5t6I2XOPldwWCPtHkc8Zcjga7o8LGvejyTa0Kadvz3S5JFnKl6nngoNLUu4 butYej4Q~AbZCdErVOfsL8TvYPfjKTOYrbbR6_MRiaEkPKsc6dka-GSNWwfOviAUmJFX4 xOoLemowOWvYd02uc2cEhgiKHA~T-HXtwe27Ri_2qdvjpJg7xao8XMyiC4AIl0cj7a9Tz tHcIXJ3PG1VLBASg3F9DfZUl89lngpavwjtanOrkQ9ZQ~hgm3vtgXij60Zd8Z9QdxNzE5 YU3i6JGnG1sXgLCdXZal_ohBuLXNe0qodOe67GQmzlfABYPAxipuovabSNBpvA~EZBvrW C1sR84SxCFD8m1Ylyq1-wL-tATHbVv-L8emVvMirXMRPPBVzz3cN5rkTx-TbbD4iyQmPr fkVr6GYcTcw~gPru-GwNKrd0R7eOufzpYkfJM9RtrtH-CwBm4dLEzNW1PIeJq4GE5kjmM rnseWdxgH1Yrubf0Qi0QsKR2PtIBw~vzNrFh5HeiU_AB3cbWa8kfW_6_zQ8wfjO3gPe4N FXxwwFG6YYZkchSEJYZHF3Ktn8Sippzr6qrOtQEEbP6Fr2Q~wRNt5VM17ZwRdXbDYhbgj 5gDobAzzhIWDipkrsCNRahP34SEkKh71SECdqs2A1twMdhIoL_Fd2o9Xd3i-XtGsQ~X6O KSnLFwQi42gOx0xaEMWwtzYIzBy3N8DKmQAbMd-X-LH-4SVdFMuN_qZxpAvgYbmL_PxmK 3bJ1JfAqz0BG3Q
To present this JPT, we first use the following Presentation Header with a nonce (provided by the Verifier):¶
{
"alg": "SU-ES256",
"aud": "https://recipient.example.com",
"nonce": "op_5jE-plCDLhI7wpy-EGdJBOl-PEmNIAy0wJjTzMX4"
}
eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vcmVjaXBpZW50LmV4YW1wbGUuY 29tIiwibm9uY2UiOiJvcF81akUtcGxDRExoSTd3cHktRUdkSkJPbC1QRW1OSUF5MHdKal R6TVg0In0
We apply selective disclosure of only the given name and age claims (family name and email hidden), and remove the proof components corresponding to these entries.¶
Using the selectively disclosed information, we generate the presentation internal representation. Using that and the selectively disclosed payloads, we get the following presented JPT in compact serialization:¶
eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vcmVjaXBpZW50LmV4YW1wbGUuY 29tIiwibm9uY2UiOiJvcF81akUtcGxDRExoSTd3cHktRUdkSkJPbC1QRW1OSUF5MHdKal R6TVg0In0.eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpQVCIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8 vaXNzdWVyLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJocGEiOiJFUzI1NiIsImNsYWltcyI6WyJpYXQiLCJleHAi LCJmYW1pbHlfbmFtZSIsImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCJlbWFpbCIsImFkZHJlc3MiLCJhZ2Vfb 3Zlcl8yMSJdLCJpZWsiOnsia3R5IjoiRUMiLCJjcnYiOiJQLTI1NiIsIngiOiJud2JiTW pxaHF6aGdLNlVJeVhaSXZkQ29FaW1ianJlYnZ5UnNBeWYyM2QwIiwieSI6ImdKZUZtU0t QM2ZkaGFYUkNIUUt6RVZnSXRPYU5BX0JRSWhicEJsY181enMifSwiaHBrIjp7Imt0eSI6 IkVDIiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYiLCJ4Ijoic3M1SHBnRzI1a0dlMFk5alNBa3I1eXF0QW1Ta 3J2WVBGODQtd1lWSjhiMCIsInkiOiJwUm1qUVBBbllDRjR0bTIwSXlXcTFCVFlseXFDdk RCbGUxS1RCVGtpdk5zIn19.ImU3ZDU3ODVkLTFmYTAtNDJiZi1hYWRiLTdhN2Q5ODgwYW EyYSI~MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IjEwMDA3MjMi~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~Imph eWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI~~~IlVTQSI~IlVTQSI~dHJ1ZQ.219oKWj5m18KayEgXC0a gGpB4f8NLv3Jb8HLHYDTJjK-PLyTonRbQ3DGS7XR-kuCC8VUkeMMyO9CN8XE6pubeg~xy mJjOnC2xroJT1sszTE2vka5BH_R9hWIGfxFM_KpDgqyh08c6yIBWUFJsrfkLpvGqne_4h nb0-3F2smuPBubQ~hJQou7F25LJBKkBdDSVQysgqtOG1qtSLr6MxMnChDS8Ko4FrCpJ1q FPLaqjCB_SLAyJjoOfYwFjfw48t1n5O7A~2pSQ352s85JxRxBc9kT9sYh8VMeQDWOn8hx CQpAsS5VowhofO_yGKPkY0DyqXNOetzHkOn0TpvHUKqKHkffs_Q~xE2rjdGsx3D0GS5p0 jt5t6I2XOPldwWCPtHkc8Zcjga7o8LGvejyTa0Kadvz3S5JFnKl6nngoNLUu4butYej4Q ~AbZCdErVOfsL8TvYPfjKTOYrbbR6_MRiaEkPKsc6dka-GSNWwfOviAUmJFX4xOoLemow