JSON Proof Algorithms

Internet-Draft	json-proof-algorithms	March 2025
Jones, et al.	Expires 28 September 2025	[Page]

Abstract

The JSON Proof Algorithms (JPA) specification registers cryptographic algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Proof, JSON Web Key (JWK), and COSE specifications. It defines IANA registries for these identifiers.¶

6. Algorithm Specifications

This section defines how to use specific algorithms for JWPs.¶

6.1. Single Use

The Single Use (SU) algorithm is based on composing multiple traditional asymmetric signatures into a single JWP proof. It enables a very simple form of selective disclosure without requiring any advanced cryptographic techniques.¶

It does not support unlinkability if the same JWP is presented multiple times, therefore when privacy is required the holder will need to interact with the issuer again to receive new single-use JWPs (dynamically or in batches).¶

6.1.1. JWS Algorithm

The Single Use algorithm is based on using multiple signatures to cover the individual payloads, all of which are generated with the same Asymmetric JSON Web Algorithm (JWA). The internal signing algorithm to use is part of the registration for a new Single Use algorithm identifier.¶

The chosen JWA MUST be an asymmetric signing algorithm so that each signature can be verified without sharing any private values between the parties. This ensures that the verifier cannot brute force any non-disclosed payloads based only on their disclosed individual signatures.¶

6.1.2. Holder Setup

In order to support the protection of a presentation by a holder to a verifier, the holder MUST use a Presentation Key during the issuance and the presentation of every Single Use JWP. This Presentation Key MUST be generated and used for only one JWP.¶

The issuer MUST verify that the holder has possession of this key. The holder-issuer communication to exchange this information is out of scope of this specification, but can be accomplished by the holder using this key to generate a JWS that signs a value the issuer can verify as unique.¶

6.1.3. Issuer Setup

To create a Single Use JWP, the issuer first generates a unique Ephemeral Key using the selected internal algorithm. This key-pair will be used to sign each of the payloads of a single JWP and then discarded.¶

6.1.4. Signing payloads

Each individual payload is signed using the selected internal algorithm using the Ephemeral Key.¶

6.1.5. Issuer Protected Header

The issuer's Ephemeral Key MUST be included in the issuer protected header via the Proof Key header parameter.¶

The holder's Presentation Key MUST be included in issuer protected header via the Presentation Key header parameter.¶

The issuer protected header is signed using the given JWA and the issuer's Stable Key.¶

6.1.6. Payloads

Each JWP payload is processed in order and signed using the given JWA using the issuer's Ephemeral Key.¶

6.1.7. Proof

The proof value is an octet string array. The first entry is the octet string of the issuer protected header signature, with an additional entry for each payload signature.¶

6.1.8. Presentation Protected Header

To generate a new presentation, the holder first creates a presentation protected header that is specific to the verifier being presented to. This header MUST contain a parameter that both the holder and verifier trust as being unique and non-replayable. Use of the nonce header parameter is RECOMMENDED for this purpose.¶

This specification registers the nonce header parameter for the presentation protected header that contains a string value either generated by the verifier or derived from values provided by the verifier. When present, the verifier MUST ensure the nonce value matches during verification.¶

The presentation protected header MAY contain other header parameters that are either provided by the verifier or by the holder. These presentation header parameters SHOULD NOT contain values that are common across multiple presentations and SHOULD be unique to a single presentation and verifier.¶

6.1.9. Presentation

Editor's Note: The current definition here is incomplete, the holder's signature needs to also incorporate the presented proof.¶

The holder derives a new proof as part of presentation. The presented proof value will always contain the issuer's Stable Key signature for the issuer protected header as the first element.¶

The second element of the presented proof is the holder's signature of the presentation protected header using the holder's presentation key. This signature is constructed using the same algorithm described in generating the issuer's signature over the issuer protected header. Signing only the presentation header with the Presentation Key is sufficient to protect the entire presentation since that key is private to the holder and only the contents of the presentation header are used for replay prevention.¶

For each payload which is to be disclosed, the corresponding payload signature (from the issued JWP) is included in the proof. If a payload is omitted from the presented JWP, the signature value will NOT be includeed, and the presentation proof will have one less part.¶

For example, if the second and fifth of five payloads are not disclosed, then the holder's derived proof would consist of the issuer's signature over the issuer protected header, the holder's signature over the holder's protected header, the ephemeral key signature over the first, third and fourth payloads.¶

Since the individual signatures in the proof value are unique and remain unchanged across multiple presentations, a Single Use JWP SHOULD only be presented a single time to each verifier in order for the holder to remain unlinkable across multiple presentations.¶

6.1.10. Verification

The verifier MUST verify the issuer protected header octets against the first part in the proof using the issuer's Stable Key. It MUST also verify the presentation protected header octets against the second part in the proof value using the holder's Presentation Key, as provided in the Presentation Key header parameter.¶

With the headers verified, the Proof Key header parameter can then be used to verify each of the disclosed payload signatures.¶

6.1.11. JPA Registration

The proposed JWP alg value is of the format "SU-" appended with the relevant JWS alg value for the chosen public and ephemeral key-pair algorithm, for example "SU-ES256".¶

6.2. BBS

The BBS Signature Scheme [I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures] is under active development within the CRFG.¶

This algorithm supports both selective disclosure and unlinkability, enabling the holder to generate multiple presentations from one issued JWP without a verifier being able to correlate those presentations together based on the proof.¶

6.2.1. JPA Algorithms

The BBS algorithm corresponds to a ciphersuite identifier of BBS_BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_.¶

6.2.2. Key Format

The key used for the BBS algorithm is an elliptic curve-based key pair, specifically against the G_2 subgroup of a pairing friendly curve. Additional details on key generation can be found in Section 3.4. The JWK and Cose Key Object representations of the key are detailed in [I-D.ietf-cose-bls-key-representations].¶

There is no additional holder presentation key necessary for presentation proofs.¶

6.2.3. Issuance

Issuance is performed using the Sign operation from Section 3.5.1 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures]. This operation utilizes the issuer's BLS12-381 G2 key pair as SK and PK, along with desired protected header and payloads as the octets header and the octets array messages.¶

The octets resulting from this operation form a single octet string in the issuance proof array, to be used along with the protected header and payloads to serialize the JWP.¶

6.2.4. Issuance Proof Verification

Holder verification of the signature on issuance form is performed using the Verify operation from Section 3.5.2 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures].¶

This operation utilizes the issuer's public key as PK, the proof as signature, the protected header octets as header and the array of payload octets as messages.¶

6.2.5. Presentation

Derivation of a presentation is done by the holder using the ProofGen operation from Section 3.5.3 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures].¶

This operation utilizes the issuer's public key as PK, the issuer protected header as header, the issuance proof as signature, the issuance payloads as messages, and the holder's presentation protected header as ph.¶

The operation also takes a vector of indexes into messages, describing which payloads the holder wishes to disclose. All payloads are required for proof generation, but only these indicated payloads will be required to be disclosed for later proof verification.¶

The output of this operation is the presentation proof, as a single octet string.¶

Presentation serialization leverages the two protected headers and presentation proof, along with the disclosed payloads. Non-disclosed payloads are represented with the absent value of null in JSON serialization and a zero-length string in compact serialization.¶

6.2.6. Presentation Verification

Verification of a presentation is done by the verifier using the ProofVerify operation from Section 3.5.4.¶

This operation utilizes the issuer's public key as PK, the issuer protected header as header, the issuance proof as signature, the holder's presentation protected header as ph, and the payloads as disclosed_messages.¶

In addition, the disclosed_indexes scalar array is calculated from the payloads provided. Values disclosed in the presented payloads have a zero-based index in this array, while the indices of absent payloads are omitted.¶

6.3. Message Authentication Code

The Message Authentication Code (MAC) JPA uses a MAC to both generate ephemeral keys and compute authentication codes to protect the issuer header and each payload individually.¶

Like the the Single Use algorithm family, it also does not support unlinkability if the same JWP is presented multiple times. and requires an individually issued JWP for each presentation in order to fully protect privacy. When compared to the JWS approach, using a MAC requires less computation but can result in potentially larger presentation proof values.¶