OWvYd02uc2cEhgiKHA~EZBvrWC1sR84SxCFD8m1Ylyq1-wL-tATHbVv-L8emVvMirXMRP PBVzz3cN5rkTx-TbbD4iyQmPrfkVr6GYcTcw~gPru-GwNKrd0R7eOufzpYkfJM9RtrtH- CwBm4dLEzNW1PIeJq4GE5kjmMrnseWdxgH1Yrubf0Qi0QsKR2PtIBw~vzNrFh5HeiU_AB 3cbWa8kfW_6_zQ8wfjO3gPe4NFXxwwFG6YYZkchSEJYZHF3Ktn8Sippzr6qrOtQEEbP6F r2Q~wRNt5VM17ZwRdXbDYhbgj5gDobAzzhIWDipkrsCNRahP34SEkKh71SECdqs2A1twM dhIoL_Fd2o9Xd3i-XtGsQ~X6OKSnLFwQi42gOx0xaEMWwtzYIzBy3N8DKmQAbMd-X-LH- 4SVdFMuN_qZxpAvgYbmL_PxmK3bJ1JfAqz0BG3Q~rO0tP3Hp_3bbExLBUVRQU3s_RNjac b9enlFz2zGY9BZcN6d1iWOrUyB3DHig_9dxZiZEkAIip52maOUWoI-_hA¶
Figure: Presentation (SU-ES256, JSON, Compact Serialization)¶
This example is meant to mirror the prior compact serialization, using RFC8392 and claims from [I-D.ietf-spice-oidc-cwt], illustrated using [I-D.ietf-cbor-edn-literals] (EDN).¶
To simplify this example, the same information is represented as the JPT example above, including the same public and private keys.¶
{ / protected header /
1: 1, / alg: "SU-ES256" /
3: 20, / typ: "JPT" (20CPA) /
5: "https://issuer.example", / iss: "https://issuer.example" /
6: [ / claims /
7, / "cti" /
6, / "iat" /
4, / "exp" /
2, / "sub" /
170, / "family_name" (I-D.maldant-spice-oidc-cwt TBD1) /
171, / "given_name" (I-D.maldant-spice-oidc-cwt TBD2) /
179, / "email" (I-D.maldant-spice-oidc-cwt TBD10) /
["addresses", 0], / no array variant defined. /
["addresses", 1], / no array variant defined. /
["addresses", 0, 6 ], / country 0 /
["addresses", 1, 6 ], / country 1 /
["age_equal_or_over", 21] / age_equal_or_over_21 /
],
8: { / iek /
1: 2, / kty : "EC2" /
-1: 1, / crv: "P-256" /
-2: h'9f06db323aa1ab38602ba508c97648bdd0a812299b8eb79bbf246c03' +
h'27f6dddd', / x /
-3: h'80978599228fddf7616974421d02b3115808b4e68d03f0502216e906' +
h'573fe73b' / y /
},
9: { / hpk /
1: 2, / kty: "EC2" /
-1: 1, / crv: "P-256" /
-2: h'b2ce47a601b6e6419ed18f6348092be72aad0264a4aef60f17ce3ec1' +
h'8549f1bd', / x /
-3: h'a519a340f027602178b66db42325aad414d8972a82bc30657b529305' +
h'3922bcdb' / y /
},
10: -9 / hpa: "ESP256" (I-D.ietf-jose-fully-specified-algorithms TBD-9) /
}
¶
Figure: Issuer Header (SU-ES256, CBOR)¶
[ / payloads /
/ cti / h'e7d5785d1fa042bfaadb7a7d9880aa2a',
/ iat / 171452160,
/ exp / 171719999,
/ sub / "1000723",
/ family_name / "Doe",
/ given_name / "Jay",
/ email / "jaydoe@example.org",
/ address 0 / {
/ formatted / 1: "1234 Main St.\nAnytown, CA 12345\nUSA",
/ street / 2: "1234 Main St.",
/ locality / 3: "Anytown",
/ region / 4: "CA",
/ post code / 5: "90210",
/ country / 6: "USA"
},
/ address 1. / {
/ formatted / 1: "18995 Sycamore Dr.\nAnytown, CA 12346\nUSA",
/ street / 2: "18995 Sycamore Dr",
/ locality / 3: "Anytown",
/ region. / 4: "CA",
/ post code / 5: "12346",
/ country / 6: "USA"
},
"USA",
"USA",
/ age over 21 / true
]
¶
Figure: Issuer Payloads (as CBOR array)¶
When signed and serialized, the CPT is represented by the following CBOR (in hex):¶
83590109a701010314057668747470733a2f2f6973737565722e6578616d706c 65068c0706040218aa18ab18b382696164647265737365730082696164647265 7373657301836961646472657373657300068369616464726573736573010682 716167655f657175616c5f6f725f6f7665721508a4010220012158209f06db32 3aa1ab38602ba508c97648bdd0a812299b8eb79bbf246c0327f6dddd22582080 978599228fddf7616974421d02b3115808b4e68d03f0502216e906573fe73b09 a401022001215820b2ce47a601b6e6419ed18f6348092be72aad0264a4aef60f 17ce3ec18549f1bd225820a519a340f027602178b66db42325aad414d8972a82 bc30657b5293053922bcdb0a288c50e7d5785d1fa042bfaadb7a7d9880aa2a1a 0a3827001a0a3c3d3f673130303037323363446f65634a6179726a6179646f65 406578616d706c652e6f7267a601782331323334204d61696e2053742e0a416e 79746f776e2c2043412031323334350a555341026d31323334204d61696e2053 742e0367416e79746f776e04624341056539303231300663555341a601782831 3839393520537963616d6f72652044722e0a416e79746f776e2c204341203132 3334360a5553410271313839393520537963616d6f72652044720367416e7974 6f776e046243410565313233343606635553416355534163555341f58d584076 1b28c589f7c34d9d5c4a3f5b44abba24637da2c5b588e56a65d80db260dc285b 7fb9cee1fffb4b5b6a480c760b586ae07c5f63e87cb291f01a4c9df21c0d1b58 40ce12a8938bf9c410f8b8ddb27c8dac3514be8c3fd72f5b249ec32aee1116ac b5b031722ac4ca7e426dbe1a83ccd7c0469baddfc49a4c4b6608b7cbe9b30205 9f58406838aaff76f703ca5145d9028566c4a2fe1dbbc4f6fdb3a3e192b33623 b6f57985f44babc20d808c89aa9c5292cde9c7c174f73b6f944218bfa88ed2ca 1c26425840188028a15ad59150827b6302c1cf18cd4d08d49d3219cbef02e07a f5395fca1dde14786cfc325f4eb9643f3eb2a6d01e5b39df6a05f7bfd185dcb1 856b05f5e6584087a6553fc965a8194772566123b3cd1a052517732509fa0fe0 7053da915d60ba8908b83ed8b7c8056fdfd4abf5c52a2b15a9a756c5366d77ef 47a498a84751805840e8712b7ad92ead6e4285269c266e1528cff22d4bdaac72 dfd53192b67ccb556d36efb3ac4a6b7b6da48793502c7db2961a33f60f7f6056 6a82c110d6f72c1cf058403304539ebe047aff2f68377a5587da5560f0b080e5 264329d3ad86a2ffaec3af278970bbbb6464a4196711fe4277591e01e415c16c a58da19e4e838c74a4cd3d5840e6334b8625f6e32a715bf4f49e4dee635e3f89 3e1cd93bbc2bcee6de7fb468d744ec101ceec629ea8457ff390e11e92a77b0be 01d88abea831faf43adc5fc2a35840b0211e58720bf4604f178c449b72b310b4 22f4e95f0a89bd66f3e0b57731bda7086657875aab5aa8ec40ca1b97bad4b3fc 4775c9c2c5f27372405d7285f82cae58404c1f2e4790ba718dd899e2122812f7 b686c71564d4b7d0b7c91a37739adaa3c09e4f87c3d2ae958ac49ec86062ba05 34dbf9496153776ed1902b10aef6e77d5e5840e768d0a11804e41c702acd227b 025346a7d48767775a14332a049b8dd129428a3bfeb8597859ea4c2e6aa8b785 98e6be6a4fde9fcffda94c58c40ec85c2d9fb25840660ca6795c223ec05686b3 824c6296d0ef55e0d40a87d8b58a6583a80afeebd1e1b2407caed5ff1678fe24 217db7cfc564d6427227d47fe95aa8f96b3ea06d6258400fdd75ede62d31f365 5eb56aa0246fc9b42adc6256286f987c1c58efb21c8e0b993e39be1354df8939 fc91c3aa6cc3c0c6a3e30604a869d4583afcccf0568e74¶
Fixtures: Issued Form (SU-ES256, CBOR)¶
The presented form, similarly to the issued form above, is made with the holder conveying the same parameters and the same set of selectively disclosed payloads as the JPT above:¶
{ / protected header /
1: 1, / alg: "SU-ES256" /
6: "https://recipient.example.com", / aud /
7: h'a29ff98c4fa99420cb848ef0a72f8419d2413a5f8f126348032d302634f3317e', / nonce /
}
¶
Figure: Presentation Header (SU-ES256, CBOR)¶
When the appropriate proof is generated, the CPT is serialized into the following CBOR (in hex):¶