The design is intentionally minimal and only involves using a single standardized MAC method instead of a mix of MAC/hash methods or a custom hash-based construct. It is able to use any published cryptographic MAC method such as HMAC [RFC2104] or KMAC. It uses traditional public-key based signatures to verify the authenticity of the issuer and holder.¶

6.3.1. Holder Setup

Prior to the issuer creating a new JWP, the issuer MUST have a presentation public key provided by the holder.¶

The holder's presentation key MUST be included in the issuer's protected header using the Presentation Key header parameter.¶

6.3.2. Issuer Setup

To use the MAC algorithm, the issuer must have a stable public key pair to perform signing. To start the issuance process, a single 32-byte random Shared Secret must first be generated. This value will be shared privately to the holder as part of the issuer's JWP proof value.¶

The Shared Secret is used by both the issuer and holder as the MAC method's key to generate a new set of unique ephemeral keys. These keys are then used as the input to generate a MAC that protects each payload.¶

6.3.3. Combined MAC Representation

The combined MAC representation is a single octet string representing the MAC values of the issuer protected header, along with each payload provided by the issuer. This representation is signed by the issuer, but not shared - parties will recreate this octet string and verify the signature to verify the integrity of supplied issuer protected header and the integrity of any disclosed payloads.¶

The issuer protected header is included in this value as a MAC created using the fixed key "issuer_header" in UTF-8 encoded octets. The value is the issuer header JSON as a UTF-8 encoded octet string.¶

A unique key is generated for each payload using a MAC, with the Shared Secret as the key and a value of "payload_X" as UTF-8 encoded octets, where "X" is replaced by the zero-based array index of the payload, for example "payload_0", "payload_1", etc.¶

Each payload then itself has a corresponding MAC, using the above per-payload key and the payload octet string.¶

The combined MAC representation is the octet string formed by the the concatentation of the issuer protected header MAC output, along with each payload MAC output.¶

6.3.4. Issuer Proof

The issuer proof consists of two octet strings.¶

The first octet string is the issuer signature over the combined MAC representation. The issuer signs the JWS using its stable public key, and a fixed header containing the alg associated with signing algorithm in use.¶

jws_header = '{"alg":"ES256"}'¶

The signature value of the JWS is extracted and base64url-decoded into an octet string.¶

The second octet string is the Shared Secret used to generate the per-payload keys for the combined representation.¶

6.3.5. Presentation Protected Header

See the JWS Presentation Protected Header section.¶

6.3.6. Presentation Proof

Editor's Note: The current definition here is incomplete, the holder's signature needs to also incorporate the presented proof.¶

The first value in the presentation proof is the presentation signature. This is a signature over the presentation protected header, using the key specified by the Presentation Key header parameter in the issuer protected header.¶

The second value is the issuer signature over the Combined MAC Representation provided with the issued form.¶

The remaining values are used by the verifier to reconstruct the combined MAC representation without access to the Shared Secret. There is one value corresponding to each payload, whether it has been disclosed or not.¶

If a payload is disclosed, the unique per-payload key derived from the shared secret is used as the payload's entry in the proof array.¶

If a payload is not disclosed, the payload's MAC in the combined MAC representation is used as the payload's entry in the proof array.¶

6.3.7. Verification of the Presentation Proof

The verifier must recreate the Combined MAC Representation from the presentation proof to verify integrity over the disclosed information.¶

The issuer protected header MAC is recreated using the same mechanism described above.¶

For each payload in the presentation:¶

If the payload is disclosed, then the presentation proof contains the unique per-payload key. The corresponding payload MAC can be computed by performing the MAC operation with this key and the corresponding payload.¶
If the payload is not disclosed, then the presentation proof contains the payload MAC, which can be used directly¶

The concatenation of the octets of the issuer protected header MAC and each payload MAC forms the Combined MAC Representation. The issuer signature in the proof is then verified by converting these values to a JWS as described above, and verifying that JWS.¶

6.3.8. JPA Registration

Proposed JWP alg value is of the format "MAC-" appended with a unique identifier for the set of MAC and signing algorithms used. Below are the initial registrations:¶

MAC-H256 uses HMAC SHA-256 as the MAC and ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256 for the signatures¶
MAC-H384 uses HMAC SHA-384 as the MAC and ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384 for the signatures¶
MAC-H512 uses HMAC SHA-512 as the MAC and ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512 for the signatures¶
MAC-K25519 uses KMAC SHAKE128 as the MAC and EdDSA using Curve25519 for the signatures¶
MAC-K448 uses KMAC SHAKE256 as the MAC and EdDSA using Curve448 for the signatures¶
MAC-H256K uses HMAC SHA-256 as the MAC and ECDSA using secp256k1 and SHA-256 for the signatures¶

8. IANA Considerations

The following registration procedure is used for all the registries established by this specification.¶

Values are registered on a Specification Required [RFC5226] basis after a three-week review period on the jose-reg-review@ietf.org mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published.¶

Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register JWP algorithm: example").¶

Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful. Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution.¶

Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts include determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing functionality, whether it is likely to be of general applicability or useful only for a single application, and whether the registration description is clear.¶

IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing list.¶

It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are able to represent the perspectives of different applications using this specification, in order to enable broadly informed review of registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other Experts.¶

8.1. JSON Web Proof Algorithms Registry

This specification establishes the IANA "JSON Web Proof Algorithms" registry for values of the JWP alg (algorithm) parameter in JWP Header Parameters. The registry records the algorithm name, the algorithm description, the algorithm usage locations, the implementation requirements, the change controller, and a reference to the specification that defines it. The same algorithm name can be registered multiple times, provided that the sets of usage locations are disjoint.¶

It is suggested that the length of the key be included in the algorithm name when multiple variations of algorithms are being registered that use keys of different lengths and the key lengths for each need to be fixed (for instance, because they will be created by key derivation functions). This allows readers of the JSON text to more easily make security decisions.¶

The Designated Experts should perform reasonable due diligence that algorithms being registered either are currently considered cryptographically credible or are being registered as Deprecated or Prohibited.¶

The implementation requirements of an algorithm may be changed over time as the cryptographic landscape evolves, for instance, to change the status of an algorithm to Deprecated or to change the status of an algorithm from Optional to Recommended+ or Required. Changes of implementation requirements are only permitted on a Specification Required basis after review by the Designated Experts, with the new specification defining the revised implementation requirements level.¶

8.1.1. Registration Template

Algorithm Name:: Brief descriptive name of the algorithm (e.g., Single-Use JWP using ES256.) Descriptive names may not match other registered names unless the Designated Experts state that there is a compelling reason to allow an exception.¶
Algorithm JSON Label:: The string label requested (e.g., SU-ES256). This label is a case-sensitive ASCII string. JSON Labels may not match other registered labels in a case-insensitive manner unless the Designated Experts state that there is a compelling reason to allow an exception.¶
Algorithm CBOR Label:: The integer label requested (e.g. 1). CBOR Labels may not match other registered labels unless the Designated Experts state that there is a compelling reason to allow an exception.¶
Algorithm Description:: Optional additional information clarifying the algorithm. This may be used for example to document additional chosen parameters.¶
Algorithm Usage Location(s):: The algorithm usage locations, which should be one or more of the values Issued or Presented. Other values may be used with the approval of a Designated Expert.¶
JWP Implementation Requirements:: The algorithm implementation requirements for JWP, which must be one the words Required, Recommended, Optional, Deprecated, or Prohibited. Optionally, the word can be followed by a + or -. The use of + indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification. The use of - indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be decreased in a future version of the specification. Any identifiers registered for algorithms that are otherwise unsuitable for direct use as JWP algorithms must be registered as Prohibited.¶
Change Controller:: For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IETF". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.¶
Specification Document(s):: Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter, preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be included but is not required.¶
Algorithm Analysis Documents(s):: References to a publication or publications in well-known cryptographic conferences, by national standards bodies, or by other authoritative sources analyzing the cryptographic soundness of the algorithm to be registered. The Designated Experts may require convincing evidence of the cryptographic soundness of a new algorithm to be provided with the registration request unless the algorithm is being registered as Deprecated or Prohibited. Having gone through working group and IETF review, the initial registrations made by this document are exempt from the need to provide this information.¶