845846a3010106781d68747470733a2f2f726563697069656e742e6578616d70 6c652e636f6d075820a29ff98c4fa99420cb848ef0a72f8419d2413a5f8f1263 48032d302634f3317e590109a701010314057668747470733a2f2f6973737565 722e6578616d706c65068c0706040218aa18ab18b38269616464726573736573 0082696164647265737365730183696164647265737365730006836961646472 6573736573010682716167655f657175616c5f6f725f6f7665721508a4010220 012158209f06db323aa1ab38602ba508c97648bdd0a812299b8eb79bbf246c03 27f6dddd22582080978599228fddf7616974421d02b3115808b4e68d03f05022 16e906573fe73b09a401022001215820b2ce47a601b6e6419ed18f6348092be7 2aad0264a4aef60f17ce3ec18549f1bd225820a519a340f027602178b66db423 25aad414d8972a82bc30657b5293053922bcdb0a288c50e7d5785d1fa042bfaa db7a7d9880aa2a1a0a3827001a0a3c3d3f673130303037323363446f65634a61 79726a6179646f65406578616d706c652e6f7267f6f66355534163555341f58c 5840761b28c589f7c34d9d5c4a3f5b44abba24637da2c5b588e56a65d80db260 dc285b7fb9cee1fffb4b5b6a480c760b586ae07c5f63e87cb291f01a4c9df21c 0d1b5840ce12a8938bf9c410f8b8ddb27c8dac3514be8c3fd72f5b249ec32aee 1116acb5b031722ac4ca7e426dbe1a83ccd7c0469baddfc49a4c4b6608b7cbe9 b302059f58406838aaff76f703ca5145d9028566c4a2fe1dbbc4f6fdb3a3e192 b33623b6f57985f44babc20d808c89aa9c5292cde9c7c174f73b6f944218bfa8 8ed2ca1c26425840188028a15ad59150827b6302c1cf18cd4d08d49d3219cbef 02e07af5395fca1dde14786cfc325f4eb9643f3eb2a6d01e5b39df6a05f7bfd1 85dcb1856b05f5e6584087a6553fc965a8194772566123b3cd1a052517732509 fa0fe07053da915d60ba8908b83ed8b7c8056fdfd4abf5c52a2b15a9a756c536 6d77ef47a498a84751805840e8712b7ad92ead6e4285269c266e1528cff22d4b daac72dfd53192b67ccb556d36efb3ac4a6b7b6da48793502c7db2961a33f60f 7f60566a82c110d6f72c1cf05840b0211e58720bf4604f178c449b72b310b422 f4e95f0a89bd66f3e0b57731bda7086657875aab5aa8ec40ca1b97bad4b3fc47 75c9c2c5f27372405d7285f82cae58404c1f2e4790ba718dd899e2122812f7b6 86c71564d4b7d0b7c91a37739adaa3c09e4f87c3d2ae958ac49ec86062ba0534 dbf9496153776ed1902b10aef6e77d5e5840e768d0a11804e41c702acd227b02 5346a7d48767775a14332a049b8dd129428a3bfeb8597859ea4c2e6aa8b78598 e6be6a4fde9fcffda94c58c40ec85c2d9fb25840660ca6795c223ec05686b382 4c6296d0ef55e0d40a87d8b58a6583a80afeebd1e1b2407caed5ff1678fe2421 7db7cfc564d6427227d47fe95aa8f96b3ea06d6258400fdd75ede62d31f3655e b56aa0246fc9b42adc6256286f987c1c58efb21c8e0b993e39be1354df8939fc 91c3aa6cc3c0c6a3e30604a869d4583afcccf0568e745840e5516de22d3efa76 a51d14511fc1aeb68a1e7e581ac1c94d7f02d9ffdcd28e798dc851fc318cfd6e 48eebe0afe1892434530ea6ed2a1751e017bc7a306f327b8¶
Figure: Presented Form (SU-ES256, CBOR)¶
The following example uses the BBS algorithm.¶
This is the Issuer's stable private key in the JWK format:¶
{
"kty": "EC2",
"alg": "BBS",
"use": "proof",
"crv": "BLS12381G2",
"x": "Aj9CVyx65pnVPHpUBhgqgXoO9ZG_nrwYTqp5j_LgDZIUAMHxce8O-FuAA5Xpm
y4JBoOBHPFHCCNdBoGT1ZT9LaD4CT8ZfVzi2lvsz5GIPMv_Skqq6HuOxa1x8xF
mkv_C",
"y": "FVqQtxj8cvQywXjhTmDqXcNmtSq3zh8iyy_dl4eHFTkfbR5HwCg3akLLgkbFD
p5IFqF65vq3FFfwuxSYAkrsKE91WojuiAg5r0izy8xbu46hyp1sTIT1zdE3qGA
LNqqb",
"d": "Y23MEuOX5L3gFeleigqihFi5jaeuNx9jLCHMfLNwDv8"
}
There is no additional holder key necessary for presentation proofs.¶
For the following protected header and array of payloads:¶
{
"kid": "HjfcpyjuZQ-O8Ye2hQnNbT9RbbnrobptdnExR0DUjU8",
"alg": "BBS"
}
These components are signed using the private issuer key previously given, which is then representable in the following serialization:¶
eyJraWQiOiJIamZjcHlqdVpRLU84WWUyaFFuTmJUOVJiYm5yb2JwdGRuRXhSMERValU4I iwiYWxnIjoiQkJTIn0.ImU3ZDU3ODVkLTFmYTAtNDJiZi1hYWRiLTdhN2Q5ODgwYWEyYS I~MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IjEwMDA3MjMi~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~ImpheWRv ZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI~eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuXG5Bbnl0b3duL CBDQSAxMjM0NVxuVVNBIiwic3RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuIiwibG 9jYWxpdHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI6MTIzNDU sImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxODk5NSBTeWNhbW9yZSBEci5cb kFueXRvd24sIENBIDEyMzQ2XG5VU0EiLCJzdHJlZXRfYWRkcmVzcyI6IjE4OTk1IFN5Y2 Ftb3JlIERyIiwibG9jYWxpdHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWx fY29kZSI6MTIzNDYsImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~IlVTQSI~IlVTQSI~dHJ1ZQ.jnzAvC e-LBGd5XAEXjbnEEdVV456qi0C738dweJou7YtAcojV07cMOLixDAKNMlkT7kFthxCali CABgh5Dok6CjME6O2O7Ur_fVbS-aDmFY
For a presentation with the following Presentation Header:¶
{
"alg": "BBS",
"aud": "https://recipient.example.com",
"nonce": "wrmBRkKtXjQ"
}
The holder decides to share all information other than the email address, and generates a proof. That proof is represented in the following serialization:¶
eyJhbGciOiJCQlMiLCJhdWQiOiJodHRwczovL3JlY2lwaWVudC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsI m5vbmNlIjoid3JtQlJrS3RYalEifQ.eyJraWQiOiJIamZjcHlqdVpRLU84WWUyaFFuTmJ UOVJiYm5yb2JwdGRuRXhSMERValU4IiwiYWxnIjoiQkJTIn0.ImU3ZDU3ODVkLTFmYTAt NDJiZi1hYWRiLTdhN2Q5ODgwYWEyYSI~MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IjEwMDA 3MjMi~~~~eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuXG5Bbnl0b3duLCBDQSAxMjM0 NVxuVVNBIiwic3RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuIiwibG9jYWxpdHkiO iJBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI6MTIzNDUsImNvdW50cn kiOiJVU0EifQ~eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxODk5NSBTeWNhbW9yZSBEci5cbkFueXRvd24s IENBIDEyMzQ2XG5VU0EiLCJzdHJlZXRfYWRkcmVzcyI6IjE4OTk1IFN5Y2Ftb3JlIERyI iwibG9jYWxpdHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI6MT IzNDYsImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~IlVTQSI~IlVTQSI~dHJ1ZQ.p5Q5spjTgli7YWvTL FhdEH5ySKO1aPCvlNg2uSDyPokrG3pCL2w7bDT3SgWPhJHGgwKK-_waoPN_Ym4mWA5e4O UG_uS00p1GiPULua6r_W8ep8GNJM9OJuOceE-ie41Ulb0ugAlVc00LPC1X08z3Bkjwm-C y-yQPPpXLOjRyL2mA8Z7LyX8OFOZRzVPuZJm2Yz9745IvKMwzbQocaKAQ_3vxGoiOYy6Z o-bJEsdffQsOgcuMpswhT-pejOkQtHgx_W5Z5_KIROM5u6_T1iIvtnPDR1D3o9ZtDhmVb kS75Q-vf2VJKsGc7RYOpNtUrnCcYqZYs5zHLWlP5rFkgTqDGrBqnGj_o2RiRrn0VwCF9I cw6qbaXUUNuLpNuvWyEE3DHhTPuo3X4dIFtMLrrXnK5DuoAPp0wALgZ1qaBwHmgsnTG6Q kZ7nyhuB4Ze6DoTghIiuzCMRCR2In7D2QjZpG9419bxQVNzevpY8REMV5xvM
The following example uses the MAC-H256 algorithm.¶
This is the Issuer's stable private key in the JWK format:¶
{
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "dMld3lLFW4U-fNSpJeInaQyft_97v7v6EiTKgN8u8tI",
"y": "4ZqSVUqiVECly07kLPNIWdU5yyUT-ta5e_VeLwTpIaM",
"d": "hMUc5zxtrGQMfw1cBozztotBc--ZpizGxREkrEQn0hQ"
}
This is the Issuer's ephemerally generated shared secret:¶
"ariSsJPtcMNROeFMvqzZfivEJE_HKVp6nrQqn4Hqx8Y"
This is the Holder's presentation private key in the JWK format:¶
{
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "ss5HpgG25kGe0Y9jSAkr5yqtAmSkrvYPF84-wYVJ8b0",