8.1.2. Initial Registry Contents

8.1.2.1. Single-Use JWP using ES256 Algorithm

Algorithm Name: Single-Use JWP using ES256¶
Algorithm JSON Label: SU-ES256¶
Algorithm CBOR Label: 1¶
Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented¶
JWP Implementation Requirements: Recommended¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): Section 6.1.11 of this specification¶
Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a¶

8.1.2.2. Single-Use JWP using ES384 Algorithm

Algorithm Name: Single-Use JWP using ES384¶
Algorithm JSON Label: SU-ES384¶
Algorithm CBOR Label: 2¶
Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented¶
JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): Section 6.1.11 of this specification¶
Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a¶

8.1.2.3. Single-Use JWP using ES512 Algorithm

Algorithm Name: Single-Use JWP using ES512¶
Algorithm JSON Label: SU-ES512¶
Algorithm CBOR Label: 3¶
Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented¶
JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): Section 6.1.11 of this specification¶
Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a¶

8.1.2.4. BBS using SHA-256 Algorithm

Algorithm Name: BBS using SHA-256¶
Algorithm JSON Label: BBS¶
Algorithm CBOR Label: 4¶
Algorithm Description: Corresponds to a ciphersuite identifier of BBS_BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_H2G_HM2S_¶
Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented¶
JWP Implementation Requirements: Required¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): Section 6.2.1 of this specification¶
Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a¶

8.1.2.5. MAC-H256 Algorithm

Algorithm Name: MAC-H256¶
Algorithm JSON Label: MAC-H256¶
Algorithm CBOR Label: 5¶
Algorithm Description: MAC-H256 uses HMAC SHA-256 as the MAC, and ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256 for the signatures¶
Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented¶
JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.8 of this specification¶
Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a¶

8.1.2.6. MAC-H384 Algorithm

Algorithm Name: MAC-H384¶
Algorithm JSON Label: MAC-H384¶
Algorithm CBOR Label: 6¶
Algorithm Description: MAC-H384 uses HMAC SHA-384 as the MAC, and ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384 for the signatures¶
Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented¶
JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.8 of this specification¶
Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a¶

8.1.2.7. MAC-H512 Algorithm

Algorithm Name: MAC-H512¶
Algorithm JSON Label: MAC-H512¶
Algorithm CBOR Label: 7¶
Algorithm Description: MAC-H512 uses HMAC SHA-512 as the MAC, and ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512 for the signatures¶
Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented¶
JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.8 of this specification¶
Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a¶

8.1.2.8. MAC-K25519 Algorithm

Algorithm Name: MAC-K25519¶
Algorithm JSON Label: MAC-K25519¶
Algorithm CBOR Label: 8¶
Algorithm Description: MAC-K25519 uses KMAC SHAKE128 as the MAC, and EdDSA using Curve25519 for the signatures¶
Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented¶
JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.8 of this specification¶
Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a¶

8.1.2.9. MAC-K448 Algorithm

Algorithm Name: MAC-K448¶
Algorithm JSON Label: MAC-K448¶
Algorithm CBOR Label: 9¶
Algorithm Description: MAC-K448 uses KMAC SHAKE256 as the MAC, and EdDSA using Curve448 for the signatures¶
Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented¶
JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.8 of this specification¶
Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a¶

8.1.2.10. MAC-H256K Algorithm

Algorithm Name: MAC-H256K¶
Algorithm JSON Label: MAC-H256K¶
Algorithm CBOR Label: 10¶
Algorithm Description: MAC-H256K uses HMAC SHA-256 as the MAC, and ECDSA using secp256k1 and SHA-256 for the signatures¶
Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented¶
JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.8 of this specification¶
Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a¶

Appendix A. Example JWPs

The following examples use algorithms defined in JSON Proof Algorithms and also contain the keys used, so that implementations can validate these samples.¶

A.1. Example JSON-Serialized Single-Use JWP

This example uses the Single-Use Algorithm as defined in JSON Proof Algorithms to create a JSON Proof Token. It demonstrates how to apply selective disclosure using an array of traditional JWS-based signatures. Unlinkability is only achieved by using each JWP one time, as multiple uses are inherently linkable via the traditional ECDSA signature embedded in the proof.¶

To begin, we need two asymmetric keys for Single Use: one that represents the JPT Issuer's stable key and the other is an ephemeral key generated by the Issuer just for this JWP.¶

This is the Issuer's stable private key used in this example in the JWK format:¶

{
  "kty": "EC",
  "crv": "P-256",
  "x": "ZhVZJFHxlBkUW0DK_WNron9byyZPbJUG99IiZDXbc9s",
  "y": "laWbUT98ryPQUUcEbV10KlfSbnJEH8mpfbLAdnfr9v4",
  "d": "qQextxfsVexBHjSHRODE9tLOmuZ_iU1On-qjve-Nyds"
}

Figure 1: Issuer Private Key (ES256 in JWK)

This is the ephemeral private key used in this example in the JWK format:¶

{
  "kty": "EC",
  "crv": "P-256",
  "x": "KHr0lY1WI3FQFwfxjhG8SXgf1UN895KaOKujrjGpFsA",
  "y": "CzRbfce621xVNZXn8dANMwVvbJnfrD-yZdRztRenJrw",
  "d": "z-bSwal79kiVWyWhJeE6rC61oHr5f8Am04CiEwQROGg"
}

Figure 2: Issuer Ephemeral Private Key (ES256 in JWK)

This is the Holder's presentation private key used in this example in the JWK format:¶

{
  "kty": "EC",
  "crv": "P-256",
  "x": "1AhQhxSTcCBPzUAd0nLDESEnR6-BmmQXkncn1TgC9NM",
  "y": "YQ-zyHTHVDblu82o6SXmyR46VHneREk43jtOUz0O3EY",
  "d": "MubQMvUfn8lYIVcq-_Yr5ad9FEwUCYQinmvBHqOSHsI"
}

Figure 3: Holder Presentation Private Key (ES256 in JWK)

The JWP Protected Header declares that the data structure is a JPT and the JWP Proof Input is secured using the Single-Use ECDSA algorithm with the P-256 curve and SHA-256 digest. It also includes the ephemeral public key, the Holder's presentation public key and list of claims used for this JPT.¶

{
  "alg": "SU-ES256",
  "typ": "JPT",
  "iss": "https://issuer.example",
  "claims": [
    "iat",
    "exp",
    "family_name",
    "given_name",
    "email",
    "address",
    "age_over_21"
  ],
  "proof_key": {
    "kty": "EC",
    "crv": "P-256",
    "x": "KHr0lY1WI3FQFwfxjhG8SXgf1UN895KaOKujrjGpFsA",
    "y": "CzRbfce621xVNZXn8dANMwVvbJnfrD-yZdRztRenJrw"
  },
  "presentation_key": {
    "kty": "EC",
    "crv": "P-256",
    "x": "1AhQhxSTcCBPzUAd0nLDESEnR6-BmmQXkncn1TgC9NM",
    "y": "YQ-zyHTHVDblu82o6SXmyR46VHneREk43jtOUz0O3EY"
  }
}

Figure 4: Issuer Protected header (SU-ES256, JSON)
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Figure 5: Encoded Issuer Protected Header (SU-ES256, JSON, encoded)

The Single Use algorithm utilizes multiple individual JWS Signatures. Each signature value is generated by creating a JWS with a single Protected Header with the associated alg value. In this example, the fixed header used for each JWS is the serialized JSON Object {"alg":"ES256"}. This protected header will be used to generate a signature over each corresponding payload in the JWP. The corresponding octet value in the proof is the octet string (base64url-decoded) value of the signature.¶

The final proof value from the Issuer is an array with the octets of the header signature, followed by entries for each payload signature.¶

[
    1714521600,
    1717199999,
    "Doe",
    "Jay",
    "jaydoe@example.org",
    {
        "formatted": "1234 Main St.\nAnytown, CA 12345\nUSA",
        "street_address": "1234 Main St.",
        "locality": "Anytown",
        "region": "CA",
        "postal_code": 12345,
        "country": "USA"
    },
    true
]