"y": "pRmjQPAnYCF4tm20IyWq1BTYlyqCvDBle1KTBTkivNs",
"d": "yQoeB0npiXfPbAUvyq9fYcpapl_N5EQ6qcoxeqH75Pg"
}
For the following Header and array of payloads:¶
{
"alg": "MAC-H256",
"hpa": "ES256",
"typ": "JPT",
"iss": "https://issuer.example",
"claims": [
"iat",
"exp",
"family_name",
"given_name",
"email",
"address",
"age_over_21"
],
"hpk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"use": "sign",
"x": "ss5HpgG25kGe0Y9jSAkr5yqtAmSkrvYPF84-wYVJ8b0",
"y": "pRmjQPAnYCF4tm20IyWq1BTYlyqCvDBle1KTBTkivNs"
}
}
[
"e7d5785d-1fa0-42bf-aadb-7a7d9880aa2a",
1714521600,
1717199999,
"1000723",
"Doe",
"Jay",
"jaydoe@example.org",
{
"formatted": "1234 Main St.\nAnytown, CA 12345\nUSA",
"street_address": "1234 Main St.",
"locality": "Anytown",
"region": "CA",
"postal_code": 12345,
"country": "USA"
},
{
"formatted": "18995 Sycamore Dr.\nAnytown, CA 12346\nUSA",
"street_address": "18995 Sycamore Dr",
"locality": "Anytown",
"region": "CA",
"postal_code": 12346,
"country": "USA"
},
"USA",
"USA",
true
]
The issuer generates an array of derived keys, one per payload slot. This is done using the shared secret as the key and a binary value based on the payload slot index (from zero) as input to the HMAC operation.¶
This results in the following set of derived keys:¶
[ "2ZK29dbj670kVoIUhXxgDkaiIXP0_dXRL7WAHiCe4xM", "CgsMC1ZSw57yWFuKL-U859f2EmSJ9RLikCQakr-EuDM", "LB66E-yg7bRwFwhvkK8HY185375PHVifXn4mYsbU4CE", "LcvxdHYanbRY6BD-dUhqTDr_AUjGr_0DaDd9_TYIs5c", "1N3-kwr6ZEC7UdtoIY6xj7cE7WcbZ0moU7tQlaPkqqc", "ot8fCVYEp2yNzgCX4W9QvnS1bUydAZzoqeA9GWPDm38", "OnDUacnrNC-MMHaA66rzC9QIyMjOqylS95l3WCe9yps", "Q6wXdhYWMAPgyeimUmseRgtt956csCfvS_bicB2EKqo", "NHTzbu9eeHRpp4h6-VnZ1h27A2vkCMicWlgqUDr7kFI", "nsuRA3l0RxD-QWE31-MXB5Qy7eMtU7zTcZaFQpnOUQc", "GHL67e4qsnPRoMVJpVZk_TXp-FWE2RyvChnbeSMi964", "xpnxosikrZ_cXYeVmKqp_RAh7gHKjwQXrLAYfNiEPxY" ]
A MAC is generated for each payload using the corresponding derived payload key. This results in the following set of MAC values:¶
[ "E5jX9yFCfKM6c4jQpNEAIMKxDUkEqcrvny8YJyq5sKI", "mFLPcVhg1vZ3dDcsU8qzJyT6sHIuPesjTuIyGdPx2cg", "ok40fsxYK1H4tKGvnN1vDobDELOHIzeEHszUGTxLwgM", "Irc0P-CUOF4f9K-Bd7rlc9Reoy7qwI5dFSDHcuua48E", "F0wb8CkJW32sLU-ibs4O2jHTVTnt2aqVxuXOd_vugc8", "i7rBD4Jm21EHWUVH4feQgmnoGdjYYOJ1e8cZSV2etC4", "0gZ3RYSkBT2P77qSoOSPSbUD_dDKBwZhz1a1LlDVHWk", "B4ityFUAde6RcQHBvjIOKVjdYEGg8HuM5fXErCagj2M", "1YALr5TivLMq8cJrse4H11jt2IiQovGD6FuwCv-WnJY", "0sPpcWBqxy3W4yNZU_oOOtNErRW2TW2egCM02Fu9v3U", "XavyLu43HUo3QaP-K8vTC7b762Zc3lzI1GzJ22aJAhg", "8SkyrOKRINqj0K4cgcBaoDE0gO_0Nqly_bz5wxVlpXM" ]
The Issuer Header and payload MAC values are combined into a binary representation known as the Compact MAC Representation. This representation is signed with the issuer's private key.¶
The proof consists of two octet string values: the signature over the combined MAC representation, and the shared secret.¶
[ "QomKM_Msxticx5YqLI5vylHtHDZm7LKll793fsfiGk6lwPYw5DOXDkGPxTbSdS7zJX OLv_he0lcKYGbDEuBDkw", "D65987PeZ-c27C4hsOpUopMl5x4CdrK3RWSnrxvqOW8" ]
The final issued JWP in compact serialization is:¶