Figure 6: Issuer payloads (JSON, as array)

The resulting JSON serialized JPT using the above examples is:¶

{
  "issuer": "eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpQVCIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBz
       Oi8vaXNzdWVyLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJjbGFpbXMiOlsiaWF0IiwiZXhwIiwiZmFtaW
       x5X25hbWUiLCJnaXZlbl9uYW1lIiwiZW1haWwiLCJhZGRyZXNzIiwiYWdlX292
       ZXJfMjEiXSwicHJvb2Zfa2V5Ijp7Imt0eSI6IkVDIiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYiLC
       J4IjoiS0hyMGxZMVdJM0ZRRndmeGpoRzhTWGdmMVVOODk1S2FPS3VqcmpHcEZz
       QSIsInkiOiJDelJiZmNlNjIxeFZOWlhuOGRBTk13VnZiSm5mckQteVpkUnp0Um
       VuSnJ3In0sInByZXNlbnRhdGlvbl9rZXkiOnsia3R5IjoiRUMiLCJjcnYiOiJQ
       LTI1NiIsIngiOiIxQWhRaHhTVGNDQlB6VUFkMG5MREVTRW5SNi1CbW1RWGtuY2
       4xVGdDOU5NIiwieSI6IllRLXp5SFRIVkRibHU4Mm82U1hteVI0NlZIbmVSRWs0
       M2p0T1V6ME8zRVkifX0",
  "payloads": [
    "MTcxNDUyMTYwMA",
    "MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ",
    "IkRvZSI",
    "IkpheSI",
    "ImpheWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI",
    "eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuXG5Bbnl0b3duLCBDQSAxMjM0NVxu
       VVNBIiwic3RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuIiwibG9jYWxpdH
       kiOiJBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI6MTIzNDUs
       ImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ",
    "dHJ1ZQ"
  ],
  "proof": [
    "zrmdkK8UjpTYq9YhBWEBhaNf3X5jvv1CefSyhuq-z_vVGwFjG2zJWM190Uu_bKId
       DUMMWPH-SBOUWCu8LvyrSw",
    "G51QRo8Q-dF2M1zjY2pgLyk4CxSe4jRR9qmL_XWXSB8E2K_dhY9cTsuNOHFr63vB
       3Bn_FDwjPek0pRdcLV1e9A",
    "VXWtLm08ENdUbyeuztqL55F4PzSihmg_0nHgXaH6CiuyjgqZPrbX1T2xRp6aDukD
       LaJTXkdY_mQ3HdRcYKk0dA",
    "-inIsdk-1EEcDybKpN_YljymC9MHSSTyt83AzatsuI2PPuVtWfz1f1DGc6pPY4l4
       QQsbj8fgOwB8KlOttMJauQ",
    "EAnIR4HZ4Q-3pG2RWIAo51zzdTNda6r_Vt2xK0GUjqrUcqpJ0bUK43LxOq43VxgS
       7T1gBfo3H1Mhkv3RVVajcQ",
    "uF3paoiqJbk4GAFW4mj2Iz0FRPvT0COf09t9l3drNejFCw_KcwF9PKJvSzhVJ_cv
       A-d_mueS34Ar40Zlif90XQ",
    "ARN3jDMqkQgxjA3Zld0OIRUe6yt41Yc5KlNHaTlGy5JeoL1bhQUtRPy92TUgY_uR
       WFZBp449tJ_uemjwfwCh0Q",
    "Hs-JWMv-bIwM7DfNfWQclRbCNBCRk_jI3vYNLqzTXoHwrn99wOepr_MNSQJE5Py-
       RpNcLf2B6OIckkq9UHtXeg"
  ]
}

Figure 7: Issued JWP (SU-ES256, JSON Serialization)

The compact serialization of the same JPT is:¶
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.MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~Imp
heWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI~eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuXG5Bbnl0
b3duLCBDQSAxMjM0NVxuVVNBIiwic3RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuI
iwibG9jYWxpdHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI6MT
IzNDUsImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~dHJ1ZQ.zrmdkK8UjpTYq9YhBWEBhaNf3X5jvv1Ce
fSyhuq-z_vVGwFjG2zJWM190Uu_bKIdDUMMWPH-SBOUWCu8LvyrSw~G51QRo8Q-dF2M1z
jY2pgLyk4CxSe4jRR9qmL_XWXSB8E2K_dhY9cTsuNOHFr63vB3Bn_FDwjPek0pRdcLV1e
9A~VXWtLm08ENdUbyeuztqL55F4PzSihmg_0nHgXaH6CiuyjgqZPrbX1T2xRp6aDukDLa
JTXkdY_mQ3HdRcYKk0dA~-inIsdk-1EEcDybKpN_YljymC9MHSSTyt83AzatsuI2PPuVt
Wfz1f1DGc6pPY4l4QQsbj8fgOwB8KlOttMJauQ~EAnIR4HZ4Q-3pG2RWIAo51zzdTNda6
r_Vt2xK0GUjqrUcqpJ0bUK43LxOq43VxgS7T1gBfo3H1Mhkv3RVVajcQ~uF3paoiqJbk4
GAFW4mj2Iz0FRPvT0COf09t9l3drNejFCw_KcwF9PKJvSzhVJ_cvA-d_mueS34Ar40Zli
f90XQ~ARN3jDMqkQgxjA3Zld0OIRUe6yt41Yc5KlNHaTlGy5JeoL1bhQUtRPy92TUgY_u
RWFZBp449tJ_uemjwfwCh0Q~Hs-JWMv-bIwM7DfNfWQclRbCNBCRk_jI3vYNLqzTXoHwr
n99wOepr_MNSQJE5Py-RpNcLf2B6OIckkq9UHtXeg

Figure 8: Issued JWP (SU-ES256, Compact Serialization)

To present this JPT, we first use the following presentation header with a nonce (provided by the Verifier):¶

{
  "alg": "SU-ES256",
  "aud": "https://recipient.example.com",
  "nonce": "mEpAMjjV1kuc_Upc4sNZ3Hb9nN7FfiUZYaDOQlNPvBI"
}

Figure 9: Presentation Header (SU-ES256, JSON)

eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vcmVjaXBpZW50LmV4YW1wbGUuY
29tIiwibm9uY2UiOiJtRXBBTWpqVjFrdWNfVXBjNHNOWjNIYjluTjdGZmlVWllhRE9RbE
5QdkJJIn0

Figure 10: Presentation Header (SU-ES256, JSON, encoded)

When signed with the holder's presentation key, the resulting signature are:¶

yP_BBM3ngMsY-9LQShAyu_F-3afuFK9JrY0jEKGDHLbZZPZEt5pHV0ywXEmTz-e2bVN8w
3OQ87oeoJP_jBk5Vg

Figure: Holder Proof-of-Possession (SU-ES256 for JSON serializations)¶

Then by applying selective disclosure of only the given name and age claims (family name and email hidden), we get the following presented JPT:¶

{
  "presentation": "eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vcmVjaX
       BpZW50LmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwibm9uY2UiOiJtRXBBTWpqVjFrdWNfVXBjNHNO
       WjNIYjluTjdGZmlVWllhRE9RbE5QdkJJIn0",
  "issuer": "eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpQVCIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBz
       Oi8vaXNzdWVyLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJjbGFpbXMiOlsiaWF0IiwiZXhwIiwiZmFtaW
       x5X25hbWUiLCJnaXZlbl9uYW1lIiwiZW1haWwiLCJhZGRyZXNzIiwiYWdlX292
       ZXJfMjEiXSwicHJvb2Zfa2V5Ijp7Imt0eSI6IkVDIiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYiLC
       J4IjoiS0hyMGxZMVdJM0ZRRndmeGpoRzhTWGdmMVVOODk1S2FPS3VqcmpHcEZz
       QSIsInkiOiJDelJiZmNlNjIxeFZOWlhuOGRBTk13VnZiSm5mckQteVpkUnp0Um
       VuSnJ3In0sInByZXNlbnRhdGlvbl9rZXkiOnsia3R5IjoiRUMiLCJjcnYiOiJQ
       LTI1NiIsIngiOiIxQWhRaHhTVGNDQlB6VUFkMG5MREVTRW5SNi1CbW1RWGtuY2
       4xVGdDOU5NIiwieSI6IllRLXp5SFRIVkRibHU4Mm82U1hteVI0NlZIbmVSRWs0
       M2p0T1V6ME8zRVkifX0",
  "payloads": [
    "MTcxNDUyMTYwMA",
    "MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ",
    "IkRvZSI",
    "IkpheSI",
    "ImpheWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI",
    "eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuXG5Bbnl0b3duLCBDQSAxMjM0NVxu
       VVNBIiwic3RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuIiwibG9jYWxpdH
       kiOiJBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI6MTIzNDUs
       ImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ",
    "dHJ1ZQ",
    null,
    null
  ],
  "proof": [
    "zrmdkK8UjpTYq9YhBWEBhaNf3X5jvv1CefSyhuq-z_vVGwFjG2zJWM190Uu_bKId
       DUMMWPH-SBOUWCu8LvyrSw",
    "yP_BBM3ngMsY-9LQShAyu_F-3afuFK9JrY0jEKGDHLbZZPZEt5pHV0ywXEmTz-e2
       bVN8w3OQ87oeoJP_jBk5Vg",
    "G51QRo8Q-dF2M1zjY2pgLyk4CxSe4jRR9qmL_XWXSB8E2K_dhY9cTsuNOHFr63vB
       3Bn_FDwjPek0pRdcLV1e9A",
    "VXWtLm08ENdUbyeuztqL55F4PzSihmg_0nHgXaH6CiuyjgqZPrbX1T2xRp6aDukD
       LaJTXkdY_mQ3HdRcYKk0dA",
    "-inIsdk-1EEcDybKpN_YljymC9MHSSTyt83AzatsuI2PPuVtWfz1f1DGc6pPY4l4
       QQsbj8fgOwB8KlOttMJauQ",
    "EAnIR4HZ4Q-3pG2RWIAo51zzdTNda6r_Vt2xK0GUjqrUcqpJ0bUK43LxOq43VxgS
       7T1gBfo3H1Mhkv3RVVajcQ",
    "uF3paoiqJbk4GAFW4mj2Iz0FRPvT0COf09t9l3drNejFCw_KcwF9PKJvSzhVJ_cv
       A-d_mueS34Ar40Zlif90XQ"
  ]
}

Figure: Presentation (SU-ES256, JSON Serialization)¶

And also in compact serialization:¶

eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vcmVjaXBpZW50LmV4YW1wbGUuY
29tIiwibm9uY2UiOiJtRXBBTWpqVjFrdWNfVXBjNHNOWjNIYjluTjdGZmlVWllhRE9RbE
5QdkJJIn0.eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpQVCIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8
vaXNzdWVyLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJjbGFpbXMiOlsiaWF0IiwiZXhwIiwiZmFtaWx5X25hbWUi
LCJnaXZlbl9uYW1lIiwiZW1haWwiLCJhZGRyZXNzIiwiYWdlX292ZXJfMjEiXSwicHJvb
2Zfa2V5Ijp7Imt0eSI6IkVDIiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYiLCJ4IjoiS0hyMGxZMVdJM0ZRRn
dmeGpoRzhTWGdmMVVOODk1S2FPS3VqcmpHcEZzQSIsInkiOiJDelJiZmNlNjIxeFZOWlh
uOGRBTk13VnZiSm5mckQteVpkUnp0UmVuSnJ3In0sInByZXNlbnRhdGlvbl9rZXkiOnsi
a3R5IjoiRUMiLCJjcnYiOiJQLTI1NiIsIngiOiIxQWhRaHhTVGNDQlB6VUFkMG5MREVTR
W5SNi1CbW1RWGtuY24xVGdDOU5NIiwieSI6IllRLXp5SFRIVkRibHU4Mm82U1hteVI0Nl
ZIbmVSRWs0M2p0T1V6ME8zRVkifX0.MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~I
kpheSI~ImpheWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI~eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3
QuXG5Bbnl0b3duLCBDQSAxMjM0NVxuVVNBIiwic3RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1
haW4gU3QuIiwibG9jYWxpdHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxf
Y29kZSI6MTIzNDUsImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~dHJ1ZQ~~.zrmdkK8UjpTYq9YhBWEBh
aNf3X5jvv1CefSyhuq-z_vVGwFjG2zJWM190Uu_bKIdDUMMWPH-SBOUWCu8LvyrSw~yP_
BBM3ngMsY-9LQShAyu_F-3afuFK9JrY0jEKGDHLbZZPZEt5pHV0ywXEmTz-e2bVN8w3OQ
87oeoJP_jBk5Vg~G51QRo8Q-dF2M1zjY2pgLyk4CxSe4jRR9qmL_XWXSB8E2K_dhY9cTs
uNOHFr63vB3Bn_FDwjPek0pRdcLV1e9A~VXWtLm08ENdUbyeuztqL55F4PzSihmg_0nHg
XaH6CiuyjgqZPrbX1T2xRp6aDukDLaJTXkdY_mQ3HdRcYKk0dA~-inIsdk-1EEcDybKpN
_YljymC9MHSSTyt83AzatsuI2PPuVtWfz1f1DGc6pPY4l4QQsbj8fgOwB8KlOttMJauQ~
EAnIR4HZ4Q-3pG2RWIAo51zzdTNda6r_Vt2xK0GUjqrUcqpJ0bUK43LxOq43VxgS7T1gB
fo3H1Mhkv3RVVajcQ~uF3paoiqJbk4GAFW4mj2Iz0FRPvT0COf09t9l3drNejFCw_KcwF
9PKJvSzhVJ_cvA-d_mueS34Ar40Zlif90XQ

Figure: Presentation (SU-ES256, Compact Serialization)¶

A.2. Example CBOR-Serialized Single-Use CPT

This example is meant to mirror the prior JSON serialization, using RFC8392 and claims from [I-D.maldant-spice-oidc-cwt], illustrated using [I-D.ietf-cbor-edn-literals] (EDN).¶

To simplify this example, the same information is represented as the JPT example above, including the same public and private keys.¶

{          / protected header /
  1: 1,     / alg: "SU-ES256" /
  3: 20,    / typ: "JPT" (20CPA) /
  5: "https://issuer.example",  / iss: "https://issuer.example" /
  6: [      / claims /
    6,      / "iat" /
    4,      / "exp" /
    170,    / "family_name" (I-D.maldant-spice-oidc-cwt TBD1) /
    171,    / "given_name"  (I-D.maldant-spice-oidc-cwt TBD2) /
    179,    / "email"       (I-D.maldant-spice-oidc-cwt TBD10) /
    187,    / "address"     (I-D.maldant-spice-oidc-cwt TBD18) /
    "age_over_21"
  ],
  8: {      / proof key /
    1: 2,   / kty : "EC2" /
    -1: 1,  / crv: "P-256" /
    -2: h'd4085087149370204fcd401dd272c311212747af819a6417927727d5' +
        h'3802f4d3', / x /
    -3: h'610fb3c874c75436e5bbcda8e925e6c91e3a5479de444938de3b4e53' +
        h'3d0edc46'  / y /
  },
  9: {      / presentation key /
    1: 2,   / kty: "EC2" /
    -1: 1,  / crv: "P-256" /
    -2: h'287af4958d562371501707f18e11bc49781fd5437cf7929a38aba3ae' +
        h'31a916c0', / x /
    -3: h'0b345b7dc7badb5c553595e7f1d00d33056f6c99dfac3fb265d473b5' +
        h'17a726bc'  / y /
  }
}

Figure: Issuer Protected Header (SU-ES256, CBOR)¶

[ / payloads    /
  / iat         / 171452160,
  / exp         / 171719999,
  / family_name / "Doe",
  / given_name  / "Jay",
  / email       / "jaydoe@example.org",
  / address     / {
    / formatted / 1: "1234 Main St.\nAnytown, CA 12345\nUSA",
    / street    / 2: "1234 Main St.",
    / locality  / 3: "Anytown",
    / region    / 4: "CA",
    / post code / 5: "90210",
    / country   / 6: "USA"
  },
  / age_over_21 / true
]