eyJhbGciOiJNQUMtSDI1NiIsImhwYSI6IkVTMjU2IiwidHlwIjoiSlBUIiwiaXNzIjoia HR0cHM6Ly9pc3N1ZXIuZXhhbXBsZSIsImNsYWltcyI6WyJpYXQiLCJleHAiLCJmYW1pbH lfbmFtZSIsImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCJlbWFpbCIsImFkZHJlc3MiLCJhZ2Vfb3Zlcl8yMSJ dLCJocGsiOnsia3R5IjoiRUMiLCJjcnYiOiJQLTI1NiIsInVzZSI6InNpZ24iLCJ4Ijoi c3M1SHBnRzI1a0dlMFk5alNBa3I1eXF0QW1Ta3J2WVBGODQtd1lWSjhiMCIsInkiOiJwU m1qUVBBbllDRjR0bTIwSXlXcTFCVFlseXFDdkRCbGUxS1RCVGtpdk5zIn19.ImU3ZDU3O DVkLTFmYTAtNDJiZi1hYWRiLTdhN2Q5ODgwYWEyYSI~MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk 5OQ~IjEwMDA3MjMi~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~ImpheWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI~eyJmb3Jt YXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuXG5Bbnl0b3duLCBDQSAxMjM0NVxuVVNBIiwic3RyZ WV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuIiwibG9jYWxpdHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIiwicm VnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI6MTIzNDUsImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~eyJm b3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxODk5NSBTeWNhbW9yZSBEci5cbkFueXRvd24sIENBIDEyMzQ2XG5VU 0EiLCJzdHJlZXRfYWRkcmVzcyI6IjE4OTk1IFN5Y2Ftb3JlIERyIiwibG9jYWxpdHkiOi JBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI6MTIzNDYsImNvdW50cnk iOiJVU0EifQ~IlVTQSI~IlVTQSI~dHJ1ZQ.QomKM_Msxticx5YqLI5vylHtHDZm7LKll7 93fsfiGk6lwPYw5DOXDkGPxTbSdS7zJXOLv_he0lcKYGbDEuBDkw~D65987PeZ-c27C4h sOpUopMl5x4CdrK3RWSnrxvqOW8
Next, we show the presentation of the JWP with selective disclosure.¶
For presentation with the following Presentation Header:¶
{
"alg": "MAC-H256",
"aud": "https://recipient.example.com",
"nonce": "op_5jE-plCDLhI7wpy-EGdJBOl-PEmNIAy0wJjTzMX4"
}
The holder will take the issuer proof (including shared secret) and derive the same individual payload MAC values (above).¶
In this case, the holder has decided not to disclose the last three
claims provided by the issuer (corresponding to email, address, and
age_over_21)¶
For each payload slot, the holder will provide one of two values as part of the proof value. For a disclosed payload, the holder will provide the corresponding derived key. For a non-disclosed payload, the holder will provide the corresponding MAC value.¶
The final presented proof value is an array of octet strings. The contents are Presentation Header signature, followed by the issuer signature, then the value disclosed by the holder for each payload. This results in the following proof:¶
[ "QomKM_Msxticx5YqLI5vylHtHDZm7LKll793fsfiGk6lwPYw5DOXDkGPxTbSdS7zJX OLv_he0lcKYGbDEuBDkw", "2ZK29dbj670kVoIUhXxgDkaiIXP0_dXRL7WAHiCe4xM", "CgsMC1ZSw57yWFuKL-U859f2EmSJ9RLikCQakr-EuDM", "LB66E-yg7bRwFwhvkK8HY185375PHVifXn4mYsbU4CE", "LcvxdHYanbRY6BD-dUhqTDr_AUjGr_0DaDd9_TYIs5c", "F0wb8CkJW32sLU-ibs4O2jHTVTnt2aqVxuXOd_vugc8", "i7rBD4Jm21EHWUVH4feQgmnoGdjYYOJ1e8cZSV2etC4", "0gZ3RYSkBT2P77qSoOSPSbUD_dDKBwZhz1a1LlDVHWk", "Q6wXdhYWMAPgyeimUmseRgtt956csCfvS_bicB2EKqo", "NHTzbu9eeHRpp4h6-VnZ1h27A2vkCMicWlgqUDr7kFI", "nsuRA3l0RxD-QWE31-MXB5Qy7eMtU7zTcZaFQpnOUQc", "GHL67e4qsnPRoMVJpVZk_TXp-FWE2RyvChnbeSMi964", "xpnxosikrZ_cXYeVmKqp_RAh7gHKjwQXrLAYfNiEPxY", "xHYZjrc_NGsAZPBiXjVzQmi934pH44SAH3GdJpXrfZ8PllccZ2tpBYGUqn61FNkyL0 -xnIXWAopaEf_VdhyIGA" ]
The final presented JWP in compact serialization is:¶