Figure: Issuer Payloads (as CBOR array)¶

When signed and serialized, the CPT is represented by the following CBOR (in hex):¶
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Fixtures: Issued Form (SU-ES256, CBOR)¶

The presented form, similarly to the issued form above, is made with the holder conveying the same parameters and the same set of selectively disclosed payloads as the JPT above:¶

{          / protected header /
  1: 1,    / alg: "SU-ES256" /
  6: "https://recipient.example.com", / aud /
  7: h'984a403238d5d64b9cfd4a5ce2c359dc76fd9cdec57e251961a0ce42534fbc12', / nonce /
}

Figure: Holder Protected Header (SU-ES256, CBOR)¶

When the appropriate proof is generated, the CPT is serialized into the following CBOR (in hex):¶
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Figure: Presented Form (SU-ES256, CBOR)¶

A.3. Example BBS JWP

The following example uses the BBS algorithm.¶

This is the Issuer's stable private key in the JWK format:¶

{
  "kty": "EC2",
  "alg": "BBS",
  "use": "proof",
  "crv": "BLS12381G2",
  "x": "CPNhsFIuGshbcLJ1GAhqIhKawpTFe8WNphb6IJgUdpl5YhrnYvYjiKeIzlOs_
       p3CB8VmFTAlvb2lTYmpdzTSpAHBPf6uEPQZlJi5oUM6E73bVFXMItGfI7sJVhn
       h67Pj",
  "y": "BmWAa-IoYrnB4z8_9PzxZN4lF9-X1HiIt84nhWxB235y6V2yn-E63IdT6H43-
       ak0FUUL3PbDxk_X5Xf0WYglOSVBDlIAYx5S8_tTzRnIpl7Alx6DyNxTw5z8D-U
       36QCn",
  "d": "MfJf06PQxxJHnVIuytbQeQ-NUiM5Swwx3dm-lky5vfQ"
}

Figure 11: BBS private key in JWK format

There is no additional holder key necessary for presentation proofs.¶

For the following protected header and array of payloads:¶

{
  "kid": "HjfcpyjuZQ-O8Ye2hQnNbT9RbbnrobptdnExR0DUjU8",
  "alg": "BBS"
}

Figure 12: Example issuer protected header

These components are signed using the private issuer key previously given, which is then representable in the following serializations:¶

{
  "issuer": "eyJraWQiOiJIamZjcHlqdVpRLU84WWUyaFFuTmJUOVJiYm5yb2JwdGRu
       RXhSMERValU4IiwiYWxnIjoiQkJTIn0",
  "payloads": [
    "MTcxNDUyMTYwMA",
    "MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ",
    "IkRvZSI",
    "IkpheSI",
    "ImpheWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI",
    "eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuXG5Bbnl0b3duLCBDQSAxMjM0NVxu
       VVNBIiwic3RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuIiwibG9jYWxpdH
       kiOiJBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI6MTIzNDUs
       ImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ",
    "dHJ1ZQ"
  ],
  "proof": [
    "oqpH_oAnYKjcJdbc0FgsBiLEXY9MJh-A9Tf0EK5zGLdlqOgxy1BgDXDi3wfKHMOD
       LuTiWjC8D2NsaxE7Ro7emgPFkp17Up7TKxx-7JzwGh0"
  ]
}

Figure 13: Issued JWP (JSON serialization)

eyJraWQiOiJIamZjcHlqdVpRLU84WWUyaFFuTmJUOVJiYm5yb2JwdGRuRXhSMERValU4I
iwiYWxnIjoiQkJTIn0.MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~Imph
eWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI~eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuXG5Bbnl0b
3duLCBDQSAxMjM0NVxuVVNBIiwic3RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuIi
wibG9jYWxpdHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI6MTI
zNDUsImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~dHJ1ZQ.oqpH_oAnYKjcJdbc0FgsBiLEXY9MJh-A9T
f0EK5zGLdlqOgxy1BgDXDi3wfKHMODLuTiWjC8D2NsaxE7Ro7emgPFkp17Up7TKxx-7Jz
wGh0

Figure 14: Issued JWP (compact serialization)

For a presentation with the following presentation header:¶

{
    "alg": "BBS",
    "aud": "https://recipient.example.com",
    "nonce": "wrmBRkKtXjQ"
}

Figure 15: Holder Presentation Header

The holder decides to share all information other than the email address, and generates a proof. That proof is represented in the following serializations:¶

{
  "presentation": "eyJhbGciOiJCQlMiLCJhdWQiOiJodHRwczovL3JlY2lwaWVudC
       5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsIm5vbmNlIjoid3JtQlJrS3RYalEifQ",
  "issuer": "eyJraWQiOiJIamZjcHlqdVpRLU84WWUyaFFuTmJUOVJiYm5yb2JwdGRu
       RXhSMERValU4IiwiYWxnIjoiQkJTIn0",
  "payloads": [
    "MTcxNDUyMTYwMA",
    "MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ",
    "IkRvZSI",
    "IkpheSI",
    null,
    null,
    null
  ],
  "proof": [
    "sHuXfD6AB_3-ZcvWjGD2Q3Twb-Lp7ZsuisgSrvTYxHnmnNI7PE-1RvWfKlgMUV5h
       jZNRuN8yXL-X1o1KZmifOyco95NXqtW9SNehyno-Z0T3_bugUMJcvYcZNz17uN
       DNqmxR5QBKPcBD2WZynKckip22wtlv0iDQqqShmWPmdFV0vagAuQ4asC5ciHNE
       5iXdHgXbdshjq6mB09Rt-nlH0QfRWIxrw9ctf3306CUFNIsM4LGbz2iDsSPZT6
       KobIYNBGL2hc0vwvTLHmnsRGu08BReDgD0yuFAkzK7bOvocKqP-q74BDhCne3w
       gWEUOVhmViq57Fps6t97w_IuZIBoOLet2IimTnqzCkFgxvcZuRcmOnKvsk_gPw
       YQ1V1Ul1Xd_koy-ynE5a8Cog79NdJDhAJkgEXKxkqd5Jr0TKPgb8CVUTof67H6
       8r0YQ8GPMRoyTEKa09F1FOphxz4piTSPc5GopbUnaC2ixFxFaw72jII"
  ]
}

Figure 16: Presentation JWP (JSON serialization)

eyJhbGciOiJCQlMiLCJhdWQiOiJodHRwczovL3JlY2lwaWVudC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsI
m5vbmNlIjoid3JtQlJrS3RYalEifQ.eyJraWQiOiJIamZjcHlqdVpRLU84WWUyaFFuTmJ
UOVJiYm5yb2JwdGRuRXhSMERValU4IiwiYWxnIjoiQkJTIn0.MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxN
zE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~~~.sHuXfD6AB_3-ZcvWjGD2Q3Twb-Lp7ZsuisgSrvTY
xHnmnNI7PE-1RvWfKlgMUV5hjZNRuN8yXL-X1o1KZmifOyco95NXqtW9SNehyno-Z0T3_
bugUMJcvYcZNz17uNDNqmxR5QBKPcBD2WZynKckip22wtlv0iDQqqShmWPmdFV0vagAuQ
4asC5ciHNE5iXdHgXbdshjq6mB09Rt-nlH0QfRWIxrw9ctf3306CUFNIsM4LGbz2iDsSP
ZT6KobIYNBGL2hc0vwvTLHmnsRGu08BReDgD0yuFAkzK7bOvocKqP-q74BDhCne3wgWEU
OVhmViq57Fps6t97w_IuZIBoOLet2IimTnqzCkFgxvcZuRcmOnKvsk_gPwYQ1V1Ul1Xd_
koy-ynE5a8Cog79NdJDhAJkgEXKxkqd5Jr0TKPgb8CVUTof67H68r0YQ8GPMRoyTEKa09
F1FOphxz4piTSPc5GopbUnaC2ixFxFaw72jII