eyJhbGciOiJNQUMtSDI1NiIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vcmVjaXBpZW50LmV4YW1wbGUuY 29tIiwibm9uY2UiOiJvcF81akUtcGxDRExoSTd3cHktRUdkSkJPbC1QRW1OSUF5MHdKal R6TVg0In0.eyJhbGciOiJNQUMtSDI1NiIsImhwYSI6IkVTMjU2IiwidHlwIjoiSlBUIiw iaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9pc3N1ZXIuZXhhbXBsZSIsImNsYWltcyI6WyJpYXQiLCJleHAi LCJmYW1pbHlfbmFtZSIsImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCJlbWFpbCIsImFkZHJlc3MiLCJhZ2Vfb 3Zlcl8yMSJdLCJocGsiOnsia3R5IjoiRUMiLCJjcnYiOiJQLTI1NiIsInVzZSI6InNpZ2 4iLCJ4Ijoic3M1SHBnRzI1a0dlMFk5alNBa3I1eXF0QW1Ta3J2WVBGODQtd1lWSjhiMCI sInkiOiJwUm1qUVBBbllDRjR0bTIwSXlXcTFCVFlseXFDdkRCbGUxS1RCVGtpdk5zIn19 .ImU3ZDU3ODVkLTFmYTAtNDJiZi1hYWRiLTdhN2Q5ODgwYWEyYSI~MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~M TcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IjEwMDA3MjMi~~~~eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuXG5 Bbnl0b3duLCBDQSAxMjM0NVxuVVNBIiwic3RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4g U3QuIiwibG9jYWxpdHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZ SI6MTIzNDUsImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxODk5NSBTeWNhbW9 yZSBEci5cbkFueXRvd24sIENBIDEyMzQ2XG5VU0EiLCJzdHJlZXRfYWRkcmVzcyI6IjE4 OTk1IFN5Y2Ftb3JlIERyIiwibG9jYWxpdHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiL CJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI6MTIzNDYsImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~IlVTQSI~IlVTQSI~dHJ 1ZQ.QomKM_Msxticx5YqLI5vylHtHDZm7LKll793fsfiGk6lwPYw5DOXDkGPxTbSdS7zJ XOLv_he0lcKYGbDEuBDkw~2ZK29dbj670kVoIUhXxgDkaiIXP0_dXRL7WAHiCe4xM~Cgs MC1ZSw57yWFuKL-U859f2EmSJ9RLikCQakr-EuDM~LB66E-yg7bRwFwhvkK8HY185375P HVifXn4mYsbU4CE~LcvxdHYanbRY6BD-dUhqTDr_AUjGr_0DaDd9_TYIs5c~F0wb8CkJW 32sLU-ibs4O2jHTVTnt2aqVxuXOd_vugc8~i7rBD4Jm21EHWUVH4feQgmnoGdjYYOJ1e8 cZSV2etC4~0gZ3RYSkBT2P77qSoOSPSbUD_dDKBwZhz1a1LlDVHWk~Q6wXdhYWMAPgyei mUmseRgtt956csCfvS_bicB2EKqo~NHTzbu9eeHRpp4h6-VnZ1h27A2vkCMicWlgqUDr7 kFI~nsuRA3l0RxD-QWE31-MXB5Qy7eMtU7zTcZaFQpnOUQc~GHL67e4qsnPRoMVJpVZk_ TXp-FWE2RyvChnbeSMi964~xpnxosikrZ_cXYeVmKqp_RAh7gHKjwQXrLAYfNiEPxY~xH YZjrc_NGsAZPBiXjVzQmi934pH44SAH3GdJpXrfZ8PllccZ2tpBYGUqn61FNkyL0-xnIX WAopaEf_VdhyIGA
This work was incubated in the DIF Applied Cryptography Working Group.¶
We would like to thank Alberto Solavagione for his valuable contributions to this specification.¶
The BBS examples were generated using the library at https://github.com/mattrglobal/pairing_crypto .¶
[[ To be removed from the final specification ]] -11¶
-10¶
-09¶
-08¶
-07¶
proof_key and presentation_key
names¶
proof_jwk to proof_key and presentation_jwk to
presentation_key to better represent that the key may be JSON or
CBOR-formatted.¶
proof_key and presentation_key to JWP where
they are defined. Consolidated usage, purpose, and requirements from
algorithm usage under these definitions.¶
BBS-PROOF into BBS¶
-06¶
presentation_header.¶
pjwk to presentation_jwk¶
-05¶
-04¶
BBS-DRAFT-5 to BBS, and from
BBS-PROOF-DRAFT-5 to BBS-PROOF¶
BBS_BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_¶
-03¶
-02¶
BBS-DRAFT-3 and BBS-PROOF-DRAFT-3 algorithms based on
draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures-03.¶
BBS-X algorithm based on a particular implementation of
earlier drafts.¶
-01¶
issuer_header and presentation_header¶
-00¶