Figure 17: Presentation JWP (compact serialization)

A.4. Example MAC JWP

The following example uses the MAC-H256 algorithm.¶

This is the Issuer's stable private key in the JWK format:¶

{
  "kty": "EC",
  "crv": "P-256",
  "x": "ZhVZJFHxlBkUW0DK_WNron9byyZPbJUG99IiZDXbc9s",
  "y": "laWbUT98ryPQUUcEbV10KlfSbnJEH8mpfbLAdnfr9v4",
  "d": "qQextxfsVexBHjSHRODE9tLOmuZ_iU1On-qjve-Nyds"
}

Figure 18: Issuer private key

This is the Issuer's ephemerally generated shared secret:¶

"HVQolImQvC54AnvC4QI7W9Rd7VFVV6mvbGUiVIbwPag"

Figure 19: Shared Secret

This is the Holder's presentation private key in the JWK format:¶

{
  "kty": "EC",
  "crv": "P-256",
  "x": "1AhQhxSTcCBPzUAd0nLDESEnR6-BmmQXkncn1TgC9NM",
  "y": "YQ-zyHTHVDblu82o6SXmyR46VHneREk43jtOUz0O3EY",
  "d": "MubQMvUfn8lYIVcq-_Yr5ad9FEwUCYQinmvBHqOSHsI"
}

Figure 20: Holder private key

For the following protected header and array of payloads:¶

{
  "alg": "MAC-H256",
  "typ": "JPT",
  "iss": "https://issuer.example",
  "claims": [
    "iat",
    "exp",
    "family_name",
    "given_name",
    "email",
    "address",
    "age_over_21"
  ],
  "presentation_key": {
    "kty": "EC",
    "crv": "P-256",
    "use": "sign",
    "x": "1AhQhxSTcCBPzUAd0nLDESEnR6-BmmQXkncn1TgC9NM",
    "y": "YQ-zyHTHVDblu82o6SXmyR46VHneREk43jtOUz0O3EY"
  }
}

Figure 21: Example issuer protected header

[
    1714521600,
    1717199999,
    "Doe",
    "Jay",
    "jaydoe@example.org",
    {
        "formatted": "1234 Main St.\nAnytown, CA 12345\nUSA",
        "street_address": "1234 Main St.",
        "locality": "Anytown",
        "region": "CA",
        "postal_code": 12345,
        "country": "USA"
    },
    true
]

Figure 22: Example issuer payloads (as members of a JSON array)

The first MAC is generated using the key issuer_header and a value of the issuer protected header as a UTF-8 encoded octet string. This results in the following MAC:¶

YYHHwhvU1tVhcK1zN5CkXBfvDFsm4tY_HVTVf2p10O8

Figure 23: Issuer MAC of protected header (base64url-encoded)

The issuer generates an array of derived keys with one for each payload by using the shared secret as the key, and the index of the payload (as payload_{n} in UTF-8 encoded octets) as the input in a HMAC operation. This results in the following set of derived keys:¶

[
  "4T2lKcj1YTAiUr3k8EzrXlcBBCvQQRwxFtyGN1eAApY",
  "6bRnNq0SPTW-KE5rYLEmikC4YGzTjLLcvbcCXb4LTrg",
  "tb0d8jSKJAGeykc8-96bkcpxUTrUc7pfMYM22xwt7Tg",
  "SfAZDT4GfGHSH42zmrqcWm0E5cJ4cAIx7GD5BHro4pM",
  "kbcrH29vlwpqo4yLBFmECHzcq0hLz5i3W3EQOWuFKmA",
  "GcN1Vc7zFPbsOtEaArAGwh0SwHIuPTCxAZKOkPwCqbw",
  "HsgHn76DJjaXTy4LGjTF6ajnT4Zgni2VLsqJSijuW9A"
]

Figure 24: Derived payload keys (base64url-encoded)

A MAC is generated for each payload using the corresponding derived payload key. This results in the following set of MAC values:¶

[
  "h1IMAGXygf18EwpAZQnvvrLCSt6MLuqYzz8FZ7d4Vrk",
  "_R6zCjt1OgScZan8TkUt9Q6oL6CNrUutyTBUX0il-2E",
  "lEZkmHOBLi_qgxAZ4CdyMmqtrNRuWkDnn0cSPEO-lG0",
  "trIjeFn8c92m94kNpF0d81x4B7-DUodDLGkppAfU4ec",
  "jC2sC2gy-QnB1X3bjfvP8MpxNyS4KKJTl7Pq6AHEjpc",
  "5fn0LQdI9YzF7F45MJ4Omhd-uph9tPKGd8OlKCu7MII",
  "Bs18z1FCT_eTEOOH9Rya9brfXTiLf2z5J1prXGffH7g"
]

Figure 25: Payload MAC values (base64url-encoded)

The issuer protected header MAC and the payload MAC octet strings are concatenated into a single value known as the combined MAC representation. This representation is signed with the issuer's private key.¶

The proof consists of two octet string values: the signature over the combined MAC representation, and the shared secret.¶

[
  "fLPFleRIM9131TyP4yGybjxt5QWA4DxIEBVGJ4X2voqhO8ocEgKEP4pbn9tMBrZ9S3
zzre5MeGuGkMxTcK8Elg",
  "7FuYs7jBew8oAkGV69b4XiLFtLAphbjgukq5AwbhfbA"
]

Figure 26: Issued Proof (base64url-encoded)

The final issued JWP in JSON serialization is:¶

{
  "issuer": "eyJhbGciOiJNQUMtSDI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpQVCIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBz
Oi8vaXNzdWVyLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJjbGFpbXMiOlsiaWF0IiwiZXhwIiwiZmFtaWx5X25hb
WUiLCJnaXZlbl9uYW1lIiwiZW1haWwiLCJhZGRyZXNzIiwiYWdlX292ZXJfMjEiXSwicH
Jlc2VudGF0aW9uX2tleSI6eyJrdHkiOiJFQyIsImNydiI6IlAtMjU2IiwidXNlIjoic2l
nbiIsIngiOiIxQWhRaHhTVGNDQlB6VUFkMG5MREVTRW5SNi1CbW1RWGtuY24xVGdDOU5N
IiwieSI6IllRLXp5SFRIVkRibHU4Mm82U1hteVI0NlZIbmVSRWs0M2p0T1V6ME8zRVkif
X0",
  "payloads": [
    "MTcxNDUyMTYwMA",
    "MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ",
    "IkRvZSI",
    "IkpheSI",
    "ImpheWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI",
    "eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuXG5Bbnl0b3duLCBDQSAxMjM0NVxu
VVNBIiwic3RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuIiwibG9jYWxpdHkiOiJBb
nl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI6MTIzNDUsImNvdW50cnkiOi
JVU0EifQ",
    "dHJ1ZQ"
  ],
  "proof": [
    "fLPFleRIM9131TyP4yGybjxt5QWA4DxIEBVGJ4X2voqhO8ocEgKEP4pbn9tMBrZ9
S3zzre5MeGuGkMxTcK8Elg",
    "7FuYs7jBew8oAkGV69b4XiLFtLAphbjgukq5AwbhfbA"
  ]
}

Figure 27: Issued JWP (in JSON serialization)

The same JWP in compact serialization:¶

eyJhbGciOiJNQUMtSDI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpQVCIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaXNzdWVyL
mV4YW1wbGUiLCJjbGFpbXMiOlsiaWF0IiwiZXhwIiwiZmFtaWx5X25hbWUiLCJnaXZlbl
9uYW1lIiwiZW1haWwiLCJhZGRyZXNzIiwiYWdlX292ZXJfMjEiXSwicHJlc2VudGF0aW9
uX2tleSI6eyJrdHkiOiJFQyIsImNydiI6IlAtMjU2IiwidXNlIjoic2lnbiIsIngiOiIx
QWhRaHhTVGNDQlB6VUFkMG5MREVTRW5SNi1CbW1RWGtuY24xVGdDOU5NIiwieSI6IllRL
Xp5SFRIVkRibHU4Mm82U1hteVI0NlZIbmVSRWs0M2p0T1V6ME8zRVkifX0.MTcxNDUyMT
YwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~ImpheWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI~eyJmb
3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuXG5Bbnl0b3duLCBDQSAxMjM0NVxuVVNBIiwic3
RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuIiwibG9jYWxpdHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIiw
icmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI6MTIzNDUsImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~d
HJ1ZQ.fLPFleRIM9131TyP4yGybjxt5QWA4DxIEBVGJ4X2voqhO8ocEgKEP4pbn9tMBrZ
9S3zzre5MeGuGkMxTcK8Elg~7FuYs7jBew8oAkGV69b4XiLFtLAphbjgukq5AwbhfbA

Figure 28: Issued JWP (in compact serialization)

Next, we show the presentation of the JWP with selective disclosure.¶

For presentation with the following presentation protected header:¶

{
  "alg": "MAC-H256",
  "aud": "https://recipient.example.com",
  "nonce": "mEpAMjjV1kuc_Upc4sNZ3Hb9nN7FfiUZYaDOQlNPvBI"
}

Figure 29: Presentation Protected Header

The holder will take the issuer proof (including shared secret) and derive the same individual payload MAC values (above).¶

In this case, the holder has decided not to disclose the last three claims provided by the issuer (corresponding to email, address, and age_over_21)¶

For the disclosed payloads, the holder will provide the corresponding derived key. For the non-disclosed payloads, the holder will provide the corresponding MAC value.¶

The final presented proof value is an array of octet strings. The contents are presentation header signature, followed by the issuer signature, then the value disclosed by the holder for each payload. This results in the following proof:¶

[
  "a_MZUFdODejuEat6Kd2rUoAplmhiXdoc_ZjxqaxFG8hEC35RMFg0gMXq4ThDi7vwo5
wHo6Gg-ufY3bpHzPY5uQ",
  "fLPFleRIM9131TyP4yGybjxt5QWA4DxIEBVGJ4X2voqhO8ocEgKEP4pbn9tMBrZ9S3
zzre5MeGuGkMxTcK8Elg",
  "4T2lKcj1YTAiUr3k8EzrXlcBBCvQQRwxFtyGN1eAApY",
  "6bRnNq0SPTW-KE5rYLEmikC4YGzTjLLcvbcCXb4LTrg",
  "tb0d8jSKJAGeykc8-96bkcpxUTrUc7pfMYM22xwt7Tg",
  "SfAZDT4GfGHSH42zmrqcWm0E5cJ4cAIx7GD5BHro4pM",
  "jC2sC2gy-QnB1X3bjfvP8MpxNyS4KKJTl7Pq6AHEjpc",
  "5fn0LQdI9YzF7F45MJ4Omhd-uph9tPKGd8OlKCu7MII",
  "Bs18z1FCT_eTEOOH9Rya9brfXTiLf2z5J1prXGffH7g"
]

Figure 30: Presentation proof (base64url-encoded)

The final presented JWP in JSON serialization is:¶

{
  "presentation": "eyJhbGciOiJNQUMtSDI1NiIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vcmVjaX
BpZW50LmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwibm9uY2UiOiJtRXBBTWpqVjFrdWNfVXBjNHNOWjNIYjl
uTjdGZmlVWllhRE9RbE5QdkJJIn0",
  "issuer": "eyJhbGciOiJNQUMtSDI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpQVCIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBz
Oi8vaXNzdWVyLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJjbGFpbXMiOlsiaWF0IiwiZXhwIiwiZmFtaWx5X25hb
WUiLCJnaXZlbl9uYW1lIiwiZW1haWwiLCJhZGRyZXNzIiwiYWdlX292ZXJfMjEiXSwicH
Jlc2VudGF0aW9uX2tleSI6eyJrdHkiOiJFQyIsImNydiI6IlAtMjU2IiwidXNlIjoic2l
nbiIsIngiOiIxQWhRaHhTVGNDQlB6VUFkMG5MREVTRW5SNi1CbW1RWGtuY24xVGdDOU5N
IiwieSI6IllRLXp5SFRIVkRibHU4Mm82U1hteVI0NlZIbmVSRWs0M2p0T1V6ME8zRVkif
X0",
  "payloads": [
    "MTcxNDUyMTYwMA",
    "MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ",
    "IkRvZSI",
    "IkpheSI",
    null,
    null,
    null
  ],
  "proof": [
    "a_MZUFdODejuEat6Kd2rUoAplmhiXdoc_ZjxqaxFG8hEC35RMFg0gMXq4ThDi7vw
o5wHo6Gg-ufY3bpHzPY5uQ",
    "fLPFleRIM9131TyP4yGybjxt5QWA4DxIEBVGJ4X2voqhO8ocEgKEP4pbn9tMBrZ9
S3zzre5MeGuGkMxTcK8Elg",
    "4T2lKcj1YTAiUr3k8EzrXlcBBCvQQRwxFtyGN1eAApY",
    "6bRnNq0SPTW-KE5rYLEmikC4YGzTjLLcvbcCXb4LTrg",
    "tb0d8jSKJAGeykc8-96bkcpxUTrUc7pfMYM22xwt7Tg",
    "SfAZDT4GfGHSH42zmrqcWm0E5cJ4cAIx7GD5BHro4pM",
    "jC2sC2gy-QnB1X3bjfvP8MpxNyS4KKJTl7Pq6AHEjpc",
    "5fn0LQdI9YzF7F45MJ4Omhd-uph9tPKGd8OlKCu7MII",
    "Bs18z1FCT_eTEOOH9Rya9brfXTiLf2z5J1prXGffH7g"
  ]
}

Figure 31: Presented JWP (in JSON serialization)

The same JWP in compact serialization:¶

eyJhbGciOiJNQUMtSDI1NiIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vcmVjaXBpZW50LmV4YW1wbGUuY
29tIiwibm9uY2UiOiJtRXBBTWpqVjFrdWNfVXBjNHNOWjNIYjluTjdGZmlVWllhRE9RbE
5QdkJJIn0.eyJhbGciOiJNQUMtSDI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpQVCIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8
vaXNzdWVyLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJjbGFpbXMiOlsiaWF0IiwiZXhwIiwiZmFtaWx5X25hbWUi
LCJnaXZlbl9uYW1lIiwiZW1haWwiLCJhZGRyZXNzIiwiYWdlX292ZXJfMjEiXSwicHJlc
2VudGF0aW9uX2tleSI6eyJrdHkiOiJFQyIsImNydiI6IlAtMjU2IiwidXNlIjoic2lnbi
IsIngiOiIxQWhRaHhTVGNDQlB6VUFkMG5MREVTRW5SNi1CbW1RWGtuY24xVGdDOU5NIiw
ieSI6IllRLXp5SFRIVkRibHU4Mm82U1hteVI0NlZIbmVSRWs0M2p0T1V6ME8zRVkifX0.
MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~~~.a_MZUFdODejuEat6Kd2r
UoAplmhiXdoc_ZjxqaxFG8hEC35RMFg0gMXq4ThDi7vwo5wHo6Gg-ufY3bpHzPY5uQ~fL
PFleRIM9131TyP4yGybjxt5QWA4DxIEBVGJ4X2voqhO8ocEgKEP4pbn9tMBrZ9S3zzre5
MeGuGkMxTcK8Elg~4T2lKcj1YTAiUr3k8EzrXlcBBCvQQRwxFtyGN1eAApY~6bRnNq0SP
TW-KE5rYLEmikC4YGzTjLLcvbcCXb4LTrg~tb0d8jSKJAGeykc8-96bkcpxUTrUc7pfMY
M22xwt7Tg~SfAZDT4GfGHSH42zmrqcWm0E5cJ4cAIx7GD5BHro4pM~jC2sC2gy-QnB1X3
bjfvP8MpxNyS4KKJTl7Pq6AHEjpc~5fn0LQdI9YzF7F45MJ4Omhd-uph9tPKGd8OlKCu7
MII~Bs18z1FCT_eTEOOH9Rya9brfXTiLf2z5J1prXGffH7g

Figure 32: Presented JWP (in compact serialization)